Keeping Autonomous Driving Alive by Both, Göde

Göde Both 


















      
  
 
Budrich Academic Press GmbH  
Opladen • Berlin • Toronto 2020 
© 2020 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 
4.0. (CC-BY-SA 4.0) 
It permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or 
format, as long as you share under the same license, give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made. 
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ 
© 2020 Dieses Werk ist beim Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH erschienen und steht 
unter der Creative Commons Lizenz Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC 
BY-SA 4.0):  
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ 
Diese Lizenz erlaubt die Verbreitung, Speicherung, Vervielfältigung und Bearbeitung 
bei Verwendung der gleichen CC-BY-SA 4.0-Lizenz und unter Angabe der 
UrheberInnen, Rechte, Änderungen und verwendeten Lizenz. 
 
This book is available as a free download from www.barbara-budrich.net 
(https://doi.org/10.3224/96665009). A paperback version is available at a charge. 
The page numbers of the open access edition correspond with the paperback edition. 
Diese Dissertation wurde von der Humanwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität 
zu Köln im November 2019 angenommen. 
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from 
Die Deutsche Bibliothek (The German Library) 
© 2020  by Budrich Academic Press, Opladen, Berlin & Toronto 
www. budrich-academic-press.de 
 
 ISBN  978-3-96665-009-0 
 eISBN 978-3-96665-983-3 
 DOI  10.3224/96665009 
Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme 
Ein Titeldatensatz für die Publikation ist bei Der Deutschen Bibliothek erhältlich. 
Budrich Academic Press 
Stauffenbergstr. 7. D-51379 Leverkusen Opladen, Germany 
86 Delma Drive. Toronto, ON M8W 4P6 Canada  
www. budrich-academic-press.de 
Jacket illustration by Bettina Lehfeldt, Kleinmachnow – www.lehfeldtgraphic.de 
Photo Credits: Göde Both 
Typesetting by Linda Kutzki, Berlin – www.textsalz.de 





Sustaining autonomous driving    12
Outline of the book   15
Some notes on language and the terms I use   16
Chapter 1 | Grounding the study   19
Theoretical approach   19
Humanist social science   19
More-than-human social science   21
Methodology   24
Technology and gender   25
Narratives and storytelling   26
Expectations, promises, and visions   27
Research design   28
Selecting a field site and negotiating access   31
Doing fieldwork and analysis   34
Chapter 2 | The AutoNOMOS project   39
The project members   39
Technological artifacts    42
A mosaic of visionary stories    45
From visions to street trials   53
Chapter 3 | Street trials   57
The “real world”   57
Assembling MiG   59
On the road   60
An imaginary of control   62
Encountering road users   65
The lonely, disembodied driver   66
Taking care of “him”    68
Reconciling tensions   71
6
Chapter 4 | Pioneers    75
Distancing from automobility   75
Identifying with racing   78
Masculinizing autonomous driving   80
Chapter 5 | Video demonstrations   93
a) The hero’s journey   94
b) The fake tutorial   99
Fragile demonstrator   102
Chapter 6 | Defending autonomous driving   103
Rejection   103
Accommodating rejection   108
a) Valuing being chauffeured over driving   109
b) Appeasing the audience   110
c) Celebrating control and technical mastery   111










It is a privilege and joy to thank the many people who have made this book 
possible. The research in this book would have impossible without the open-
ness of members of the field of research in autonomous driving. I am indebted 
to Raúl Rojas for granting me access to his robotics project. I thank all the 
project members for letting me shadow them and for sharing their stories and 
thoughts. 
I am thankful for the many scholars who helped me expand and clarify my 
research during numerous workshops, conferences, and colloquia, including 
Stefan Beck (†), Anna-Lena Berscheid, Andreas Bischof, Søsser Brodersen, 
Ivanche Dimitrievski, Maren Heibges, Shreeharsh Kelkar, Ulf Mellström, 
John Law, Jörg Niewöhner, Josefine Raasch, Estrid Sørensen, Lucy Suchman, 
Helen Verran, Judy Wajcman, Nathan Wittstock, and Yutaka Yoshinaka. 
Rachel Douglas-Jones, Christopher Gad, Brit Ross Whithereik, and other 
members of the ETHOS Lab offered helpful comments in the Technologies in 
Practice Salon at ITU Copenhagen. 
I finished writing this book at the Center for transdisciplinary Gender 
Studies at Humboldt-University Berlin and I am grateful for the encouragement 
of many people there, including Karin Alexander, Smilla Ebeling, Felici tas 
Günther, Simon Herchenbach, Gabrielle Jähnert, Anna Kraher, Kerstin Rosen-
busch, Sigrid Schmitz, and Marie Springborn. I thank Sumi Jessien of Budrich 
Academic Press for handling the publication process with care.
I owe a substantial debt to my PhD advisors, Diana Lengersdorf and 
Maja Horst, who always had an open ear for me when I needed it during 
my fieldwork and beyond. They were a constant source of encouragement 
and guidance. Diana Lengersdorf and Maja Horst have read the book’s draft 
and offered helpful comments that significantly improved the argument. My 
analysis and writing were also shaped through the autonomous working group 
Political Ethnography (http://akpe.org/). The working group gave me a home 
and a bearing while moving between universities and fields. I am indebted to 
the extensive support and encouragement of its members, including Sina Birk-
holz, Annett Bochmann, Johannes Coughlan, Alejandro Esguerra, Christiane 
Howe, Martina Kolanoski, Dörte Negnal, Yannik Porsché, Christine Preiser, 
Anna Sauerwein, Jan Schank, Thomas Scheffer, and Tim Seitz.
During the journey of pursuing my fieldwork and writing the book, 
I bene fited from the support and advice from many dispersed but close col-
leagues, including Corinna Bath, Sandra Buchmüller, Marisa Cohn, Sarah R. 
Davies, Pedro Ferreira, Kathrin Ganz, Irina Gradinari, Sabine Grenz, Julia 
Gruhlich, Raffael Himmelsbach, Lydia Jenderek, Katrin M. Kämpf, Nicole 
8
Kirchhoff, Vanessa Krogmann, Petra Lucht, Ksenia Meshkova, Norma 
Möllers, Lisa Pfahl, Winnie Poster, Bianca Prietl, Sarah Schauberger, Jana 
Szeimies, and Lena Weber. 
I am grateful for the friends who have cheered me on through the years 
and never wavered in their support, including Martin Atzler, Hannes Beuter, 
Jessica Euler, Philipp Marquardt, Anne Weitere, and Sebastian Winkler. The 
journey of writing this book was also shared with my life partner Ulrike A.C. 
Müller who saw me through the final four years of finishing my research. For 
her generous love and unwavering support, I dedicate this book to her. 
9
Introduction
Autonomous driving is often depicted as a ‘disruptive’ technology with 
a potential for having a prominent ‘impact’ on society. For example, the 
Scientific Foresight Unit of the European Parliament lists autonomous vehicles 
as the first of ten technologies “which could change our lives” (van Woensel 
et al. 2015). Autonomous driving promises that motorized vehicles can be 
fully automated. That is, driverless cars are expected to be able to navigate 
through messy everyday traffic without human supervision. 
Germany’s Federal Government expects autonomous driving to enhance 
traffic safety and reduce emissions (The Federal Government 2015, p. 8–11). 
By optimizing traffic flow, it is assumed to make room for more motorized 
traffic on the existing roads. As a technological fix, autonomous driving 
is expected to remedy some of automobility’s issues, such as, congestions 
and accidents. What appears desirable for the Federal Government seems 
threatening to others. For example, some German automotive and tech-
nology journalists draw on dystopian science-fiction narratives to locate 
autonomous driving within a frame of loss of control and robot uprising 
(Berscheid 2014, p. 28). 
The driverless car is a vision. It exists only in the form of expectations 
and promises that have shaped their potentials. However, there are other tech-
nologies related to autonomous driving which have entered everyday traffic. 
Today’s cars are equipped with a multitude of driver-assistance systems, which 
range from the anti-blocking system to the latest advanced driver-assistance 
systems (ADAS), such as Tesla’s “Autopilot”. The “Autopilot” enables a “car to 
steer, accelerate and brake automatically within its lane.” (Tesla 2019) Never-
theless, “Autopilot features require active driver supervision and do not make 
the vehicle autonomous.” (ibid.) ADAS do not fully substitute for drivers. All 
ADAS require a driver to be present and conscious behind the wheel (Broggi 
et al. 2016, p. 1630). Neglecting to monitor ADAS can lead to lethal accidents 
(see Stilgoe 2018). 
Autonomous driving is not a novel phenomenon; it is a long-standing 
modernist dream of control that has yet to be realized. For instance, roboticist 
Raúl Rojas refers to a 1918 cover of Scientific American depicting a futuristic 
automobile. Its caption reads “The motorist’s dream: a car that is controlled 
by a set of push buttons” (Rojas 2013). According to Rojas, this exemplifies 
the promise that drivers could use their driving-time for activities other than 
operating their vehicle within traffic. 
During the past 100 years, driverless cars and autonomous driving have 
been imagined under various labels, such as automated highway systems 
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(hereafter: AHS). Expectations and promises have remained stable over time 
(Wetmore 2003). Advocates of automated driving promise driverless cars 
that are supposed to be safer, more efficient, and more comfortable than 
manually driven cars. Autonomous driving is expected to be feasible and 
its realization is promised to be within reach. Enthusiasts of driverless cars 
continually cite technological improvements as reasons for the feasibility 
of these cars. With each technological advance, enthusiasts claim that their 
dream can be turned into reality. 
Technological progress and its related technological imperative are the 
ideologically resources that underpin visions of autonomous driving. Tech-
nology demonstrations (Smith 2009; Simakova 2010; Rosental 2013) are crucial 
practices in sustaining autonomous driving. In technology demonstrations 
socio technical assemblages are presented in action as evidence for their worth. 
Companies and university projects use technology demonstrations to convince 
external audiences by providing visual ‘proof’ of the feasibility and of the 
usefulness of an envisioned technology. It is through the agencies’ of these 
demonstrations, that visions acquire substance as these presentations enact 
links between concrete technological artifacts and more encompassing visions.
The vision of AHS has been popularized by General Motors, who sold 
AHS to the U.S. public through a large-scale marketing effort. The company’s 
“Highways and Horizons” pavilion at 1939’s World Trade Fair in New York City 
featured a vision of the city of 1960, which it called “Futurama” (Norton 2011). 
Inside the pavilion, visitors sat on armchairs mounted on a conveyor and were 
moved over a 3000 m2 model landscape. Visitors took on the bird’s-eye view of 
a modernist city planner as they looked down on “10,000 animated model cars, 
dashing along a fourteen-lane highway, [which, GB] embodied the automatic 
traffic of tomorrow, kept in lane by radio waves” (Kröger 2016, p. 48). Futurama 
was envisioned as a city dominated by cars but without the usual gridlock and 
messiness. GM’s vision was more about reconstructing the city to accommodate 
1940s cars than presenting the car of the future (Norton 2011, p. 593). 
There was a considerable discrepancy between what was envisioned and 
demonstrated in the form of models and what was technologically feasible 
(Wetmore 2003). Wetmore argues that GM benefitted from this dream—despite 
its not being realized—because “by selling the future GM was also selling the 
present” (ibid.). General Motors’ concern in this technological demonstration 
was to promote automobility (Urry 2004; Böhm et al. 2006) and to secure its 
future rather than to implement large-scale efforts of automation. Wetmore 
points out that, at the time of the exhibition, it was uncertain whether cars would 
remain a dominant form of transportation. It was only after World War II, with 
the construction of the U.S. national highway system and the emergence of 
suburban sprawl, that automobility’s hegemony solidified (Seiler 2007). 
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AHS contributed to making already existing cars more appealing by 
providing imaginary solutions to automobility’s pressing problems and 
thereby contributing to the hope that automobiles could be further improved. 
Wetmore argues that the continued appeal of these visions stems from the 
seductiveness of the technological demonstrations. AHS was never realized 
outside of carefully staged presentations, whereas other forms of car auto-
mation became working systems and achieved mass production. The grand 
vision of AHS was reduced and individualized into cruise control in the 
mid-1950s (Kröger 2016, p. 55).
In the new millennium, autonomous driving has become a hot topic in AI 
and robotics primarily due to the ever-growing civilian market for ADAS and 
the demand for uncrewed military ground vehicles (Broggi et al. 2016). In 
2000, the U.S. Congress passed a mandate (U.S. Government 2000) that by 
2015 one-third of the operational ground combat vehicles of the U.S. military 
were to be uncrewed (“unmanned”). In response to this, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) organized a series of Grand Challenges 
in 2004, 2005, and 2007. DARPA and its predecessor agencies have been a 
key driver and supporter of AI and robotics since the 1960s (Edwards 1996, 
pp. 64–65). Prizes and competitions are a well-known method to support 
technological research and innovation (Maibaum 2018). 
DARPA sees military potential in autonomous driving in so far as it 
promises to increase the security of U.S.-American soldiers. During the 
opening of the DARPA Urban Challenge 2007, Tony Tether, the director of 
DARPA from 2001 to 2009, promised “that this technology will save a lot of 
lives—on the battlefield.”1 DARPA succeeded in enrolling many influential 
researchers and thus enlarged a research community that was marginal prior 
to the Grand Challenges (Broggi et al. 2016, S. 1630). During these events, in 
which research vehicles were required to solve tasks such as completing an 
autonomous drive through the desert or through simulated suburban traffic, 
university projects competed with each other for a cash prize. 
Researchers are often motivated by the belief that autonomous driving 
can be compartmentalized into tasks or subproblems to be solved, such as 
“path-planning in structured areas” (Wang 2012, pp. 103–124). For roboticists 
in the field of autonomous driving, driverless cars in everyday city traffic 
are more than a seductive future; today, university projects and automotive 
companies conduct street trials (Marres 10/21/2016). In street trials, com-
panies and university projects monitor their research vehicles’ performance 
in in everyday city traffic. Research vehicles are computationally enhanced 
1 https://youtu.be/-xibwwNVLgg?t=17 [Checked on 03/04/20]
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automobiles that can serve two purposes at once. First, they serve as research 
instruments in the process of solving subproblems, which involves testing, 
evaluating, and improving approaches from artificial intelligence (AI) and 
robotics. The objective is to determine the feasibility of a specific approach, 
for example, that of a certain sensor configuration paired with a specific 
algorithm. Second, since solving specific subproblems often materializes in 
visible movements of the research vehicle or visualizations of the algorithm’s 
output, the research vehicle can also be used for technology demonstrations. 
Streets trials can serve the two objectives simultaneously. 
Sustaining autonomous driving 
So far social science has mostly been concerned with possible implications 
of driverless cars (Bissell et al. 2018; Büscher et al. 2012; Laurier and Dant 
2012) rather than in analysis of empirical materials. These speculatively 
oriented studies are complemented by empirical studies on acceptance (e.g. 
Fraedrich and Lenz 2016), which take for granted the feasibility of driverless 
cars and the future widespread diffusion of autonomous driving. All of these 
studies tend to reproduce uncritically the rhetoric of governments, private 
companies, and research projects that are rallying for autonomous driving. 
The above studies misconstrue contemporary innovation. The proliferation 
of hyperbolic expectations and visions can be seen as a necessary part of 
strategic science and technology innovation (Borup et al. 2006, pp. 286–287). 
The claims of inevitability of autonomous driving are acts of persuasion 
(Stilgoe 2020, pp. 8–9). Governments are inclined to stimulate hype in order to 
justify present spending on irreducibly uncertain ‘technologies of the future’. 
Private companies and publicly funded research project are incentivized to 
claim that driverless cars are within reach; these actors compete for attention 
and financial resources (Stilgoe 2020, pp. 40–41). With regard to autonomous 
driving, “the gap between baby steps and giant leaps, between concept cars 
and transport systems, is filled with promise and speculation.” (Stilgoe 2018, 
p. 33). Given that we are dealing with a vision, the only certainty is that there 
is no certainty concerning if, when, under which conditions, and for whose 
benefit autonomous driving will be realized.
Studies that investigate autonomous driving empirically are still rare 
(Brown and Laurier 2017), but this seems to be changing. For example, Stilgoe 
reconstructs the competing definitions of problems, solutions, and concerns 
within the public debate of autonomous driving (2018). What remains missing, 
however, is an analysis of the lived relations between technological artifacts, 
researchers, and visions. This study seeks to contribute to an understanding 
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of autonomous driving by engaging with technological artifacts and with the 
practitioners who actually try to realize visions of autonomous driving. 
This book is not about if, when, how, and to whose benefit autonomous 
driving will emerge. Science and Technology Studies consider technological 
research and innovation to be contingent and heterogeneous (Bijker and Law 
1992). The emergence of a particular technology depends on the stabilization 
of a sociotechnical network of heterogeneous elements; its elements are human 
and nonhuman. Thus, technological research and innovation is never only 
‘technological’. Furthermore, technologies are not ‘born’ feasible. Technolo-
gies only seem inevitable in retrospect. This study investigates a technological 
project in a situation where very little is certain but expectations are high. It 
analyzes how relations between technological artefacts, visions, and research-
ers are sustained both symbolically and materially.
This book is not about ‘the future’. Rather, it is about how certain visions 
of the future are kept alive in the observable present. In particular, this study 
examines research in autonomous driving by engaging with a pioneering 
project in computer science. Autonomous driving is investigated through the 
lenses of narrative, care, and gender-technology relations. 
Narrative forms are a primary element of autonomous driving. To endow 
their artefacts with meanings that are recognized by laypersons, researchers 
in autonomous driving need to construct frames of meaning (Carlson 1992, 
p. 177) in which autonomous driving makes sense. As autonomous driving is 
controversial, researchers need to craft persuasive and compelling narratives. 
These narratives are enacted through texts and speech, but they also enacted 
through staged performances, including video demonstrations. Visionary 
storytelling reduces the complexities of research in autonomous driving by 
concealing its contingencies and uncertainties. Innovation communication is 
not what comes ‘after’ technological research but is rather integral to the very 
processes of innovation (Horst et al. 2017, pp. 892–893). 
In the hands of the computer scientists doing research in autonomous 
driving, these visions are transformed into a variety of enactments, including 
street trials and video demonstrations. It is through these translations that 
visions are sustained and acquire substance. Unlike carefully staged video 
demonstrations, street trials are risky. During Uber’s street trials a pedestrian 
was killed in 2018 (Stilgoe 2020, p. 1). Sociotechnical assemblages of autono-
mous driving demand care to be held stable in the messy and contingent world 
of everyday city traffic. 
This study is situated within a recent re-orientation in the social studies of 
technology (Both and Cohn 2017; Cohn 2013; Denis and Pontille 2015; Jackson 
2014; Singleton 2010) towards relations of care in sociotechnical assemblages, 
which connects to earlier studies of repair and maintenance (Orr 1996; 
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Mellström 2003). Jackson argues that the social studies of technology display 
a “productivist bias” (Jackson 2014, p. 234) in so far as novel technologies 
are valued over old technologies. In other words, Jackson is observing how 
the assembling and diffusion of technologies is given prominence over the 
sustaining of networks and maintaining of technologies over time. A focus on 
caring for technology directs attention away from the generation and expan-
sion of sociotechnical assemblages and towards the maintenance and support 
of existing sociotechnical imaginaries and their related artifacts.
Enthusiasm for driving cars is often associated with masculinity (Vobker 
2016, pp. 185–186). Driverless cars are anticipated by some scholars with the 
potential of undermining the masculine coupling of drivers and cars (Balkmar 
and Mellström 2018; Manderscheid 2018; Redshaw 2018). This tendency can 
also be observed in popular culture. For example, a sports car company framed 
its cars as “man’s last stand”2 in a TV ad. The company continued along the 
lines by framing autonomous driving as a ploy to emasculate men (Both and 
Weber 2014). The incapacitation narrative makes autonomous driving an inter-
esting case for studies of masculinity and technology. Technology in Germany 
is created, imagined, researched, and developed in male-centered communi-
ties (Solga and Pfahl 2009). How do researchers in the field of autonomous 
driving negotiate masculinity in the light of being framed as contributing to 
the incapatication of the driver?
Masculinities and technologies may converge or diverge in terms of 
subjectivities, identities, practices, and symbols. Relations of masculinity 
and technology remain a curiously under-researched area. Sociology of 
technology tends to ignore gendered aspects of its object of study (Cockburn 
and Ormrod 1993, pp. 9–10; Berg and Lie 1995; Wajcman 2004; Lengersdorf 
2011). Technology is analyzed as a ‘general’ phenomenon, thereby leaving its 
cultural and social specificities unexamined. To illustrate this point, the latest 
German Introduction to Sociology of Technology—a textbook with more than 
400 pages—covers gender studies and feminist technology studies in a single 
paragraph (Häußling 2014, pp. 129–130).3 The gender-blindness of the bulk of 
studies in the sociology of technology is open to criticism because it fails to 
account for the power relations that constitute and are constituted by technol-
ogy. Performances of masculinity play a role both in the technology-centered 
communities and in the ways in which technologies are assembled. 
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ya8QXq7diYw [checked on 12/14/19]
3 A previous German introduction to sociology of technology (Degele 2002) dedicated a 
whole chapter to technology and gender.
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Feminist technology studies (Bray 2007; Faulkner 2001; Wajcman 2000), 
or “technofeminism” (Wajcman 2004), conceptualizes gender and technology 
relationally—that is, as co-productions. My study contributes to this body of 
work by studying how masculine subjectivities and relations between mascu-
linity and technology are (re-)configured within a research project of computer 
scientists in Germany. 
Studies of men and masculinities, tend to underplay the significance 
of technology in many—though certainly not all—men’s lives (Lohan and 
Faulkner 2004, p. 319; Mellström 2004, p. 369). This is puzzling because 
historical research shows that the very definition of modern technology is 
coterminous with masculinity (Oldenziel 1999); during the professionaliza-
tion of engineering in Germany, for example, different forms of masculinity 
competed over what constitutes an engineer (Paulitz 2012). Few studies of 
men and masculinities investigate how homosocial communities may be 
centered on a shared passion for and intimacy with machines—a centering 
that has been observed, for example, in studies of communities of Swedish 
engineers (Mellström 1995), of British robotics hobbyists and U.S. Ameri-
can software developers (Kleif and Faulkner 2003), of Chinese automobile 
mechanics in Malaysia (Mellström 2003), and of Swedish car modifiers 
(Balkmar 2012).
Outline of the book
Autonomous driving is not independent of the actors involved in the constitu-
tion of the phenomenon. This is to observe that autonomous driving cannot be 
understood in terms of an institution or an object-in-itself. Germany’s Federal 
Government, together with Germany’s automotive industry, its journalists, 
and many others, are helping to enact autonomous driving. Social science—
even if only to a very small degree—is also participating in its constitution. 
As a matter of fact, this very text that you are reading at the moment helps to 
enact autonomous driving as a sociotechnical phenomenon. Social scientists 
who study autonomous driving cannot claim that they are only ‘observing’ the 
phenomenon from a distance. No “god-trick” (Haraway 1988, p. 587) may be 
used to articulate a detached and innocent perspective. There are only partial 
perspectives on autonomous driving.
In order to account adequately for the phenomenon, then, it becomes 
necessary to study autonomous driving relationally. This is accomplished by 
pairing the relational ontology of actor-network-theory with ethnography. This 
study has engaged, by means of ethnographic fieldwork, with members of the 
field of research in autonomous driving. Between June 2012 and November 
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2015, I conducted fieldwork within a male-centered computer science univer-
sity project in Berlin, Germany. 
In chapter 1, I explicate my theoretical and methodological framework 
and elaborate on the design of my study. In chapter 2, I introduce my field 
site by describing the university project as an assemblage of project members, 
technological artefacts, and visionary stories. I analyze how its vision is trans-
lated into street trials. I continue in chapter 3 by zooming in on street trials. 
I describe how project members assemble their computationally enhanced 
vehicle for—what they call—the “real world” of mundane city traffic. I recon-
struct the imaginary of control realized in the configuration of the research 
vehicle. I conclude this chapter by analyzing how the project members take 
care of the computationally enhanced vehicle during street trials. In chapter 4, 
I use my disconcertment during fieldwork as a method to trace the ambivalent 
relations of computer scientists, cars, and driving. By analyzing project mem-
bers’ narratives, I show how research in autonomous driving is masculinized. 
Chapter 5 takes a tour through the fantastic genres of video demonstrations. 
Video demos appear to document the uses and capacities of technologies, but 
they are actually a medium in which members can live out their fantasies 
without “real world” restraints. In video demos, visions can be narrated as if 
they were already realized. I analyze its genres and its performative effects 
for the project. Chapter 6 resumes the discussion of the performativity of 
innovation communication. I scrutinize the different strategies of promoting 
autonomous driving to varying audiences. I show how project members try 
to settle controversies over autonomous driving and their status as a robotics 
research project. The final chapter offers a conclusion to the study. I close this 
introduction by briefly elaborating on the challenges and opportunities related 
to the languages I use in this study.
Some notes on language and the terms I use
American English is my second language. I decided to write in English4 rather 
than German because I would like my study to contribute to the international 
conversations in social science. I did not want my study to be inaccessible 
for anglophone audiences. However, my fieldwork took place in mostly 
German-speaking settings. I wrote most of my fieldnotes in German and I 
conducted my interviews predominately in German. Given that I report upon 
4 I am indebted to Daniel Barber, a native speaker and professional editor, who corrected 
the spelling and grammar in large parts of the book.
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my research in English, this poses both a challenge and an opportunity. I use 
a number of interview excerpts in this study, and when I translated interview 
segments from German into English I became aware of many subtleties in 
utterances that I would not have been able to detect if I had not interpreted 
them myself. This effort of translation has contributed to my analysis. The 
downside of this effort was that, while I gradually grew confident in under-
standing what the members meant when they said something in German, I 
was often unsure whether my translation made sense in the English language. 
In particular, the casual and intimate tone of my conversations with project 
members tended to be lost in translation, as it exceeded my proficiency of 
English. This is why, during a later stage of my writing, I hired Sally Hoff-
meister, a professional interpreter and native speaker of English, to translate 
the remaining interview excerpts. I edited and corrected these excerpts in 
order to capture the often hermetic and elliptic phrasing of the members. I 
sought a compromise between readability and preservation of the natural 
flow of the conversations. 
When reporting on my fieldwork, I tried to use members’ terms (Emerson 
et al. 2011, pp. 142–144) whenever possible. That is how I settled on auton-
omous driving rather than, e.g., (fully) automated driving, which is a term 
preferred by other projects and Germany’s state agencies (Gasser et al. 2012; 
The Federal Government 2015, 2017). In other instances, I deliberately chose 
to use terms from academic literature rather than the terms of the members. 
One such instance is my decision to use the term “demonstrator” rather than 
“prototype.” A prototype of a driverless car would insinuate a technological 
artifact that is capable to display all functionalities required to fully substitute 
for human drivers. However, a demonstrator or “proof of concept” (a term 
used by members) is in actuality limited to certain capabilities. For example, 
when the TU Braunschweig presented its demonstrator in October 2010, its 
functionality was not nearly as significant as advertised. It was capable of 
driving on Braunschweig’s inner-city ring, but only in a clockwise direction 
because turning left on intersections is more difficult to realize. Nevertheless, 
the TU Braunschweig send out a press release claiming to be the first in the 
entire world to have achieved automated driving in “real urban traffic” (im 
realen Stadtverkehr) (TU Braunschweig 10/7/2010).
Political ethnography (Bochmann et al. 2019), as a specific form of qual-
itative social research, does not stop at the reconstruction of practitioners’ 
meanings and theories; it seeks to develop an observer’s or analyst’s theory, 
which goes beyond theories provided by members within the field (Strübing 
et al. 2018, p. 91). Unresolvable tensions usually arise between members’ the-
ories and the analyst’s theory. For example, my reconstruction of masculinity- 
technology relations in Chapter 4 will most likely be disputed by practitioners, 
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for these findings are in conflict the gender-neutral self-understanding com-
mon amongst scientists and engineers (Paulitz et al. 2016). 
Some of the words and concepts I use are difficult—if not impossible—to 
translate without friction. For example, account or to account has a specific 
meaning in social science conversations and maps onto several different 
German expressions. Naturally, the same translational friction is at issue 
with various German words, such as Sinn (meaning, sense, or purpose) and 
Sinnfrage (question of meaning, search for meaning). Whenever I was unsure 
about whether my use of the English language captured the meaning I sought 
to convey, I added the German word in parentheses and in italics. There 
are also some German terms, such as Informatik (computer science), that I 
deliberately choose to translate in a specific way so as to make them legible 
for international audiences.
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Chapter 1 | Grounding the study
The aim of this chapter is to develop a “minimal methodology” (Sørensen 
2009, p. 28) that serves to ground the empirical study. I start by outlining 
my theoretical approach and then proceed to present the methodology, the 
research design, and its methods. I account for my generation and archiving 
of empirical materials, thereby showing how they have shaped my fieldwork 
and redirected my research questions. 
Theoretical approach
This is a study of an imaginary that ties (human) members, artifacts, and 
visions together within the field of research in autonomous driving. My theo-
retical approach draws on social sciences, with an emphasis on anglophone 
theorizing in Science & Technology Studies (hereafter: STS) and Gender 
Studies. Since this chapter begins by laying down the key concepts of the 
study, I will initially proceed by referring simply to ‘members’ of or ‘practi-
tioners’ in the field without further specifying who I studied. While we will 
learn more about them in the course of this chapter, for now it matters only 
that they are members of the field of research in autonomous driving. 
Humanist social science
My theoretical approach can be traced back to the premise that both technol-
ogy and gender can be studied as socially constructed (Cockburn and Ormrod 
1993, pp. 7–12). I will use Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge 
(1991 [1966]) to understand how practitioners who see autonomous driving as 
self-evident maintain their promises and visions conceptually when faced with 
hegemonic definitions of automobility. 
Berger and Luckmann write within a humanist social science tradition; 
they focus on the role of knowledge in a society constituted by relations 
between people or groups of people. If we take their theory of knowledge as a 
starting point, then we are able to investigate autonomous driving as socially 
constructed. This is to say that everything we know about autonomous driving 
has been and is still being negotiated between varying actors. Knowledge on 
autonomous driving is still in the making. The knowledges we are dealing 
with are either expectations, e.g. what autonomous driving would look like if 
it was eventually realized, or accounts of the state of the art and progress in 
the domain of autonomous driving. There are competing accounts or diverging 
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expectations as to what the characteristics of autonomous driving are or will 
be (Chapter 6). 
The meanings of autonomous driving are also in the making; they are 
neither self-evident nor pre-determined. Autonomous driving acquires mean-
ing within a symbolic universe. A symbolic universe is a frame of reference 
in which “all human experience can […] be conceived of as taking place” 
(p.114). Symbolic here refers to “processes of signification that refer to real-
ities other than those of everyday experience” (Berger and Luckmann 1991 
[1966], p. 113). Symbolic universes “integrate different provinces of meaning 
and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality […]” (Berger and 
Luckmann 1991 [1966], p. 123). 
Symbolic universes can become problematic if alternative symbolic uni-
verses challenge their self-evidence. Let us assume, for example, that for us 
the dream of autonomous driving is self-evident. In our symbolic universe, 
autonomous driving therefore makes sense and is desirable. What happens, 
however, if former Porsche and Volkswagen CEO Matthias Müller comes 
along and calls autonomous driving “a hype lacking justification” (N.N. 2015)? 
Müller thereby sets forth an alternative definition of reality. In his definition, 
autonomous driving has no place and therefore no right to be pursued further. 
To immunize itself against challenges, symbolic universes “develop a con-
ceptual machinery to account for such deviations and to maintain the realities 
thus challenged” (Berger and Luckmann 1991 [1966], pp. 130–131). Berger 
and Luckmann describe two strategies that serve to protect a symbolic uni-
verse when it becomes problematic: therapy and nihilation. Therapy concerns 
“itself with deviations from the ’official’ definitions of reality” (Berger and 
Luckmann 1991 [1966], pp. 130–131). Nihilation seeks to neutralize threats by 
conceptually liquidating deviant definitions of reality that are outside of the 
challenged symbolic universes. Berger/Luckman (Berger and Luckmann 1991 
[1966], pp. 132–133) describe nihilation as a form of negative legitimation. 
Definitions of realities or the reality of phenomena are denied because they 
do not fit into the universe. There two forms: either the deviant phenomenon 
is assigned an inferior status, such that it cannot really be taken seriously, or 
the deviant definitions of reality are accounted for in terms of concepts from 
one’s own universe. The aim here is to incorporate the deviant conceptions 
by translating them into one’s own universe. A threat to one’s universe is 
translated into an affirmation. 
The concept of symbolic universe is useful for understanding how visions 
of autonomous driving are maintained conceptually as they are challenged 
by alternative definitions of reality. However, it is important to note that the 
symbolic universe is an anthropocentric concept. The origins and dynamics of 
symbolic universes are independent of materiality. As we will see in the course 
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of this study, the symbolic universe of researchers in the field of autonomous 
driving is entangled with the affordances of information and communication 
technology (hereafter: ICT). Berger/Luckman’s concept of symbolic universes 
cannot grasp the transmission between the symbolic and the material.
To understand how members imagine and perform autonomous driving in 
both its symbolic and material dimensions, we need concepts and theoretical 
toolkits that neither privilege human relations (e.g., humanist social science) 
nor marginalize human relations (e.g., mainstream computer science). This is 
to say that we cannot narrowly focus on material or ‘technical’ relations and 
ignore how these relations are shaped in cultural and social contexts. Yet to 
adopt a humanist approach—i.e, one that privileges human relations—is also 
inadequate, for this would fail to account for the ways in which autonomous 
driving is heavily inflected by the availability and affordances of high- 
precision GPS and sensors (such as laser scanners or RADAR). To understand 
autonomous driving in both its symbolic and material dimensions, we need 
a posthumanist social science, or what has been called a “more-than-human 
social science” (Whatmore 2003, pp. 90–92).
More-than-human social science
Imaginaries
Imaginaries is a concept suitable for grasping the entanglement of the 
symbolic and the material. Imaginary is a term of art that may be used as 
a hybrid concept. This is because it can be used to describe relations of 
humans and nonhumans. Although it has acquired popularity within STS, it 
is rarely defined and often used in different ways (McNeil et al. 2017). My use 
of imaginary refers not to Jasanoff’s socio-technical imaginaries (Jasanoff 
2015), which have been used to study nations, institutions, and policies, but 
rather to the members’ shared imaginary, “a collective fantasy landscape of 
at least partly shared ideals, practices and images” (Balkmar 2012, p. 35). 
Technoscientific imaginaries tie together promissory practices and material 
practices. This type of imaginary “looks to the future and future possibility 
through technoscientific innovation but is equally constrained by the very 
present conditions of scientific work” (Marcus 1995, p. 4 cited in McNeil et al. 
2017, p. 445). Expectations and visions shape laboratory practices and vice 
versa. According to Lucy Suchman, 
[imaginary] shares with the more colloquial term imagination an evocation of both 
vision and fantasy. In addition, however, it references the ways in which how we see 
and what we imagine the world to be is shaped not only by our individual experiences 
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but also by the specific cultural and historical resources that the world makes available 
to us, based on our particular location within it. And perhaps most importantly for my 
purposes here, cultural imaginaries are realized in material ways. (Suchman 2007, p. 1 
footnote 1)
Balkmar, Marcus and Suchman put emphasis on the collective nature of 
imaginaries. They draw attention to the ways in which the beliefs, fantasies, 
and ideals at issue in imaginaries are shared and situated rather than held by 
individuals alone. 
Imaginaries are necessarily involved in knowing and knowledge-making. 
They are “constitutive of, and constituted by, ontic and epistemic commit-
ments” (Verran 1998, p. 238). For example, how members demonstrate their 
version of autonomous driving and how they perceive and understand driving 
in everyday city traffic are constituted by an imaginary. 
Robotics & AI is a field where the boundary between fact and fiction 
is continuously breached (Richardson 2015, p. 113). Robots “materialize the 
cultural imaginaries that inspire them and which they work in turn to enact” 
(Suchman 2007, p. 226). In this field, imagination and materiality are not 
separable ontological domains but rather intertwined. 
Relationality and heterogeneity
Actor-network-theory (hereafter: ANT) offers anti-essentialist sensitivities for 
doing more-than-human social science. It presumes that “things are what they 
are in relation to other things, not because of essential qualities” (Gad and 
Bruun Jensen 2010, p. 58). ANT is fundamentally relational: it treats every-
thing “as a continuously generated effect of the webs of relations within which 
they are located” (Law 2009, p. 141). Established categories, such as society 
and technology or men and women, as well as widely used distinctions, such 
as social/technical and masculine/feminine, are themselves effects of relations. 
Consequently, society and technology cannot serve as explanatory categories, 
nor do the categories of women or men “hold inherent explanatory power” 
(Faulkner 2009a, p. 15).
Since the ‘social’ and the ‘technical’ are outcomes of “purifications“ 
(Latour 1993, pp. 10–12), all “relations should be seen as both social and 
technical” (Law and Bijker 1992, p. 290). This is the principle of heterogene-
ity, which seeks to eschew both social and technological determinism. This 
means that technology is neither fully determined by society nor something 
that can be reduced to purely technological relations. Instead, technology is 
constituted by relations between heterogeneous elements (Callon and Law 
1997, pp. 167–170).
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I draw on the concept (sociotechnical) assemblage—which I use inter-
changeably with network—as a means of referring to the intertwining of 
heterogeneous elements, such as humans, ICTs, materials, narratives, and 
meanings. The concept of sociotechnical assemblage entails a figure-ground 
reversal in studying technology: what is foregrounded is no longer the tangible 
artifact with its implied fixed boundaries, but rather the relations that con-
stitute a sociotechnical assemblage. However, the concept of sociotechnical 
assemblages is not limited to the study of technology.
ANT’s principle of performativity states that “nothing has reality or form 
outside of the enactment these relations” (Law 2009, p. 141). Relations do 
not hold by themselves; they must be performed or enacted. Everything is a 
matter of doing. Technology is performed. Gender is enacted. Everything is 
practice. Nothing exists outside of practice. To say that gender and technology 
are performed does not mean that they are matters of individual achievement. 
Robinson Crusoe is of no interest here. Rather, gender and technology are 
conceptualized as the outcomes of collective accomplishments. This theo-
retical premise entails that gender is a process rather than a given essence 
or structure. Gender is an analytical category. Women/men or femininity/
masculinity are outcomes of the analysis and not its starting point. 
If technologies can be conceptualized as sociotechnical assemblages, then 
gender, too, can be conceptualized as a sociotechnical assemblage. Vivian 
Lagesen argues,
Leaning on ANT, we may claim that doing gender is an on-going movement where 
associations with bodies, norms, knowledge, interpretations, identities, technologies, 
and so on, are made and unmade in complex ways. Thus, gender is fluid and flexible 
because new associations are established, while old ones are dissolved. (Lagesen 2012, 
p. 445)
But what about the seemingly ‘natural’ connection between masculinity and 
technology? If this gendered association appears to be stabilized, it is because 
it is made stable through the making and re-making of narratives, identities, 
and representations that “uphold stable gender practices” (Sørensen et al. 2011, 
pp. 52–54). 
Within ANT translation is a concept for understanding and describing 
processes of innovation. Translation carries many meanings: to interpret, to 
betray, and to move. For example, Latour (1987) analyzes how goals, interests, 
and actors are translated in processes of innovation. Latour studied the biog-
raphy of a rapid personal transportation system called Aramis (Latour 1996), 
which has a vision that is strikingly similar to that of autonomous taxis (see 
chapters 2 and 4), except that it takes place on tracks. Aramis ultimately failed 
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to become a working system. Latour describes how a technological project 
is translated between different media (e.g. plans, trials, chips) and achieves 
different degrees of realization over the course of its history. For example, the 
vision of Aramis on paper in 1970 has less substance than Aramis’ simpli-
fied test site at Orly in 1973. Latour argues that the only way for a project to 
become more realizable is through compromise. 
ANT shares with the Social Construction of Technology the premise that 
technologies are shaped through conflict (Bijker and Law 1992, pp. 8–11). 
For instance, the shape of the TSR2 fighter plane was negotiated between 
competing government agencies, the manufacturers and Soviets Union’s 
RADAR capabilities. 
ANT argues that researchers in technology are “heterogeneous engineers” 
(Law 1987). Heterogeneous engineers seek to associate entities of various kinds, 
such as skills, artifacts and even weather conditions. In Law’s analysis of the 
colonial expansion of the Portuguese, he demonstrates how a new type of ship 
has to embody different relations in order to withstand trials of strength, such 
as forces of nature. For an artifact to stabilize it needs to maintain its shape in 
the face of other entities that seek to dissociate it. The fate of the networks that 
heterogeneous engineers assemble is decided by these trials of strength. 
Over the years, ANT has received a great deal of criticism within social 
science. For instance, German sociologists typically criticize Latour for his 
lack of rigor and coherence, as well as for the incompatibility of his theory 
with those of mainstream social theory (Kneer et al. 2008). Another point of 
controversy is ANT’s proposition that intentions can be inscribed into artifacts 
or infrastructure. For example, organizational researcher Paula Jarzabkowski 
and STS practitioner Trevor Pinch argue that ANT analyses tend to “‘black 
box’ the social interactions within which activities are accomplished to focus 
on the materials themselves” (Jarzabkowski and Pinch 2013, p. 585). 
Methodology
ANT is particularly suitable for analyzing processes of stabilization (Hyysalo 
2010, pp. 37–40). The label ANT invites misreadings.5 ANT is not a theory 
in the sense that it seeks to explain anything. In fact, it dismisses large-scale 
sociological theories and is instead descriptive (Law 2009, pp. 141–142). 
ANT is interested in practice, materiality and the accounts of actors (‘how’ 
5 However, alternative labels, such as sociology of translation (Callon 1986), actant- rhizome 
ontology (Latour 1999), or material semiotics (Law 2009) have not gained wider usage.
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questions) (Sismondo 2004, p. 65). It does not seek generalizable causal expla-
nation (‘why’ questions) but rather offers a “set of sensitivities” (Mol 2010, 
p. 265) which are useful in developing “throwaway explanations” (Latour 
1988 cited in Gad and Bruun Jensen 2010, p. 76) for specific assemblages. 
Hence, ANT analysis can only explain in retrospect why a network did or did 
not succeed in stabilizing. 
Technology and gender
If the ‘social’ and the ‘technical’ are the outcome of “purifications“ (Latour 
1993, pp. 10–12)—this applies as well to other binaries, such as men/women 
or masculine/feminine—then I can neither take them for granted as a starting 
point of analysis nor use them as a means of explanation. Where do we start 
then? A popular method of ANT is to follow the actors and their associations 
(Latour 1987) in order to describe how these actors assemble their world 
(Latour 2005). In an ANT analysis, what is central are the accounts and prac-
tices of actors. Rather that starting with the categories of the analyst, “actors 
ought to be given voice in their own categories” (Gad and Bruun Jensen 2010, 
p. 76). At the beginning, we need to assume that actors “know their own 
practices best” (Gad and Bruun Jensen 2010, p. 76).
Feminist STS scholars have challenged the “Machiavellism” (Hyysalo 
2010, pp. 39–40) of many ANT analyses for their overemphasis on central 
actors or emergent artifacts. Haraway charges Latour for intensifying the 
“structure of heroic action” (Haraway 1997, p. 34), contrary to his own intent. 
Famously, Latour did not address gender issues in his textbook Science 
in Action (1987). Marginal actors and “implicated actors” (Clarke 2005, 
pp. 46–48) may easily be left out of ANT analyses, even though they can be 
affected—sometimes with grave consequences—by “network externalities” 
(Star 1991, p. 43). The fields of technological research and design are often 
male-centered. As such, women and minorities tend to be absent from ANT 
analyses unless, for example, these analyses are focused on the domestication 
of technology. Another common critique of ANT analyses is the reluctance 
of many authors to consider gender, class, race, and other markers of social 
inequality as analytical categories (Wajcman 2004, p. 103). 
Other feminist scholars view ANT as helpful in overcoming analytical 
shortcomings in constructivist studies of gender and technology (Omrod 
1995; Lagesen 2012). Whereas technology is analyzed as fluid and malleable, 
gender often remains a static and binary category. Studying gender-technology 
relations with ANT’s sensitivities can be way to minimize reification and to 
keep gender flexible and dynamic. This involves investigating how uncertain-
ties are overcome and how controversies are settled (Lagesen 2012, p. 444). 
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Gendered meanings are only considered if they are actively used as resources 
to stabilize networks (Omrod 1995, pp. 44–45).
Narratives and storytelling
Communication cannot be separated from other aspects in the making of 
technology (Horst et al. 2017, pp. 892–893). There is no innovation without 
communication. ANT studies demonstrate that innovation cannot be under-
stood independently of the communication around it. “Instead, it is an integral 
part of the way in which a technology is developed, appropriated, and used” 
(Davies and Horst 2016, pp. 138–139). 
Plesner and Horst argue that “visionary communication” (Plesner and 
Horst 2012, 2013) can be a means to gain support, build networks and thus 
contribute to the stabilization of a new technology. Narratives are crucial not 
only the legitimation of technology but also in the allocation of resources. 
Stories and sense-making are the very stuff of which technological projects 
are made. The production of narratives is a crucial part of innovation.
Narrative is the main device for making sense of social action (Czarni-
awska 2004, pp. 6–10). Without narrative, action would be reduced to behav-
ior, or to merely arbitrary events with no significance. Without interpretation 
there can be no understanding. The capacities of envisioned technologies are 
narrated through different genres and forms of communication. Expectations 
and promises of innovations are embedded in narratives.
I assume narratives to be crucial in the development, sharing, and cir-
culation of meanings. Narrative is a mode of knowing and communicating 
(Czarniawska 2004, pp. 6–12). As such, narratives define tacitly the frames 
of reference according to which we imagine technologies and perceive actual 
steps taken towards their realization. Narratives order (Law 1994): they 
associate elements with one another or dissociate elements from one another. 
Technologies can be aligned with multiple narratives and there are no tech-
nologies without some kind of narrative attached to them. Prominent exam-
ples are narratives of technological progress, which associate technological 
innovation with societal progress. Narratives integrate events or elements in 
a meaningful whole. Like images, they emphasize some aspects while hiding 
others—as is the case, for example, with narratives of autonomous driving. 
Narratives in innovation are central to the reduction of complexity and 
uncertainty (Deuten and Rip 2000). According to Deuten and Rip, the work 
that is performed by stories is often neglected in analyses. Narrative can 
constrain or act forcefully. Stories are not free-floating, for they are often 
produced in relation to other narratives and they depend to a certain degree 
on material enactments. 
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Czarniawska defines narrative as “a spoken or written text giving an 
account of an event/action or series of events/actions chronologically con-
nected” (2004, p. 17). Czarniawska distinguishes between narratives and 
stories: the naked narrative is a purely chronological account, whereas stories 
are emplotted narratives (2004, p. 17). Emplotment constructs characters, 
attributes functions to events and provides an interpretative theme. In doing 
so, it turns random events (2004, p. 32) and purposeful action into something 
meaningful.
Narratives deal with existing plots and interpretative themes; they may 
also involve acts of positioning. They are produced in relation to other narra-
tives. They are a collective and contingent achievement. While they are not 
the product of individual minds, they provide crucial elements in the making 
of individual and institutional identities. Identity can be created by a self-nar-
rative (Czarniawska 1997). I understand identity not as a set of unchanging 
and essential characteristics of an individual, group or artifact, but rather as 
a creative process (Tonso 2007). For example, Horst (2013) argues that when 
scientists talk about their work, they enact particular understandings of what 
science, projects, and scientists are or should be. Members perform identities 
by drawing on different cultural resources, such as narratives, images, or 
discourses. Identities are enacted through positioning (Davies and Harré 1990) 
and narration within available cultural frames. Positioning can take many 
forms, such as taking up, identifying with, or rejecting subject positions. 
Expectations, promises, and visions
How do I understand expectations, promises and visions, and how do I dis-
tinguish them from one another? Technological expectations are “real-time 
representations of future technological situations and capabilities” (Borup 
et al. 2006, p. 286). Promises are expectations with wishful and subjective 
elements. Technological visions are “strategic framework[s] for realizing 
expectations” (Davies and Horst 2016, pp. 141–142). 
Expectations, promises, and visions are not free-floating. They depend on 
materiality and embodiment to take on substance. Borup et al. ask,
to what extent are expectations the enunciated views and ideas of people (utterances), 
and in what way do they become ‘inscribed’ in texts, actions, bodies, materials, objects 
and machines (embedded)? (2006, p. 292)
Expectations, promises, and visions are not limited to the imagination. Lean-
ing on Borup et al., I conceptualize them as co-produced by imagination and 
materiality. 
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Expectations, promises, and visions are never neutral (Davies and Horst 
2016, pp. 144–146). They are normative and interested accounts. Technologi-
cal visions often include a script which organizes relations between imagined 
users and envisioned technologies. Visions include assumptions regarding 
societal and ecological problems and how they ought to be solved. In this 
sense, visions can be connected to problematizations (Callon 1986, p. 203; 
Plesner and Horst 2013, p. 1120). 
Expectations are not just statements about the future, for they also 
enable—that is, perform—certain things in the present. Expectations, 
promises, and visions are not only interesting for their intrinsic qualities but 
also because of what they can do. Expectations, promises, and visions can be 
performative (Davies and Horst 2016, pp. 141–142) in the sense that they do 
not simply represent the envisioned technology in a context; they fabricate a 
context for the technology to be realized. They can give meaning and purpose 
to a technological project and perform an identity. Expectations and promises 
are not facts but means of generating desired attention. Expectations can be 
generative by providing structure and legitimation, attracting interest and 
fostering investment.
Research design
Autonomous driving is an emerging technology and as such it is messy, 
ambiguous and uncertain. How can we understand something that is still in the 
making and has not stabilized? STS researcher John Law asks, “How might 
method deal with mess?” (Law 2004, p. 2)? His answer is that standard social 
sciences methods will produce a single reality and thereby distort whatever 
you are seeking to describe. We necessarily order, even as we try to describe 
mess. Order and mess are mutually constitutive (Suchman 2011a, pp. 28–29). 
If we order too much, we make a mess out of it. When investigating an emerg-
ing technology, such as autonomous driving, we cannot expect single answers. 
To be open towards the ambivalences, dynamics, and uncertainties, we 
have to start with a negative argument. This is where ANT’s sensitivities 
become particularly valuable. The advantage of ANT over many humanist 
social theo ries is that it does not define in advance who/what does and does 
not play a role in processes of innovation. ANT is sensitive to messiness 
and materiality (Law 2009, pp. 141–142). It simultaneously helps one move 
beyond the study of technology as a self-evident and bounded artifact 
(Hyysalo 2010, p. 39). 
We need a research design that comes with a minimal set of assumptions. 
What is necessary is not ‘High Theory’ but “sets of sensitivities” (Mol 2010, 
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p. 265) which are open to the unexpected and adaptable to researchers’ imag-
inary of autonomous driving. If we do not want to fixate the phenomenon 
before investigating it, then we need to refrain from defining the shape and 
ontological status of an emergent technology prior to its analysis. In this man-
ner, the object of study—researchers’ imaginary of autonomous driving—is 
simultaneously turned into an empirical and methodological question. If we 
want to be open towards imaginaries of autonomous driving, we will have to 
devise an adaptable research design. 
This section describes the research design of my study. It begins by argu-
ing that ANT should be coupled with ethnography in order to explore the 
imaginary of autonomous driving. Following this, I will describe how I oper-
ationalized my research questions by conducting an ethnographic “window 
study” (Czarniawska 1997, pp. 64–65). Finally, I will outline the materials I 
generated and describe how I analyzed them. 
My research design is an ethnographic window study. In a window study, 
the researcher “opens an arbitrary time window and describes all that can be 
seen through it” (Czarniawska 1997, pp. 64–65). What is relevant, routine or 
exceptional is not decided by the ethnographer alone. It is negotiated with the 
members. I did not decide prior to the analysis what kind of case it is because 
for ANT analyses, this should be treated as an empirical question (Latour 
2005, pp. 143–144). My study did not start off as a case study of an emerging 
technology; it developed into one through time.
If one claims that imaginaries are inflected by and realized in the design 
of a sociotechnical assemblage, then one cannot study the imaginary of an 
emerging technology from a distance. We know very little about roboticists’ 
imaginary of autonomous driving in social science. As a research strategy, 
ethnography can open up ‘new’ objects (Breidenstein et al. 2013, p. 175) for 
social science. By describing what researchers actually do and how they 
account for their practices, ethnography can be instrumental in accounting 
for technoscientific practices without contributing to the generation of myths 
(Braun-Thürmann 2002, p. 29). If one only relies on interview material or pub-
lished accounts, it will be hard to reconstruct what is actually relevant to the 
members and how they really go out about doing their research. This is why 
it is important to become a quasi-member of the field oneself. Interviewing 
alone does not do the trick. By triangulating data generated through participant 
observation, ethnographic interviewing, videography and document analysis, 
one can learn what members find relevant and how they imagine autonomous 
driving. By analyzing what practitioners actually do, in relation to what they 
hope and claim to do, and what they mean when they describe their goals and 
accomplishments, we can understand and appreciate the problems members 
are dealing with from their own perspectives. The latter is very important, as 
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social scientists and computer scientists often do not speak the same language. 
In addition, our systems of relevance can be very different. For example, 
roboticists tend to think from the position of the artifact or system (Vertesi 
2012, p. 406) rather from the position of the user or bystander. A distanced 
analysis of a social scientist might misrepresent practitioners’ meanings. 
Ethnography is both research process and its outcome, e.g. this book. 
One of the key challenges of doing ethnography is to iteratively develop 
a research design that integrates theoretical approach, research questions, 
methods, and data materials into a sound whole. Sociologists call this objec-
tive “adequacy” (Gegenstandsangemessenheit) (Strübing et al. 2018, p. 86). 
Questions and hypotheses are constantly modified in the course of the study 
(Lengersdorf 2015). 
In order to achieve adequacy in ethnographic fieldwork, full immersion 
and empirical saturation (Strübing et al. 2018, p. 88) within the field is a 
must. Immersion makes it possible to identify problems of double relevance 
(Breidenstein et al. 2013, pp. 167–170)—in other words, problems that are rel-
evant to roboticists and to social science audiences. Immersion is necessary 
to understand what is going on and to understand the world from members’ 
points of view. As a trained computer scientist,6 I tend to be less misled by 
practitioners’ tech lingo “purposefully saturated with anthropomorphism” 
(Wajcman 2017, p. 121) or by far-fetched promises inspired by science fiction 
stories. Both my training7 and the empirical saturation that results from my 
fieldwork enable me to claim some authority in writing about autonomous 
driving, even though I was not involved in the design aspect of the project. 
I am thus able to judge for myself whether some utterance or demonstration 
has substance or takes advantage of a gullible audience. This is an extremely 
important resource with respect to autonomous driving, as many visionary 
stories circulate that tend to conceal any uncertainty, ambivalence and com-
plexity of autonomous driving in urban traffic. Researchers in AI and robotics 
are “profoundly optimistic about their practices; they describe any obstacle in 
6 Technically, I studied „Informatik“. German „informatic” is the translation for com-
puter science. It has little to do with what is internationally called informatics (e.g. a 
study program at University of California, Irvine) or information science (e.g. a pro-
gram at University of Aarhus). The German misnomer “Informatik” hides the fact that 
German computer science is fundamentally machine-centric.
7 During my academic studies in computer science, I took courses in areas relevant 
to robotics, such as basic and advanced signal processing, image processing, pattern 
recognition, and machine learning. Thus, before I started my fieldwork I was mostly 
familiar with the theoretical foundations of the field; my practical engagement with 
robotics was limited to a course in areal robotics.
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robotics as a matter of the flaws in current science and technology—without 
questioning if their robotic projects are feasible” (Richardson 2015, p. 113). 
As a trained computer scientist, I can understand roboticists’ perspectives 
and, at least to a certain degree, possess an expert opinion on my own. 
My training in computer science provided me with a set of sensibilities 
that was relevant during my fieldwork. It equipped me with a roboticist’s 
sensibility of seeing the world. It has helped me become aware of the limita-
tions and inherent logic of ICTs and given me an appreciation for the hard 
work that is required in order for ICT artifacts to function. My background in 
computer science and robotics is an advantage that I have over ethnographers 
without backgrounds in computer science and robotics; yet there is also a 
downside to this. During the longer part of my PhD journey, my training 
in computer science felt more like a barrier that prevented me from reach-
ing “estrangement” (Czarniawska 2008, pp. 133–137) and analyzing what 
is taken for granted in computer science’s imaginaries and practices. As a 
trained computer scientist, it is not simply that I risked ‘going native’; I was 
already a quasi-native. Belonging to the same gender category as the majority 
project members can also be seen as a similar issue. 
Selecting a field site and negotiating access
When I first developed the idea for the study, in the summer of 2011, I had just 
received my university diploma in computer science. I wanted to pursue a PhD 
in Social Science in order to learn more about ICTs in relation to masculinity. 
Autonomous driving appeared to be a new and emerging field. It drew my 
attention due to its promises to make drivers expendable and to overthrow 
the hegemony of private car ownership in urban areas. My intuition was that 
the emergence of new transportation technologies could destabilize the links 
between masculinity, cars, and driving. I expected the field to be controversial 
with respect to the doing of masculinity.
It was through a friend that my attention was drawn to my future field site. 
While I was searching for a field site, a friend of mine wrote his computer 
science Master’s thesis on pedestrian detection in a project in autonomous 
driving at Freie Universität Berlin (hereafter FU). In addition to my friend’s 
stories about the project, I was attracted by the video demonstrations featured 
on the landing page of the project’s website. Throughout the years, the group 
has assembled three experimental vehicles,8 and the project was proud to 
8 Regular automobiles enhanced with sensors, GPS, and actuators to allow control through 
computers.
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demonstrate their work through these videos. The website’s landing page 
narrated the project’s history as a continuous success story: 
The AutoNOMOS team is part of the Artificial Intelligence Group of the Freie Univer-
sität Berlin. We, researchers and students, have the vision to develop the technology 
for driverless cars of the future. The team was founded in 2006 around Prof. Dr. Raúl 
Rojas. In 2007 the group managed to reach the semi-finals of the DARPA Urban Chal-
lenge 2007. The AutoNOMOS group managed to become one of the chosen projects 
in 2009 for a market-oriented program (ForMaT9) created by the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research as initiative within the German High-Tech Strategy.10
The project’s website was filled with press releases and video demos about 
their latest achievements. The video demonstrations covered numerous areas. 
These videos demonstrate various ways of controlling a car through comput-
ers. I downloaded all the videos, press releases, and articles on the project, 
and I took screenshots of the website. I started to archive everything on my 
hard drive.
To negotiate access to the field site, I went to my friend’s thesis defense to 
approach Prof. Rojas in person. I signaled my interest in spending time with 
the group in order to learn more about how the project team engages with 
autonomous driving. Rojas granted me access and said that he sees my project 
as benefiting them as a form of “project documentation” (Fieldnote 02/14/13). 
Rojas is the only real name in my presentation of the empirical material. 
While I do refer to actual publications written by projects members, I have 
otherwise taken this drastic measure in order to make it difficult to decipher 
which first name maps to which actual member. I anonymized all the project 
members (apart from Rojas) by using popular male ‘German’ first names, such 
as Thomas and Michael. I did this for two reasons, but it comes with a cost. 
First, the project was male-dominated during my fieldwork. With students 
coming in to write their qualification theses and leaving afterwards, it was 
hard to specify, at any given point in time, exactly how many people belonged 
to project. I mostly followed what I recognized as an all-male informal ‘core’ 
team, which consisted of 8 members at the beginning of my field work and 5 
at the end. 
9 ForMaT is an acronym for “Forschung für den Markt im Team“ (research team for the 
market). The funding line (Hiepe 2007) was limited to teams from Eastern Germany, 
officially called ‘new federal states’ (Neue Länder). All of Berlin counts as a ‘new fed-
eral state.’ As a result, West Berlin’s FU was able to benefit from the funding line.
10 https://web.archive.org/web/20110719204731/http://autonomos-labs.com/ [Checked on 
03/04/20]
33
During my fieldwork there was one female project member. She is only 
mentioned here because I do not want to expose her. Second, some of the 
members had backgrounds in migrant families or were migrants themselves. 
For example, Prof. Rojas was born in Mexico City and came to West Berlin in 
the 1980s to write his PhD on the production process of Das Kapital (Rojas 
1989) before being appointed as Professor for Artificial Intelligence (Thio 
2012). My use of male ‘German’ names makes any diversity within the project 
team invisible. This is open to criticism, as I homogenize the project team 
through my description. 
Almost all the practitioners during my fieldwork were men. I am using 
the heteronormative categories of men and women as if these were unprob-
lematic. The field I am describing is heteronormative. During my field work 
non-binary genders were not present and non-heterosexual sexualities were 
never a topic of conversation. However, at no point in time did I ask members 
how they self-identify in terms of gender and sexual identity. This binary 
classification of project members relies on my interpretation alone. The field 
of autonomous driving research is an extreme case of gendered divisions of 
labor. In this study I intentionally use the heteronormative categories of men 
and women to highlight that this is a man’s world.
To study men and masculinities with an almost exclusively male group of 
computer scientists runs the risk of reifying masculinity as a feature of men. 
In addition, it may contribute to reproducing the equation of technology and 
masculinity. However, as laid down in my theoretical approach, I assume 
gender to be a sociotechnical assemblage. It is an effect of sociotechnical 
processes. Gender is something that results from the making and unmaking 
of links within an assemblage. If technology and masculinity appear to be 
a fixed, ‘natural’ connection, it is not because of a given ‘male essence’ or 
because technology is inherently patriarchal; it is an effect of the constant 
iterations that maintain the stability of the connection. Nevertheless, rela-
tions between masculinity and technology are historically, culturally and 
mutually constituted and thus potentially open for transformation.
Finally, I also homogenized the project team in terms of their academic 
training. My typification of all members as computer scientists in the area 
of robotics and artificial intelligence neglects the fact that one of core team 
members was an electrical engineer and that some of the students who 
became temporary members of the project (as part of their qualification the-
ses) were from technical universities rather than non-technical universities, 
such as FU.
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Doing fieldwork and analysis
In June 2012 I started visiting the project whenever my university posi-
tions in western Germany would allow it—that is, predominantly during 
non-teaching seasons. I used participant observation to generate fieldnotes. 
I started by “memoing” (Emerson et al. 2011, pp. 171–199) my analytical 
insights and questions and by keeping a research diary.
Ethnographers are embodied research instruments which are calibrated 
by moving between field and desk (Knorr-Cetina 2002, pp. 36–37). 
During the first phase, in 2012, I became acquainted with the field and 
my field site. On my first day out with the project members and one of 
their automobiles, I decided to take pictures and to film the interactions 
inside the car; in total I recorded videos of five different test-drives. Since 
project members were used to having journalists around, they did not seem 
uncomfortable being filmed. Braun-Thürmann (2002) has also observed 
that roboticists are skilled in presenting themselves while going about their 
work. At the end of the first phase, I expanded my repertoire to include 
ethnographic interviewing (9 in total). In February 2013 I returned for a 
more intense stay. I continued to visit the project for special occasions 
until November 9, 2015, when a point of empirical saturation had been 
reached. 
During my fieldwork in the project, I usually introduced myself as a 
computer scientist. This was intended to position myself as somebody 
who can appreciate their engagement with ICTs. As we know from other 
studies of scientists and engineers, researchers tend to draw from multiple 
discourses when describing a technology (Wynne 1988, pp. 160–161), e.g. 
public and private discourses. When I am recognized as a fellow computer 
scientist who is interested in the details of their work, practitioners tend not 
to sugarcoat the limitations of their approach to autonomous driving. In fact, 
some members were very open about the difficulties in automating driving. 
It is noteworthy that the level of rapport was different with each individual 
member. Some addressed me as if I were a journalist, or some other outsider 
to the project, by trying to ‘sell’ me autonomous driving. 
For some practitioners, the fact that I was a computer scientist who was 
interested in hanging out with other computer scientists—and not in doing 
‘proper’ work in computer science—seemed troubling. Doing ethnography 
does not belong to the canon of computer science practice in Germany. This 
led to some interesting reactions, ranging from one member suspecting me of 
plagiarizing his PhD thesis to another ignoring me completely once he found 
out that I was not a proper project member. After I had shadowed Michael 
for a while, he eventually introduced me to temporary project members as a 
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recurring guest for whom “everything is interesting” (Fieldnote 08/22/13). 
This was a typification with which I could identify. 
I tell these things not out of vanity, but because I find the nature of the 
rapport and the manner in which I was positioned to be crucial to what kind 
of stories were told to me and how they were told. I view the stories that 
emerged during participant observation and in the ethnographic interviews as 
co-fabricated (Whatmore 2003, pp. 90–92). This becomes salient with respect 
to heroic storytelling. For example, in chapter 4 one will find a “side-story” 
which Stefan tells me. Stefan succeeds in turning an account of a malfunc-
tioning research vehicle into an exciting story that concerns the life and death 
of the project. I support this storytelling by constantly giving reassurance 
and responding emotionally at important moments in the narrative. I assume 
that with a different audience the story would have been told differently. The 
stories they shared, and the way in which I showed interest in the technical 
details, not only made me an audience to their storytelling but also possibly 
contributed to male bonding. If I did not belong to the same gender category 
as the project members and had not studied computer science, then I might not 
have become a competent quasi-member. For example, a female who is not 
a computer scientist might have had difficulties escaping tokenism (Götsch 
2014, pp. 81–82). As a male computer scientist among male computer scien-
tists, I had little difficulties of blending in.
During the period of my fieldwork, the ‘core’ group in the project was a 
homosocial association. As an ethnographer and a computer scientist, I was 
able to participate in male homosocial bonding over technology. It should 
be noted that it is not the physical co-presence of men that constitutes male 
homosocial associations. As opposed to men-only clubs, for instance, mem-
bers of male homosocial associations often do not see themselves as a group 
constituted by gender (Meuser 2007, p. 41). Male homosocial associations are 
groups of men with a shared imaginary for orientation (Meuser 2010, p. 301). 
The course of my fieldwork was marked by disappointment when it occurred 
to me that I might be at the right place but at the wrong time. This may have been 
a case of “ethnographer’s anxiety” (Law 1994, pp. 43–47)—that is, an anxiety 
that can overcome ethnographers when they come to believe that the interesting 
stuff always happens when they are not around. What was it that made me 
anxious and disappointed? I arrived at my field site during the aftermath of a 
€2,2 million project that had funded 12 researchers and 8 student assistants. The 
project team became smaller and smaller because members’ contracts could not 
be extended due to lack of funding. The party was over. After the first year it 
dawned upon me: this is not a project that is continuously heading towards the 
future (as insinuated in the success story of project’s landing page); it is a pre-
carious project struggling to continue (see Kröger 2012). The observable work 
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in the project primarily took the form not of development or research—as I had 
hoped—but rather of maintenance and science communication. This redirected 
my research questions from the making of autonomous driving to the imagining 
of autonomous driving. I will return, in the following chapter, to the precarious 
state of the project during my fieldwork. 
In this final section, I elaborate on the types of materials that I selected for 
analysis. I developed my perspective as an ethnographer in the social sciences 
through group interpretation sessions (Forschungswerkstatt) (Reichertz 2013). 
Ethnography is craftwork; you cannot learn only by reading text books. I have 
benefited from learning from experienced ethnographers with backgrounds in 
STS, Sociology, Gender Studies, and European Ethnology. In interpretation 
group sessions, I not only presented my own materials but also learned from 
joint interpretations of materials from other research projects. 
My archive includes different forms of data materials that emerge from 
four sources:
(1) Naturally occurring materials or found materials i.e. materials produced 
by project members: video demonstrations, promotional texts (mostly from 
the website), scientific articles, reports, magazine articles for interested 
audiences, and qualification theses.
(2) Materials co-fabricated with project members: ethnographic fieldnotes, 
ethnographic interviews (audio and transcriptions), and videos of rehearsal 
drives and technology demonstrations. 
(3) Materials produced with project members by journalists: radio debates/
features, television programs, and articles concerning on the project. 
(4) My analytic notes: memos and research diary, notes from group interpreta-
tion sessions and from feedback sessions with my PhD advisors.
The differences between these types of materials pose a challenge. At first, 
I consulted literature on each specific form—that is, video analysis for demon-
stration videos (Reichertz and Englert 2011), videography for my own videos 
of street trials (Tuma et al. 2013), and interview analysis (Helfferich 2011) for 
my ethnographic interviews. However, this seemed unsatisfactory since these 
approaches are constructed for studies with only one type of material.
The literature that I consulted on ethnography (Hammersley and Atkin-
son 2007; van Maanen 2011; Gay y Blasco and Wardle 2007; Breidenstein 
et al. 2013; Emerson et al. 2011; Gobo 2008; Dellwing and Prus 2012; Fetter-
man 2010) and narrative analysis (Czarniawska 1997, 2004, 2008, 2014) deals 
explicitly with the problem of how to integrate different types of data material 
into an analysis. This does not mean that I use all the different materials in 
each chapter; the empirical chapters (2–6) have different analytic foci and rely 
on different materials.
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I identified the project’s video demonstrations as found materials. 
I view them as naturally occurring materials constructed under certain 
circumstances and with specific intentions. These video demonstrations 
were already around when I entered the field. I was not able to observe their 
process of production. However, what makes them relevant to my study is that 
they were consequential for the members during the time of my fieldwork. 
As documents, video demonstrations are an additional layer of meaning 
(Sinnschicht). I analyzed them with respect to their content and form. In other 
words, I treated them as stories in their own right by giving attention to: the 
characters they mobilize; their themes and figurations; the type of narrative 
they deploy; and the manner in which specific visions are articulated. In 
addition, I took into consideration how members interpret the genre of video 
demonstrations, both in general and according to specific instances. This 
relates to the performative aspects of the videos. What do these videos do for 
the project? What are their consequences? How are they both beneficial and 
harmful elements of the project?
My fieldnotes were supported by my own video recordings. It was over-
whelming to observe safety drivers monitoring and operating their research 
vehicles. So many things were happening simultaneously inside and outside 
the car! My videos of street trials enabled me to slow down and repeat the 
action that had taken place inside the research vehicle. This helped me to see 
reoccurring patterns and to give attention to finer details. Watching excerpts 
from my videos with other social scientists proved to useful in challenging 
my own interpretations and bringing me to an understanding of what was 
happening during the recorded events.
From the nine interviews that I conducted with project members (including 
two who were former members at the time) and an expert from Stanford Uni-
versity, I eventually selected six for transcription and open coding. I identified 
passages that puzzled me for more detailed analysis. In contrast to the stories 
that I was told informally during participant observation, the interviews were 
opportunities for eliciting stories and capturing them on tape. Many of the 
stories that I elicited seemed well-rehearsed. I understand the narration in 
these interviews to be the result of an available repertoire of stories and inter-
pretative themes (Czarniawska 2014). In my study, most practitioners have 
experience being interviewed by journalists. On many occasions, the stories 
and narratives I elicited through interviews and informal chats are seen as col-
lectively produced and rehearsed. Other stories were constructed specifically 
for me; the stories from the safety drivers that I analyze in chapter 3 provided 
an opportunity for the safety drivers to reflect on their experiences, tactics, 
and strategies in monitoring and operating a research vehicle. Identities are 
enacted through positioning and narrating within a shared imaginary.
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Chapter 2 | The AutoNOMOS project
The AutoNOMOS project is a research project in autonomous driving. In this 
chapter, I introduce the AutoNOMOS project by conceptualizing it as local 
network that is made up of roboticists, computationally enhanced automo-
biles, and visionary stories. I begin by describing my field site and the project 
members’ perception of the state of the project. I continue by describing the 
computationally enhanced automobile “MiG”, the main demonstrator and 
research instrument of the project, and the manner in which MiG relates to a 
mosaic of visionary stories. The chapter concludes by tracing the assembly of 
a global network that shapes the conditions of street trials.
The project members
The AutoNOMOS project is part of FU (Freie Universität Berlin). A ride on 
the subway takes me to the posh neighborhood of Dahlem, which is outside 
the S-Bahn-ring that encloses Berlin’s inner-city districts. This comes with 
a change of scenery. The subway emerges above ground until it reaches 
Dahlem Dorf (literal translation “Dahlem village”). The subway station 
exit is a half-timbered structure. An air of privilege surrounds Dahlem; it 
is less busy than the inner-city districts of Berlin. There is little motorized 
traffic apart from the main avenues. On a weekday, one can see more people 
walking on the side streets than driving on them. The streets are quiet, with 
little motorized traffic, but there are parked cars on every side street. There 
are lots of trees and individual mansions with gardens, some of which host 
departments of FU. Among these mansions you can find other buildings that 
make up FU: there are larger concrete buildings from the 1950s on, as well 
as the main buildings from the 1970s, which—with their metal (rather than 
concrete or brick) facade—remind me of a space station.
You might be surprised to find a project on autonomous driving at FU. 
After all, it is not a technical university! FU was founded, following World 
War II, as an alternative to the Humboldt University, which is located in what 
was then East Berlin. FU was one of the hotspots of the student rebellion that 
took place in the second half of the 1960s. Today, it is one of Germany’s largest 
and most prestigious universities, with more than 30,000 students. It hosts 
many departments, ranging from medicine to a variety of humanities, social 
sciences, and natural sciences. However, there is no engineering department.
The AutoNOMOS project is part of Intelligent Systems and Robotics Group 
(formerly Artificial Intelligence Group) at the Institute of Computer Science, 
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which belongs to the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science. The 
project members are hosted inside an office building on a calm, tree-lined 
side street. The space of the project is dispersed, as it includes several offices, 
a seminar room which is used for project meetings, and a shared kitchen, as 
well as the shared workshop of the RoboCupSoccer11 team and the autono-
mous driving scale model team. The project members share the building with 
other working groups from the computer science department. In the office 
building, the team works on the software and holds their weekly Monday 
morning project meetings. These meetings take place at the institute’s semi-
nar room, which consists of rows of tables and a black board in the front. The 
seminar room is also used for oral exams (e.g. defenses of master thesis). At 
the Monday morning meeting a project member will typically present his/
her ongoing work or material from attended conferences. Less often plans 
are discussed. During the window of my study the project meetings were 
often canceled due to a lack of presenters. The Monday morning meeting is 
supposed to be attended by all members of the project. Apart from lunch, it 
is the only regular event I oversaw where most of the project members come 
together. 
Most project members were computer scientists from non-technical 
universities. Many studied at FU. They often became project members while 
pursuing their program of study in computer science. Courses on subjects 
from the areas of robotics and AI are electives that often take the form of 
educational projects, such as RoboCupSoccer. The majority of team members 
worked on robots before entering the AutoNOMOS project. However, the 
study program of computer science does not offer courses in automotive 
engineering or electrical engineering. 
The Intelligent Systems and Robotics Group is led by Prof. Raúl Rojas. 
The management of the AutoNOMOS project is undertaken by PhD students 
or post-doctoral researchers. The project is also the topic of many qualifica-
tion theses (B.Sc. to PhD). The AutoNOMOS project belongs to FU, but it 
relies heavily on third-party funding. Industrial PhDs are externally funded. 
Graduate students either work for free as part of their qualification theses or 
are hired as student assistants (studentische Hilfskräfte). The FoRmaT project 
(2009–11) made the AutoNOMOS project grow into a team of 25 members, 
ranging from student researchers to post-docs. When the funding from the 
FoRmaT project ran out, many project members finished their studies and 
left university; they received lucrative offers from the automotive industry 
11 RoboCupSoccer is organized around domestic and international events where Univer-
sity teams compete by having their robots play soccer against each other.
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(Interview Stefan 08/23/13). Project members applied for research grants but 
many were rejected. Rojas claims that funding institutions for basic research, 
such as the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft), no longer support autonomous driving because they think, “this is 
now up to the [automotive, GB] industry” (Interview Rojas 07/13/15). With 
few paid positions left in the project, it has decreased in size. This might 
sound surprising when one considers the hype surrounding autonomous 
driving at the time my field work 
The AutoNOMOS project is an elite group. Becoming a member is 
time-consuming and generally demanding. Potential members are expected 
to be skilled in programming in C++. According to a temporary member of 
the project, it took him three months to become acquainted with the code 
while working two days a week in the project (Fieldnote 08/26/13). The 
project, then, is open only to students who are able and willing to make a 
huge commitment. Rojas views the educational projects of RoboCupSoccer 
and the autonomous driving scale model project as less demanding: “Students 
[male gender, GB] who do not have so much time at their disposal and who 
only want to learn some aspects of robotics join these projects” (Interview 
Rojas 07/13/15).
Metaphors of stasis occur frequently when the remaining project members 
describe the current state of the project. During ethnographic interviews and 
informal chats, project members often contrast their perception of stasis 
in the present with their memory of a heroic and lively past of the project. 
The stories they tell about the past highlight passion and dedication, often 
involving collectively spent nights of coding and testing (Chapter 4). During 
a group meeting I joined in December 2012, a plan is announced in which the 
subproject focused on the third research vehicle will “hibernate” (Fieldnote 
12/03/12) until spring. This means that all the remaining resources will be 
concentrated on their second research vehicle (the first research vehicle had 
already been decommissioned and scavenged for parts). During an interview 
nine months later, Stefan expresses his dissatisfaction with what he perceives 
as stasis:
In principle, we have only been showing the car12 to the press for two years, but noth-
ing has progressed. The development is standing still. (“Wir zeigen seit zwei Jahren 
eigentlich immer nur noch das Auto in der Presse, aber bewegt hat sich da überhaupt 
gar nichts mehr. Also die Entwicklung steht.“) (Interview Stefan 08/23/13).
12 He refers to the second research vehicle, MiG, which will be properly introduced 
shortly.
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Stefan’s assessment of the development as “standing still” does not imply 
that the project has been discontinued. The project has research vehicles at its 
disposal but lacks the necessary members for exploiting the potential of these 
vehicles. Stefan points out that the project members are continuously demon-
strating “the car” for TV and print journalists. In the following vignette, I 
asked Thomas how much time he spends with working with the press.
Thomas tells me that they take journalists for a ride in the car five times a year. He 
would prefer an interview once a month, including a photo session, because this does 
not require a second project member. Journalists call him “every other day,” but he is 
not available at the moment. All the paper work, such as contracts, makes it even more 
time-consuming. (Fieldnote 07/23/15)
Journalists are eager to film the research vehicle in action. For the project 
members, however, this means dedicating a significant portion of their time 
towards preparing, rehearsing and conducting a demonstration. Interviews and 
photo sessions require considerably less effort from of the project members.
The project is simultaneously active in relation to the outside—as it is 
frequently reported on in the media—and perceived as being stagnant on 
the inside. Christian describes their current work to a journalist by saying 
“debugging is most of the work we do” (Fieldnote 03/10/14). Debugging means 
troubleshooting software. For Christian, this takes the form of “feeding” 
algorithms with data and “observing how they behave” (Fieldnote 03/10/14). 
Developing something new, e.g. trying out new approaches, was a smaller 
portion of the whole project during the period of my fieldwork. The larger part 
of the work in the project was dedicated to its stabilization, its demonstrator 
(i.e., the research vehicle), and its imaginary of autonomous driving as an 
emerging technology. 
The main research vehicle needs to be kept up and running; it demands 
technical care work in order to preserve its capabilities (Chapter 3). A bias 
is manifest in the contrast that is invoked between moving forward through 
development and sustaining the project through maintenance and science 
communication. Developmental activities are generally valued over commu-
nicative activities and maintenance.
Technological artifacts 
Project members spend most of the day working on their computers in offices 
(Image 1). Apart from e-mail communication, the predominant use of the 
computers is the extension and maintenance of the project’s code base and 
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using the recorded data from street trials for simulations. Computers are the 
major tools by which members do their jobs. 
Yet what makes this project an unusual computer science project is an 
element of the sociotechnical assemblage that cannot be found in the office 
building. The computationally enhanced Volkswagen Passat, called “MadeIn-
Germany”13 (hereafter: MiG), distinguishes this working group from many 
other areas and projects in computer science and robotics. The research of the 
group differs from the majority of the research done in computer science (e.g. 
databases, formal logics etc.) since it develops software that materializes in 
visible actions of a tangible artifact, which one can literally inhabit by sitting 
inside of it. 
The technological project is distributed. While its human members, 
together with their offices and computers, are located in the computer science 
building, MiG is sheltered in its indoor parking space (“Garage”). The human 
members and their computers are separated from MiG. In order to go about 
their daily work, the majority of human project members do not depend on 
the physical co-presence of the car. Most of their work can be done with the 
desktop computers in their offices. The office building where the working 
13 According to Rojas, the names of their experimental vehicles are part of a strategy to 
make their efforts visible by literally putting themselves on the map (Interview Rojas 
07/13/15). They named their first car “Spirit of Berlin” and their second research vehi-
cle “MadeInGermany.” The use of these geographical markers does not come without 
associations. While Spirit of Berlin was supposed to be a reference to the land speed 
record-setting race cars (all named “Spirit of America”), “MadeInGermany” refers to 
the well-known trademark which was initially introduced as a British warning label 
against inferior German products in the 19th century. Today, “Made in Germany” sig-
nals high-quality industrial products rather than cutting edge ICTs (Trischler 2007, p. 
45). Associating their car with the brand “Made in Germany” is a powerful move. By 
appropriating a global trademark, this computer science project claims membership in 
German engineering and manufacturing.
Image 1: One of the office rooms in the building
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group is based does not have an indoor parking space. From the office building 
it is a brief walk to its “garage.” You walk through a quiet street lined with 
old trees and enter the physics department, a large concrete building from the 
1970s. The indoor parking space is inside a large physics laboratory.
Michael enjoys entering the physics laboratory from the top entrance where a metal 
staircase leads to the ground. He loves this view of the laboratory. The ceiling of the 
laboratory is two stories high. From the top of the staircase you can see over a vast 
collection of experimental apparatuses from the physics department. Some of them 
seem actively used; others seem to just be stored here. Michael often jokes that the 
project members started to call these apparatuses “doomsday devices” because the 
members do not know what they are for but they look as if they belonged to mad 
scientists. Physically separated from the physicists’ experimental apparatuses by office 
cabinets and in the corner near the big door, MiG is parked inside the laboratory. Some 
of MiG’s modifications are visible from the outside, such as the rotating LIDAR on top 
of the roof (Image 2).
The laboratory space is shared, yet team members rarely engage with their 
hosts. They joke about their colleagues from the Physics Department by pro-
jecting the science fiction trope of “doomsday devices” onto their equipment. 
Among these “doomsday devices” is a Volkswagen Passat station wagon 
modified by Volkswagen Research with additional sensors, actors, and an 
interface that the project members use to access some aspects of the MiG’s IT 
infrastructure (Wang 2012, pp. 64–67).
Image 2: MiG (front) in its “garage” with physicists (background) and their equipment
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Members have an abundance of terms indexing MiG. When they are 
among themselves they usually use terms like “the car” (“das Auto”), “MiG” 
or “Passat.” Yet when communicating to lay or expert audiences, e.g. in articles 
and presentations or during public engagement events, other terms are more 
likely to be used: “autonomous vehicle,” “autonomous car,” “driverless car,” 
“self-driving car,” “experimental vehicle,” “research vehicle,” “test vehicle,” 
“research platform,” “test-rig,” “robot,” and “prototype”. 
Each label presupposes a typification. These terms are not ‘just’ descrip-
tive. They position the project and MiG in a specific way. The typifications 
come with certain claims about its present purpose or its imagined potentials. 
Some of these terms, such as “test-rig,” “research platform,” and ”research 
vehicle,” suggest that MiG is an instrument for conducting basic research 
in robotics and artificial intelligence (see Reuschenbach et al. 2011, p. 435). 
Terms such as “autonomous car” or “autonomous vehicle” suggest that MiG 
is a result of their research. In other words, these terms perform the project as 
a project in applied research. Such terms might even insinuate that the project 
is developing the autonomous vehicle as a certified consumer product. Clearly, 
however, this is out of reach for a university project. 
The semantic space opened up by these labels indicates that MiG oscillates 
between two poles: research instrument and demonstrator. For the project 
members, it is at once a means to conduct research and a means to com-
municate results of the research to different audiences. These two poles are 
irreducible to one another.
A mosaic of visionary stories 
The landing page of the project’s website proclaims, “We, researchers and 
students, have a common vision for developing the technology of the driverless 
cars of the future.”14 An introduction for a conference paper written by project 
members says, “It is the ultimate aim to have a completely autonomous car 
that can drive in daily traffic by [on, GB] its own without human intervention” 
(Czerwionka et al. 2011, p. 78). These are elements of visionary stories that 
constitute the last piece of the triangle. The roboticists and their technolog-
ical artifacts are tied together by a vision. Yet the vision is not a singular 
promissory narrative. As I will argue in this section, the vision emerges from 




elements of the vision can be seen as unable to fit together. It is for this reason 
that I adopt the metaphor of a mosaic. With a mosaic, one’s visual impression 
depends on one’s distance from it. Up close it may seem messy, yet from a 
distance a beautiful pattern may become visible. 
In the following vignette, I engage in a discussion with two project members 
about MiG’s new ‘outfit,’ which leads to the articulation of a particular problem. 
I am meeting Thomas at the car’s garage 
to join him and other team members for a 
public engagement event. I notice that the 
stickers on the MiG’s chassis have been 
altered since my last visit in the garage. At 
the height of the trunk, you can now see 
(Image 3) a schematic drawing of the upper 
body of an old-fashioned science fiction 
robot with antennas on its head. Next to 
it, there is an explanation (in German and 
English, depending on the side of the car). 
It says, “This car is self-driving. Everyone 
inside is a passenger.” I share my surprise 
about the new logo with Thomas. He says 
“it’s cool” and explains that it was put on by 
their partner in Switzerland, who had recently invited the project as an attraction for 
the opening of a new business campus. 
When we arrive at the public engagement event, I ask another team member, Martin, 
for his take on the new sticker. He likes the new logo, too. He reports that during 
test-drives in Kleinmachnow (a suburb of Berlin) it has drawn more attention towards 
the car. He argues that it has never been clear what the old logo—three interlinked 
tori—actually means (Fieldnote 06/13/15).
The stickers on MiG’s chassis change from time to time. Project members are 
pleased with this sticker. Thomas and Martin identify with the new inscrip-
tion. Despite the fact that it was applied by their Swiss hosts, they see it as 
reflecting MiG’s essence. For them it solves a problem. They have experienced 
that, during street trials, MiG can be easily mistaken by project outsiders for 
the Google Street View car (Kröger 2012).15 The demonstrator’s meaning 
15 In Germany in 2008, Google’s initiative to send out cars to take panoramic pictures for 
its “Street View” service had sparked a controversy that was widely reported in the news.
Image 3: The inscription on MiG in 2015
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is not self-evident; it relies on an inscription to become legible. The sticker 
makes visible what is otherwise visible only to specialists. It makes visible that 
this is not a normal car, that it is more than a car—it is a robot! By drawing on 
retro science fiction symbolism, MiG is positioned as the embodiment of the 
“driverless car of the future.”16 The sticker figures MiG as if the vision had 
already been realized. Retro science fiction serves as an interpretive template. 
To become a meaningful, an image of the past is inscribed onto MiG. The 
“self-driving” automobile relies on a vision of the past to become meaningful. 
Visionary storytelling can serve many functions. In the above vignette, it 
addresses the problem of being ignored or misunderstood by project outsiders. 
The next interview transcript illustrates how visionary storytelling can also 
serve as a tool to manage a project. Start-out stories are particularly important 
for future-oriented projects, since at the beginning of a project little is certain 
(Deuten and Rip 2000, p. 78). In order to orient members’ actions, a techno-
logical project needs a story in which the envisioned technology plays a role. 
In the following interview transcript, Rojas accounts retrospectively for the 
circumstances that led to the production of a particular start-out story. 
My question is motivated by my curiosity about why it is that a team 
with success in robotics in laboratory environments moves outside into the 
messiness of everyday traffic. Robotics usually takes place in highly con-
strained and controlled environments, as is the case with industrial robots or 
RoboCupSoccer. Rojas justifies his decision to move to autonomous driving 
as stemming from a need for new challenges. Providing new opportunities for 
challenges is narrated as his leadership strategy to keep up morale. Visionary 
storytelling serves as a management tool to build a shared sense of purpose 
for the project members.
GB: What was your motivation for taking the step “out of the laboratory”?
R: Oh well, yeah, …… (thinks) I think it was a kind of saturation. (laughs) We were 
already world champion 2004, 2005. You could say we had done everything in 
RoboCupSoccer. And then I thought, now we need a new challenge. And then the 
competitions with autonomous vehicles started, and I was mostly interested in the real 
deployment and the societal effects. When we started up in Stanford 2006, we were 
together with the Stanford group that later went to Google. The journalists asked, “Why 





R: (Indirectly citing Stanford knowledge) because autonomous vehicles will be safer, 
no one will die, no one will be run over any more. I said something different. I always 
said I do it,
(GB expresses attentiveness)
because then you can really make car-sharing a reality in the cities. And that would 
relieve the strain on the cities. Instead of 1 million vehicles in a city you could make 
do with 100 or 200 000.
That would really make traffic safer, but even more it would make it so much more 
efficient—there would be less environmental pollution, traffic would even be faster, 
there wouldn’t be a sea of cars at every corner of the city. That was the difference in 
perspective. Both things are complementary, but I always underlined the social aspect 
in the sense of a new kind of city (Interview Rojas 07/13/15).
My question prompts Rojas to tell the origin story of the vision of the project. 
It is a story about a story. Rojas begins with the story of how he and his 
PhD students became interested in autonomous vehicles and ends with the 
kind of potential that they see in autonomous driving. The story Rojas tells 
me adopts the narrative form of a hero’s journey. In the genre of product 
creation stories, project teams are the heroes in the beginning (Deuten and 
Rip 2000, p. 69). The story creates characters with typifications and a setting. 
The initial state of the story is that its heroes (Rojas and his group of junior 
researchers) have succeeded in past adventures (RoboCupSoccer) and are in 
need of a new challenge. The DARPA Grand Challenges open up new oppor-
tunities for adventure. In turn, Rojas and his team travel to the heartland of 
ICT innovations, Silicon Valley,17 and seek the wisdom of their mentors, i.e. 
Sebastian Thrun and his team at Stanford University.18 A second group of 
supporting characters, the journalists, make an appearance and confront the 
researchers from Berlin and Stanford. They ask about the researchers’ motives 
and expectations. Their answers differ. The Stanford group promises to make 
driving safer. Rojas’ motivation for developing technologies for autonomous 
17 During my fieldwork, Silicon Valley was the world-wide center for research and inno-
vation in autonomous driving. German car makers had also opened up subsidiaries for 
research and innovation in autonomous driving in Silicon Valley.
18 The Stanford team had created the first computationally enhanced car to finish a 
DARPA Grand Challenge (Broggi et al. 2016).
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driving goes beyond of that of their mentors. He imagines the possibility of 
significantly reducing individual motorized city traffic by making car-sharing 
schemes more convenient. Autonomous vehicles are the means to make cities 
more sustainable and livable. The role of the hero has shifted from project 
team to the imagined end-products of the research projects (Deuten and Rip 
2000, p. 88).
Different narratives articulate elements of the project’s vision on differ-
ent occasions, for varying audiences (see chapter 6), and through multiple 
genres and media. Occasions for visionary storytelling are manifold, and may 
include: public engagement events (e.g. “Long Night of the Sciences”, “Science 
Slam”, “TEDx”19); technology demonstrations (e.g. Freie Universität Berlin 
9/13/2011; Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 8/15/2012); public 
lecture series;20 interviews (e.g. Schönball 2009; Tychsen 2014; Boytchev 2014; 
Eva-Maria Götz, Michael Roehl 5/27/2015); discussions with spokespersons 
of the automotive industry;21 articles for non-specialist audiences (e.g. Rojas 
2012, 2013, 2014); and academic texts for specialist audiences (Wang 2012; 
Rojas and Ulbrich 2013; Reuschenbach et al. 2011; Czerwionka et al. 2011).22 
Another outlet for visionary stories is the project’s website, which features 
video demonstrations23 and self-descriptions of the project. The website fea-
tures a section covering frequently asked questions (FAQ) by journalists and 
other outsiders. FAQs are a common format in technological cultures. They 
were popularized in USENET newsgroups to deal with recurring questions of 
newcomers that had already been addressed by its members (Hersch 1997). 
The following excerpt from the project’s FAQ is a response to the question: 
“You describe your car as ‘green’. Why?” The question is skeptical and 
demands an explanation. The following answer justifies driverless car research 
by envisioning a specific use for autonomous vehicles. 
In our vision of the future, autonomous vehicles will be deployed as “taxis” in urban 
areas. Many people today neglect the advantages of car sharing, due to the dominating 
inconvenience: it’s a pain not to have a car available on demand at any time of the 
day. One solution would be cars that independently picks [sic] passengers up. With 
a signal to the coordination system, the next available vehicle collects the passenger 
19 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zmffUHFM6Kk [Checked on 03/27/19]
20 E.g. “Berliner Gespräche” (Berlin) “Telepolis Gespräch“ (Munich)
21 According to Rojas (2012), automotive industry representatives rejected the vision as 
“blasphemy” because it does not take the ‘joy of driving’ seriously.
22 My presence in the field in the also opened up opportunities for visionary storytelling 
(Chapter 3 & 4).
23 The genre and format of video demonstrations is explored in chapter 4.
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meterprecise from their current GPS position, and proceeds directly to the desired 
destination or connection to other mode of transport. This would allow an optimal 
mix of cars, buses and other transport modes to be achieved. Through the transport of 
multiple passengers per vehicle, road traffic density could be reduced. Cars, currently 
spending 80% of their time unused, would no longer pose a burden. Remaining cars 
could flow faster and more efficiently through traffic. Time and energy would be 
saved. This is a vision of the future which is only viable in the long term, and requires 
social acceptance. It is however an attractive alternative to the current situations in 
metropolises like Tokyo and Mexico City. In the states [In countries, GB] with high 
populations only beginning to increase personal mobility—China and India—this 
offers an opportunity to pursue a more environmentally sustainable course. This is 
why we describe autonomous driving as “green.”24
The answer tells a visionary story in which autonomous driving could play a 
role in making motorized transportation more efficient and, as a result, cities 
more livable and sustainable. At the beginning, the vision is told from the 
frog’s-eye view of a car user and promises that autonomous taxis will be more 
comfortable than conventional car-sharing schemes. The vision associates 
autonomous driving with taxi and ride-sharing services. It uses taxi services 
and ride-sharing services as familiar frames of meaning to project them onto 
the future (see Czarniawska 2008, p. 33–38). 
The perspective then shifts from the individual user of mobility services 
to the bird’s-eye view of policy makers and city planners. It promises that if 
autonomous vehicles are integrated as components of an intelligent public 
transportation infrastructure, then trips with other modes of public trans-
portation can be made seamless. This would then diminish the advantage of 
individual cars for personal transportation. 
This vision translates traffic and personal transportation into an engineer-
ing problem that can be optimized for efficiency by automation and digitaliza-
tion. It argues that limited resources, such as time, energy and space, could be 
used more efficiently—thereby making cities more sustainable and livable—if 
the urban landscape were dominated by shared autonomous vehicles and other 
means of public transport, rather than by privately owned, manually driven 
cars. It tells a story of hope for those dreaming of cities that are less dominated 
by cars. Rojas uses an old-timey picture of Berlin in his presentation slides and 
in one of his articles (Rojas 2012) to illustrate for technology-savvy audiences 
how the streets of Berlin appeared before they were taken over by cars and 
24 https://web.archive.org/web/20140323085746/http://autonomos-labs.com:80/ [Click on 
“FAQ”, checked on 03/27/19]
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trucks. A photograph from the past here serves as the basis for projection onto 
the future.
The project’s vision of autonomous driving emerges from the mosaic of 
promissory stories that I have described above. The vision enacts a “prob-
lematization” (Callon 1986)—that is, it identifies a set of problems which it 
promises to solve through technological innovation. Problematization is a 
double move. From the position of the network builder (Rojas and his team), it 
defines actors in a such a way that their project appears indispensable to those 
who care about sustainable and livable cities. In this case, problematization 
takes place through the definition of a series of problems associated with 
privately owned and manual driven cars—for instance, they take up precious 
city space while both being used and not being used. Problematization also 
defines today’s automobile users. Car users are imagined as rational agents 
that choose between different modes of transportation. They are imagined as 
being open towards car-sharing schemes, as long as they are convenient. Con-
venience is characterized by the reduction of walking distances, e.g. walking 
to a parked shared car or a metro station. Convenience does not involve the 
habit of driving a car oneself or the emotional attachment to one’s own car.
The project’s problematization draws on a graphic and widely shared 
image—“a sea of cars at every corner” (Blechlawine an jeder Kreuzung)—as 
well as on the “antagonisms of automobility” (Böhm et al. 2006): if too many 
people pursue the ‘freedom of the road’ at the same time and place, it will lead 
to congestion and immobility. The image of a sea of cars defines individual car 
use as an issue to be resolved. However, the proposed solution does not address 
the issue directly; it does not, for example, demand a reduction of parking 
spaces or a ban of cars from densely inhabited areas. Rather, the problemati-
zation defines autonomous taxis as a “detour” (Latour 1987, pp. 111–113) for 
actors interested in greener cities. The vision appeals to its recipients: ‘If you 
want to make the city more livable and personal transportation more efficient 
by radically reducing the number of cars without loss of the convenience, 
then you will have to take a detour!’ The solution is to reconfigure driver-car 
relations. The vision suggests a radical break with today’s “regime of automo-
bility.” (Böhm et al. 2006) Instead of being privately owned by individuals, 
cars are imagined as publicly shared. Instead of being driven by humans, they 
are supposed to be controlled by ICTs. Instead of having cars independent of 
existing regimes of public transportation, the autonomous taxi integrates cars 
as an element within an all-encompassing public transportation system. 
What does the vision do for the project? As an emergent, prospective story, 
it ascribes potentials to an imagined end product that is narrated as a direct 
consequence of the project’s present research. Visions are performative in the 
sense that they do not simply represent the envisioned technology in a context; 
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they fabricate a context for MiG. Crafting a vision around MiG creates a rhe-
torical space for it in the future. It envisions a network in which autonomous 
vehicles could contribute to a transition towards more sustainable cities. 
The vision is transgressive. It has literally led Rojas’ group of junior 
researchers out of their basement in the Institute of Computer Science and 
onto the streets. By crafting a future, the project’s research becomes mean-
ingful beyond the advancement of robotics and AI as an academic field. By 
associating their project with discourses of sustainable urban transport, the 
project transgresses the boundaries of computer science expertise. In this 
vision, the project’s competence extends to issues of city and traffic planning 
(Verkehrs planung). The computer scientists’ expertise in topics of robotics, 
such as computer vision and trajectory planning, is extended to serve the 
population of a global mega city like Tokyo or Mexico City. In this manner, 
the group is constructed as a collective of visionaries skilled in predicting the 
relevance of the envisioned technology for urban transportation. Like other 
AI scientists, they claim to have the “ability to speak on behalf of an as yet 
unknown population of future machines” (Woolgar 1985, p. 566).
Emerging technologies are uncertain (Rotolo et al. 2015). Visionary stories 
reduce uncertainty by, e.g., performing driverless cars as a stable endpoint of 
a projected innovation trajectory. The following excerpt from the project’s 
FAQ draws on present and expected innovations to proclaim its inevitability. 
Are we standing before a transport revolution?
Autonomous driving will rather be evolutionary, and introduced alongside a gradual 
adjustment of traffic law. The driver assistance systems of today already offer aspects 
of autonomous driving, e.g. automatic parking and automatic speed control. Further 
assistance systems are continually being introduced at the luxury end of the market. 
Some vehicles offer pre-crash systems to prepare for emergency braking, or even col-
lision avoidance systems which initiate emergency stops. Many component suppliers 
work on further systems which will continually find entrance to the consumer market. 
In this way, the required technology will one day sit in every vehicle. The time to allow 
full autonomous driving will be a question for government.25
This piece of the vision narrates autonomous driving as the result of incre-
mental rather than radical innovation. It positions autonomous driving in 
line with developments in Advanced Driving Assistance Systems (ADAS). It 
25 https://web.archive.org/web/20140323085746/http://autonomos-labs.com:80/ [Click on 
“FAQ”, checked on 03/27/19]
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narrates the emergence of autonomous vehicles as the outcome of an evolu-
tionary process of incremental advances. The rising quantity of sensors and 
ICTs built into each new generation of cars will eventually lead to a qualitative 
change, turning plain old cars into “driverless cars of the future.” The differ-
ence between present ADAS and autonomous vehicles is to be found in the 
responsibilities of the driver. Even the most advanced ADAS does not make 
the driver expendable. S/he still has the responsibility to monitor his or her car 
while driving and to intervene if necessary. 
The story’s protagonist is not embodied by a specific hero. It narrates soci-
otechnical change as an unstoppable force leading to more and more ADAS. 
This narrative draws on technological determinism (MacKenzie and Wajcman 
1999, p. 5). It constructs technological change as an independent force, out-
side of society. Policy makers do have a say in it, but only in terms whether 
autonomous driving should be allowed or not. By imagining driverless cars 
as the end point of a continuous diffusion of ADAS, the mere possibility of 
autonomous driving is elevated to a certainty (“the required technology will 
one day sit in every vehicle”). 
Analytically, the vision emerging from the mosaic of visionary stories can 
be understood as a nesting of two distinct visions: the (1) autonomous taxi, 
a vision of a seamless public transportation system enabled by autonomous 
vehicles; and the “driverless car of future,” a vision of all-purpose autonomous 
vehicles. (2) Driverless cars are envisioned to be capable of taking over all the 
functions of human drivers. The nesting of the two visions diverts attention 
away from the uncertainties inherent in all emerging technologies. It performs 
the feasibility of driverless cars as a certainty. Such feasibility depends on the 
expectation that all the functions of human drivers can be safely and efficiently 
executed by automation and without supervision. Uncertainty is delegated to 
the domains of policy makers and consumers (“social acceptance”26). 
From visions to street trials
So far, I have described the AutoNOMOS project as a sociotechnical assem-
blage constituted by relations between its members, its artifacts, and its 
vision. Yet to give more substance to a vision of the “driverless car of the 
future,” it is not enough to assemble a local network consisting of researchers, 
narratives, sensors, and ICTs, together with a computationally enhanced 
26 https://web.archive.org/web/20140323085746/http://autonomos-labs.com:80/ [Click on 
“FAQ”, checked on 03/27/19]
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automobile embedded in the infrastructure of a University. The project must 
assemble a global network where additional resources can be allocated (Law 
and Callon 1992, p. 46). To make the vision more realizable, allies need to be 
enrolled and a global network needs to be shaped in favor of the realization 
of the vision.
All projects in autonomous driving have a common adversary: the traffic 
code and the authorities enforcing them. Project members usually refer to the 
U.N. Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, which has been ratified by almost 
all European countries (e.g. Wang 2012, p. 26). Article 8 states, “Every mov-
ing vehicle or combination of vehicles shall have a driver” (Inland Transport 
Committee 1968, p. 11). The Vienna Convention clearly demands that a human 
driver must always be conscious and present behind the wheel. The latest 
amendment to Article 8, which is a response to the diffusion of ADAS, is quite 
clear about the driver’s responsibilities: it is “the driver’s obligation to monitor 
and control any kind of action taken by a vehicle system” (Inland Transport 
Committee 2014, p. 11). If we understand autonomous driving to be unsu-
pervised, then autonomous driving on public roads is illegal. For supervised 
automated driving, traffic authorities have issued approvals for research and 
development purposes. 
In order to get MiG on the road, the project has to relate to the traffic 
authorities. The only option was to apply for a special permit for street trials 
(Erprobungsfahrten). The project had to fulfill two requirements. First, MiG’s 
modifications had to be approved by a licensed workshop. Second, it was 
necessary to develop a safety concept which demonstrates that MiG is no more 
dangerous than manually driven cars. 
All motorized vehicles on public roads require approval by safety author-
ities. Researchers cannot simply tinker with a car, reconfigure it a significant 
way, and then drive on public roads with the presumption that it is alright. 
Motorized vehicles, in Germany and many other countries, must be approved 
before they can legally operate on the road. Otherwise, they are considered 
hazardous and banned from public roads. Finding a licensed car workshop that 
was willing to vouch for MiG’s modifications was difficult. Stefan tells me in 
an interview how “nobody agreed to give us the signature” (Interview Stefan 
08/23/13). For example, the project approached their colleagues in automotive 
engineering at Technical University Berlin and at FU’s own workshop at the 
Botanical Garden. They all denied the project their signature because they did 
not want to become liable for modifications that they did not make themselves. 
Finally, and by coincidence, project members managed to recruit the person 
from whom they purchased their tires, who gladly vouched for the modifica-
tions because he was very fond of the project. Stefan concludes, “without him 
we could not have made it” (Interview Stefan 08/23/13).
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The project’s safety concept (Sicherheitskonzept) is a protocol for test-
drives27 which spells out rigorous tests that must be passed in computer simu-
lations and on enclosed grounds before a car is able to operate on public roads. 
The concept demands the presence of a safety driver behind MiG’s wheel 
and of a system observer behind a laptop that monitors MiG’s software. The 
safety concept also prescribes different ways of disconnecting the automobile 
from its modifications. MiG is fitted with emergency switches which—when 
applied—disconnect the systems (Wang 2012, pp. 65–66). In addition, the 
connection between the modifications and MiG is cut temporarily whenever 
the brake paddle or accelerator is pressed. Rather than using the Passat’s 
built-in actuators, the MiG is fitted with additional motors for steering; this 
allows a full separation of the systems. 
The safety concept was put to test (Prüfung) in a fenced-off area of the 
former Tempelhof Airport in Berlin. Thomas was the first safety driver of the 
project. He explained to me in an interview:
The TÜV (Technical Inspection Agency) wanted to know if the whole vehicle could 
still be controlled if anything happened at 30 or 50 km/h. And because we had certain 
requirements in the safety concept and said this and that will work. We can even inter-
vene in that time, we can make sure—even if the components go crazy—that in the 
end the safety driver can always make sure nothing happens. That was the test. So we 
drove and the TÜV said, now you turn the wheel right around. And then they wanted 
to see that it was no problem to control it so that it never gets dangerous. That was more 
or less the test. That was the test of our safety concept. (Interview Thomas 03/16/15)
In order to pass the test, the project had to demonstrate to the safety authorities 
that MiG “could be still controlled” by the safety driver. Thomas was able to 
demonstrate that he could resume control of MiG fast enough when the TÜV 
forced MiG to exhibit a totally random behavior.
The project’s vision promises something which cannot be realized within 
the regulations of most countries at the time of this writing.28 To conduct 
trials on public roads, the project had to relate to the traffic authorities and 
turn them from adversaries into allies. In the course of the network-building, 
MiG was reconfigured to satisfy the demands of their newly won allies. The 
project managed to negotiate a compromise with the traffic authorities. The 
27 Members tend to translate Erprobungsfahrt as “test-drive”. “Street trial” is a term 
taken from STS literature (Marres 2016). I am using the terms “test-drive” and “street 
trial” interchangeably.
28 The exceptions are autonomous driving on private grounds or forms of guided trans-
portation, such as the driverless Métro de Lille and the driverless Københavns Metro.
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requirement of two drivers—the safety driver29 and the system observer—has 
rendered the full realization of the vision impossible. This can be seen as 
ironic. For more than 80 years, autonomous driving has been promised to 
be safer than cars operated by human drivers (Kröger 2016, pp. 45–46), yet 
today’s traffic authorities consider MiG as potentially more dangerous. To be 
able to demonstrate that automobiles can be made driverless, two new driver 
figures—the safety driver and the system observer—had to be introduced. To 
demonstrate the feasibility of autonomous cars, the project had to prove that 
MiG is as controllable as any other car operated by a human driver. Ultimately, 
by being allowed to conduct street trials with MiG, the degree of reality of 
the project has increased through this very compromise (Latour 1996, p. 99).
To get MiG on the road, the local network had to withstand a series of tests. 
The project had to demonstrate that MiG is still as controllable as a regular 
automobile despite its modifications. Simultaneously, MiG is shaped by the 
global network through its implementation of a safety concept that satisfies 
the demands of the traffic authorities and the technical inspection agency. 
The configuration of street trials in urban areas is a compromise between the 
vision of unsupervised autonomous driving and the goal of reasonably safe 
motorized transportation.
29 As we will learn in following chapter, the fact that the safety driver sits behind the 
wheel changes what is put to test in a trial on public roads.
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Chapter 3 | Street trials30
The “real world”
Traditionally, experiments in robotics are conducted in the controlled envi-
ronments of enclosed laboratory spaces. Contrary to this, the AutoNOMOS 
project conducts its street trials in everyday city traffic. This move introduces 
additional sources of uncertainty and complexity to the sociotechnical assem-
blage. In the following excerpt from an interview, Thomas compares Rob-
oCupSoccer in the laboratory with autonomous driving “in the real world.”
I believe that what is interesting about autonomous driving is the “outside of the labora-
tory” (“raus aus dem Labor”). The kind of robotics I knew before was RoboCup. That 
was also very exciting. […] The disadvantage of the laboratory situation is that the colors 
had to be exactly the colors and the lights had to be exactly right. Let me put it this way, 
everything was a little bit fake (“Retorte”) in RoboCup. I understand why it is like it is. 
This is not criticism. And with the vehicle it is like that, you program the robot, but the 
robotic car (“Fahrzeugroboter”) drives in the real world. You cannot say that we only 
drive when it is sunny sky. It always has to work somehow. (Interview Thomas 03/16/15)
Thomas explains what attracts him to autonomous driving. For computer sci-
entists, autonomous driving is a complex and challenging endeavor. Thomas 
refers to the expectation that autonomous vehicles should be able to deal with 
all kinds of weather conditions. The “real world” is a proving ground for 
roboticists (Richardson 2015, pp. 124–127). 
Knowledge about situations in the “real world” is shared through story-
telling among project members. This form of storytelling is more than enter-
tainment—although it can certainly serve this goal. Telling stories about “real 
world” situations is an essential part of the work practices of project members 
(Orr 1996). In the following vignette, Michael includes me in the project’s 
community of discourse by telling me a particularly popular story.
Michael and I are smoking in front of the building where the human project members 
have their offices. We talk about the surprisingly nice weather. I ask him whether 
different weather conditions influence the reliability of the lane detection. Michael 
30 This chapter builds on and extends arguments I originally developed for an article 
(Both 2017).
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tells me that, in a case of wet roads, the contrast is stronger than on dry roads—mak-
ing the lane detection more robust. He continues by telling me the story of their first 
autonomous drive on the city Autobahn during heavy snow fall. Michael praises the 
other drivers for their cautious driving during that event. However, the other drivers did 
not stick to their lanes. Instead of driving in the original three marked lanes, the other 
drivers formed two queues because the lane markings were obscured by the snow. The 
car, however, drove stubbornly in between the two queues in the original middle lane 
(Fieldnote 02–04–13: 13).
Michael’s point is that weather conditions have an impact on MiG’s perfor-
mance. In the story, the car neglects joining the other drivers in their newly 
formed queues. MiG’s performance is interpreted within a frame of adaptation 
to local traffic conditions. The sociotechnical assemblage is anthropomor-
phized and attributed to a personality (“stubborn”). The story’s point is that 
MiG fails to adapt to the other road users. In a situation where lane markings 
are concealed by snow and all the other drivers ignore them, why does the car 
still drive within the invisible lanes? I will keep this a mystery to be resolved 
in the course of this chapter. 
Stories about situations figure MiG’s relationship with its environment, 
and especially with other traffic participants and the road infrastructure. 
These are institutionalized stories of events in which MiG serves as the pro-
tagonist. The stories may be very brief and elliptic. Project members recount 
them externally—in written and oral form, e.g. in popular science articles 
(Rojas 2013, p. 93), and in public engagement settings—as well as internally to 
highlight or discuss specific characteristics of the sociotechnical assemblage. 
Stories about situations usually recount events in which MiG’s capaci-
ties to deal adequately with the “real world” are exceeded. Because MiG’s 
behavior becomes problematic in these stories, they are of high significance 
for the project members. Through listening to the stories about situations, I 
learned how members make sense of and configure MiG’s relationship with its 
environment, as well as how MiG’s affordances inflect the ways that members 
imagine driving in traffic.
This chapter analyzes the practice of street trials. I begin by following 
project members from their offices to the indoor parking space and from there 
onto the road. I describe how MiG is assembled for each test-drive. What 
members call driving in “autonomous mode” is an effect of the temporary 
stabilization of the assemblage. I continue by zooming into MiG’s config-
uration of sensors, laptop, and software. I outline the imaginary of control 
which is realized in the assemblage. Finally, I analyze how members take care 
of the assemblage during street trials. Fitting MiG into everyday traffic is a 
challenging task in which irreconcilable goals need to be managed.
59
Assembling MiG
A street trial does not begin in the garage or on the road. They already start in 
the office. This is where MiG prepared for the “real world.” In the following 
vignette, Michael checks and corrects MiG’s map for an upcoming test-drive. 
In robotics and artificial intelligence, it is customary to refer to representations 
of the environment as maps (Murphy, pp. 42–44). It is a network graph, a 
collection of nodes (GPS coordinates) and edges (lanes connecting the nodes). 
The map is an a priori representation of the road infrastructure on which MiG 
drives. It also includes other elements, such as the position of traffic lights and 
the priority of streets at intersections (Czerwionka et al. 2011). The mission 
file is a representation of the test-track (“Teststrecke”) encoded as a specific 
path through the map. The mission file also encodes information about speed 
limits. A test-track is a stretch of road that has been carefully mapped and 
modeled in detail beforehand. A test-track can extend from a few hundred 
meters up to several kilometers.
I am sitting in the office next to Michael. Michael is preparing the car’s laptop for 
the upcoming test-drive. The car’s laptop sits on Michael’s desk, hooked up to a large 
screen. Michael starts the “control center”—software that is used for both simulating 
and operating the vehicle. He is working on the car while sitting in the office. He 
loads an old log file from a previous test-drive into the control center. On screen I see 
the map of the road infrastructure and the actual tracks travelled by the car during a 
particular test-drive. The recorded tracks depart from the roads of the map at certain 
points. Michael activates a second layer visualizing data from a specific laser scanner. 
He begins to correct the map. I ask him how he can tell the actual road from all the 
different measurements. He explains that he can see where, for example, the bike lane 
is simply by looking at the visualizations of the sensor data. After a while he says “we 
definitely have to test-drive this” and continues with a second log file.
Michael loads a second log file from another drive into the control center. He com-
ments, “a nice drive (…) it definitely matches the map.” The second log file seems to 
be more aligned with the map. Puzzled by all the deviations, I ask him what causes 
those deviations. He suspects that the first one was logged without correcting the GPS 
positions. I observe how he follows the map and the tracks on screen and I ask him 
what he is doing. He says that he wants to know whether the tracks are overlaying. 
(Fieldnote 02/18/13)
Autonomous drives do not start from scratch. MiG does not venture in 
unknown territory. Before MiG can autonomously drive anywhere, it must 
already have been there. It requires a very precise map; the error must not be 
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greater than a few centimeters. As we have seen in this vignette, maps can be 
imprecise: the map and the tracks travelled by MiG do not overlap all the time; 
the map and the recorded positions are not sufficiently aligned. Michael works 
on getting the a priori representation of the road infrastructure aligned with 
the measurements that were made during previous street trials. 
After Michael has finished preparing the laptop, we pick up a second project member, 
Timo, from his office and walk to the indoor parking space. Once we are inside, we 
unplug MiG from its battery charger and push the car out of the garage to avoid pollut-
ing the air inside. On the forecourt the engine is started and the members pop the trunk, 
booting up the different systems in a pre-determined order. Timo connects the laptop 
to the ICT systems of the car and launches the “control center.” The laptop responds 
with a feminine voice that says, “System’s ready”.
I take a seat in the back of the car. This is where I usually sit and film, or simply 
observe, the action and ask questions. (Fieldnote 02/18/13)
Project members use a laptop to control the car.31 MiG cannot drive auton-
omously without the laptop. A car-to-computer interface grants the laptop 
access to the car’s steering, accelerator, brake, and signals (Wang 2012, 
pp. 64–67). The laptop controls MiG’s movements with its software. In 
addition, the laptop serves as MiG’s user interface. The human members use 
the laptop to monitor and control MiG (Image 4). Operation, monitoring and 
manipulation are all integrated in one piece of hardware; the laptop thus plays 
a key role in re- assembling the car and—as we will soon see—in diagnosis. 
On the road
Project members distinguish between manual driving and autonomous 
driving. Manual driving is whenever MiG is operated by the safety driver. In 
autonomous mode the car is operated by the laptop, which in turn is monitored 
and controlled by MiG’s crew. 
During my fieldwork, the most experienced member usually assumed the 
role of the safety driver (left in Image 4). The safety driver sits behind the 
steering wheel and monitors the car and the surrounding traffic. He32 takes 
31 Detailed technical descriptions can be found in the qualification theses written in the 
context of the project, e.g. Wang 2012.
32 I use the pronoun ‘he’ to highlight that the research group is overtly male dominated 
(Chapter 1). During all test-drives in which I participated, there was an all-male crew. 
This is not a coincidence; it is an instance of gender division of labor in Germany.
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control over MiG whenever it cannot handle a situation adequately. A second 
member, who sits in the passenger seat (right in Image 4) and is informally 
called “co-pilot,” assumes the role of the system observer. He monitors and 
controls the laptop. The following vignette of a technology demonstration with 
a journalist takes place in the quiet neighborhood of Berlin-Dahlem, where 
many of the Freie Universität’s buildings are based.
We manually drive to the test-track in order to drive autonomously. A test-track often 
used during my field work is close to the garage just in front of the university’s main 
building. This test-track is a section of a public two-lane street. The test-track goes 
up and down the road separated by a grass strip with trees. In each direction it has a 
driving lane, a lane for parking, and—in between them—a bike lane. On each end of 
the track the car makes a U-turn to resume driving in the opposite direction. 
When we arrive at the test-track, Michael says that a sensor does not work. He then 
exists the car, opens the trunk and reboots a particular sensor system before returning 
into the car and resuming driving. Michael counts down: “3-2-1.” He flicks a switch at 
the steering wheel and the laptop responds with a feminine voice: “Engaged“. Michael 
takes his hands off the steering wheel and rests them on his lap. Shortly after, he 
again takes hold of the steering wheel and resumes control of the car, because it does 
not drive in the lane as it is supposed to do. He explains to the journalist by pointing 
towards the laptop screen: “You can see the arrow.“ He continues by stating that, due to 
a problem with the correction data, the deviation of the GPS receiver is too big. For this 
reason, the car assumed it was driving on the other side of the grass strip. The laptop 
Image 4: The laptop (right) is MiG’s user interface (still taken from a video 2/18/13)
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is not aligned with the world. Michael stops the car once again. He and Timo fix the 
problem quickly and we continue to drive autonomously (Fieldnote 03/10/14).
Technology demonstrations oscillate between manual and autonomous 
driving—that is, between the car being operated by the laptop and by the 
driver. Safety drivers often switch into autonomous mode in mid-drive or, 
alternatively, resume control in mid-drive. One moment you are in autono-
mous drive, and in the next moment MiG is back in manual drive. During 
trials autonomous driving is a volatile technology. Autonomous driving is 
enacted as part of a mundane practice—manual driving—that incorporates a 
stable technology—the automobile. MiG can only drive in autonomous mode 
when its network, which is constituted by its crew, its ICTs, and the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) are temporarily stabilized. 
The vignette is also indicative of an asymmetry. MiG cannot evaluate 
whether its actions are adequate in a given traffic situation. The crew is not 
only responsible for safety, but also to get the car to work and assess MiG’s 
performance. While I will shortly return to the monitoring work performed 
by the crew, we first need to understand which imaginary is realized in the 
assemblage. We can only grasp the technical care work done by the crew if we 
understand what they are monitoring. 
An imaginary of control
Imaginaries are constitutive of and constituted by ways of knowing (Verran 
1998). The manner in which members model driving and configure MiG is 
constituted by imaginary. An imaginary highlights certain aspects while 
hiding others. It makes some things present while making others absent. In 
this section, I use imaginary as a lens for investigating how an autonomous 
vehicle orders urban traffic and, in turn, how it responds to the order that it 
generates. How does MiG ‘know’ and ‘understand’ traffic? And how does its 
‘knowledge’ influence the way it performs driving? These questions will help 
us to understand why the ‘real world’ is a challenge for roboticists and to solve 
the mystery of the snowy drive.
When I ask how the car is able to ‘know’ and ‘understand’ traffic, I do 
not wish to imply that a machine—no matter how advanced it is supposed to 
be—knows and understands in the manner that humans do. As it is the com-
puter scientists who configure MiG, knowing and understanding should be 
understood as results of the roboticists’ efforts to make the car participate in 
traffic. In this section, then, I view knowing and understanding as distributed 
between humans and nonhumans. 
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How do the project members make MiG ‘aware’ of what is going on around 
the car? The laptop draws together all the sensor data33 in order to produce a 
singular representation of MiG’s environment. In other words, the laptop gen-
erates a “world model.” (Murphy, p. 43) In robotics and artificial intelligence, 
a world model is a representation of the environment of a robot or software 
agent. In order to generate a world model, the project members have the laptop 
make use of different types of resources. 
We have already addressed the first type of resource, which includes the 
a priori representations of the road infrastructure and the test-track—a map 
and a mission. A priori refers here to the fact that this data must be stored and 
selected on the laptop before autonomous driving and will not change over the 
course of the test-drive.
The second type of resource is new to us it refers to the measurements of 
sensing information that come from the sensors and the GPS (global position-
ing system) unit during the drive. To enable MiG to locate itself on the map, 
project members installed a military-precision GPS unit in the car’s trunk. The 
MiG’s laser scanners (LIDAR) and RADAR systems constantly monitor the 
environment of the car. If there are traffic participants, buildings, or vegeta-
tion in the vicinity, they will reflect the electro-magnetic waves of the LIDAR 
or RADAR back to the car. The laptop transforms data from its LIDAR and 
RADAR systems into computational objects labeled as “obstacles.” In the 
language of robotics and AI, these processes are called object detection and 
classification.
Translating traffic participants and anything else detected by the sensors 
into obstacles is a means of bringing the “real world” into the laptop. The 
world model is supposed to mimic the car in its environment. Each obstacle 
is rendered meaningful by producing a set of figures: velocity, direction and 
position (Göhring et al. 2011, p. 408). Based on these figures, obstacles are 
mapped into the world model. The world model does not only represent, it 
also simulates. It estimates the future positions of obstacles by taking the 
orientation and position on the road into account. It simulates a version of how 
traffic situations could evolve.
Up to this point, we have reached a basic understanding of how the laptop 
processes sensor data, constructs a world model, and locates itself within 
this world. Now, we can proceed to how MiG navigates through traffic. The 
representation of the test-track specifies only a limited number of GPS way-
points—not all of them. The waypoints are connected by the laptop through 
33 Project members call this process “sensor fusion” because data from different sensors 
are brought into alignment.
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a process called trajectory generation (Wang 2012, pp. 103–124). The laptop 
generates different potential paths and selects them with respect to certain 
requirements, such as “comfort.” The result of this process is a “plan”. By 
executing the plan, the laptop’s computations are translated into movements of 
the research vehicle. As long as everything goes as planned (pun intended), the 
laptop will command the car along the test-track—much like a tram, though 
on invisible tracks. 
MiG is seldom alone on the road; there are almost always other traffic 
participants. How do encounters register themselves from the laptop’s point 
of view and how are they managed? This question leads us to the third type of 
resource: rules. I will illustrate this with an example. 
Rules are linked to what project members call a scenario or—more col-
loquially—a “situation”. A scenario is the context in which a rule is applied, 
such as yielding to road users on a street with higher priority. When MiG 
approaches a junction or intersection, it checks the world model for obstacles 
in certain areas. The following images visualizes the procedure (Image 5). 
In the case of (b), for example, if the world model features obstacles in the 
zone marked in green, then the car will put its plan on hold until the zone is 
cleared. In other words, MiG will yield until traffic participants with higher 
priority have passed. 
Project members succeed in making a laptop drive a car by ordering the 
surrounding environment in a specific way. Driving, a multifaceted practice, 
is transformed into a series of distinct “do-able problems” (Fujimura 1987), 
such as mapping, localization, path-planning and controlling the vehicle 
(Wang 2012). The imaginary materialized in the assemblage is physicalist. 
(a) Left Turn
Figure 5.9: Areas where the RightOfWay module searches for obstacles with priority 
to be right during (a) a left turn, (b) driving straight ahead, or (c) a right turn. Higher 
priority areas are marked in green while lower priority areas are shown in yellow.
(b) Straight Ahead (c) Right Turn
Image 5: The intersection scenario is compartmentalized into three distinct cases. 
(visualization taken from Wang 2012, p. 118)
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Traffic participants are understood as isolated Newtonian objects moving on 
a map. In the right-of-way at intersections scenario, for example, we have 
just learned how the car responds to situations in which this rule is applied. 
To sum up, MiG uses three types of resources to understand traffic: a priori 
representations, measurements, and scenario-based rules. 
Going back to the mystery of the snowy autonomous drive, we now under-
stand that the other drivers, who drove so cautiously, were represented not 
as cars but as obstacles moving along the car’s trajectory. Since they did not 
block MiG’s projected trajectory, MiG continued to drive as prescribed by its 
map and mission. 
Encountering road users
Traffic encounters occur because traffic participants share the road with other 
users. Coordination is necessary to avoid accidents or disturbances in the traf-
fic flow. In the following vignette reporting on a technology demonstration 
with an international journalist the safety driver resumes control of the MiG 
because it yields to another car.
Michael, Christian, a journalist, and I are riding in autonomous mode. MiG detects 
another car in a side street and slows down to yield. However, the driver of the other 
car makes a friendly gesture at the safety driver, Michael, and waives his right-of-
way. Michael takes over control of the vehicle and comments: “interesting situation.” 
Michael explains the situation to the journalist: “He [The other driver, GB] had the 
right-of-way but he made it clear that he preferred to yield. This is why I had to inter-
vene. Otherwise the car would have waited forever.” (Fieldnote 2014–03–10)
For Michael this is an “interesting situation” because MiG’s capacities are 
exceeded. The vignette ends with Michael making an excuse for taking control 
from the car. He does not intervene due to a particularly dangerous situation 
or a reckless driver but because of a calm situation and a considerate driver. 
Micheal resumes control not to prevent an accident but to avoid becoming an 
obstacle to other road users.
How can we understand the event reported in the vignette? We have to 
distinguish between the ways that MiG, on one hand, and the two drivers, on 
the other, achieve an ‘understanding’ of the situation. How do the nonhuman 
elements of the assemblage ‘interpret’ the traffic situation and respond to it? 
MiG detects an obstacle moving towards its planned path. According to the 
map, the obstacle is on a street with a higher priority. MiG responds to the 
obstacle by putting its plan on hold and thus slowing down and coming to a 
stop. MiG ‘assumes’ that this particular interpretation of a traffic situation is 
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shared by all interaction partners. MiG now keeps its plan on hold as long as it 
can detect obstacles in the street with the higher priority. The response of MiG 
can be reconstructed as an application of a formal rule from the code of traffic. 
How do the drivers interpret the situation? Two “driver-car assemblages” 
(Dant 2004, p. 62) encounter each other. Both drivers try to make sense of 
what the other driver is up to. As everybody is driving slowly, they establish 
eye-contact. The other driver sees a driver-car already moving and decides to 
waive his right-of-way rather than force the other driver-car to stop. Michael 
recognizes the driver’s offer to proceed. He interprets the other driver’s 
gesture and reluctance to proceed as an offer based on the informal rule of 
giving priority to flowing traffic. A mutual understanding of the situation 
is achieved between the human drivers by coordinating their actions (Juhlin 
2010, pp. 54–57). Instead of relying on the global rules of the traffic code, 
right-of-way is negotiated locally taking local variations and contingencies 
into account.
In the above vignette, Michael takes the perspective of MiG. He intervenes 
because he knows how MiG functions. Due to his intimate relationship with 
MiG, Michael can predict how it will respond. He knows with certainty that 
it will not move until the other driver-car has cleared the street. The ability to 
anticipate all possible responses in particular traffic situation is part of what 
Brown and Laurier call “co-driving” (2017, p. 419).
The coordination problem is skillfully resolved by Michael. He accepts the 
offer from the other driver and thus “repairs” (Collins 1990, pp. 62–70) MiG’s 
inadequate behavior. Michael competently manages the relation between 
the order prescribed by MiG and the unfolding of a local, contingent traffic 
situation. MiG is programmed on the premise that traffic scenarios evolve 
along a deterministic path. It ‘assumes’ that only one rule can be applied to a 
particular situation, whereas in practice various rule sets can often be applied 
to a particular situation.
The lonely, disembodied driver
MiG, as a sociotechnical assemblage, embodies ontic and epistemic commit-
ments concerning driving in urban traffic: Traffic can be known through sen-
sors and maps alone. Everything the car needs to know about its environment 
can be derived from sensor measurements and maps. There is a correspondence 
between the maps and what they seek to represent. There is also a correspon-
dence between what is measured by the sensors and what is ‘out there.’ 
Other road users are figured as individual obstacles and driving is figured 
as evading obstacles. It is presumed that the development of the traffic situa-
tion can be estimated by locating the obstacles on the map, treating them like 
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Newtonian objects and applying the rules provided by the traffic code. These 
rules a define a “framework of action together with the actors and the space 
in which they are supposed to act” (Akrich 1992, p. 208). Based on the rules 
inscribed into the software, MiG expects the ‘obstacle’ to behave in a certain 
way—for example, to exercise its right-of-way or to observe a red light. The 
imaginary materialized by the assemblage renders urban traffic meaningful 
as a collection of isolated, law-abiding, moving obstacles. 
MiG’s rules prescribe other traffic participants to act in an anticipated 
way. The considerate driver rejects MiG’s script by establishing eye-contact 
with Michael and consequently waiving his right-of-way. With the friendly 
driver’s rejection of the script, the order according to which MiG operates 
breaks down.34 
Encounters between the car and other traffic participants are based on 
the assumption of a universally given interpretation of the interaction back-
ground. The understanding is given through the rigorous application of traffic 
code. The imaginary realized in the car assumes that an interpretation of the 
interaction background is given by the position of vehicles in relation to a 
map and the autonomous car. Actions of traffic participants are interpreted as 
documents of rule-following in accordance with the code of traffic. It assumes 
that the interpretation of the traffic situation is shared by all.
The imaginary outlines the androcentric subject position of the lonely, 
disembodied driver. Embodied communication between traffic participants 
is othered by the assemblage. Other road users are figured as law-abiding 
obstacles that can interfere with the lonely driver’s plan. Therefore, autono-
mous driving is not only a reconfiguration of cars and their drivers but also 
a reconfiguration of the relations between driver-car assemblages and other 
traffic participants. 
The imaginary assumes that a shared understanding of traffic situations 
and their development is given by traffic participants’ position and bearing 
in relation to the road infrastructure. The imaginary combines a physicalist 
understanding of traffic with a mechanistic application of the legal traffic 
code. In this way, it others embodied communication between traffic partic-
ipants. As my vignette has illustrated, this may give rise to a coordination 
problem. The irony is that MiG, which ‘sees’ road users as obstacles, would 
have become an obstacle to other road users if Michael had not anticipated 
this event.
34 In a way, the considerate driver can be seen as a “spect-actor” during a performance of 
Augusto Boal’s “invisible theater.” The ‘considerate driver’ becomes a spect-actor of a 
scripted performance without realizing it.
68
Taking care of “him” 
We have seen that the safety driver manages tensions between the order pre-
scribed by the car and the contingent unfolding of traffic situations. Based on 
the lived experiences of the crew members, I will describe how they developed 
of way dealing with the complexity of the car and its behavior on the road. 
We have seen that MiG is a character in stories about situations. In diagnosis, 
a similar means of reducing complexity can be observed. By personifying 
the car as a male character and locating themselves within it, they reduce its 
complexity and blur the distinction between the car and its crew. 
The following vignette and still are based on a video I recorded during a 
drive with Michael (safety driver) and Christian (system observer). This drive 
served as a rehearsal for an upcoming demonstration with a journalist that was 
scheduled for the following day. Michael usually referred to the rehearsals as 
“seeing if everything still works” (“gucken, ob alles noch geht”). This mundane 
episode illustrates the fluidity, obscurity and speed of situations in street trials, 
as well as the ways in which these situations pose a challenge to the crew. The 
vignette has illustrated how uncertainty may arise from letting MiG drive in 
traffic. Perspective-taking is used a strategy to make sense of the car’s actions.
Michael, Christian and I are driving in autonomous mode on a test track that passes the 
main building of the university. It is a two-lane street separated by a grass strip with 
trees in the middle. The turning signal makes a sound. MiG slows down and turns left 
as it begins to make a U-turn. Christian, the co-pilot, observes the plan on the laptop 
screen. He tells the safety driver Michael, “yes, he sees him,” to confirm the detection 
of an incoming car on the street onto which MiG is turning (Image 6). 
Image 6: Still taken from a video 03/07/2014
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During the second half of the U-turn we hear brief noises from MiG’s brakes. Making 
an assertive gesture with his fingers towards the laptop, Michael comments on MiG’s 
behavior: “Every time, he sees something here.” (Image 7)
Image 7: Still taken from a video 03/07/2014
Christian speculates that MiG interprets the curb as an obstacle. Michael disagrees: 
“more likely a bush or a tree or something like that.” (Image 8)
Image 8: Still taken from a video 03/07/2014
Pointing to the laptop screen, Michael explains, “It must be on the street that we grant 
the right-of-way . He sees something on the street.” (Image 9)
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Image 9: Still taken from a video 03/07/2014
Simultaneously, MiG finishes the U-turn, accelerates, and passes a cyclist riding in the 
bike lane. Christian tells Michael about the anomalies on the laptop screen. They discuss 
potential causes and explanations while looking at the screen. In this moment, MiG 
stops at the traffic light. Ignored by the crew, the feminine synthetic voice proclaims 
the result of the traffic light detection “Red! Yellow! Red! Yellow! Red!” Michael and 
Christian agree that the anomaly does not deserve any further consideration, since the 
underlying problem will soon be resolved. (based on a video 03/07/2014)
Michael and Christian are monitoring MiG driving in autonomous mode. An 
unaccounted braking maneuver stimulates a brief discussion about potential 
explanations. The crew engages in joint sense-making. The car’s response is 
related to obstacle detection.
Michael and Christian anthropomorphize MiG and attribute to it a per-
sonality and identity. This is a common practice in the field of robotics & AI 
(Sharkey and Suchman 2013). Michael and Christian figure the car as if it were 
a male person (“he”) who “sees” something “every time.” The car becomes a 
character with a history of previous test drives on the same track. By attrib-
uting agency to ‘him,’ “he” is held accountable for braking. The pattern of 
using a masculine pronoun is habitualized. The sociotechnical assemblage 
that member monitor is made sense of as a bounded masculinized subject 
responding to an external stimulus. Michael and Christian refer to it like they 
might refer to an old pal. 
MiG is so complex that it is treated like a human to a certain degree. “He” 
works as a short-hand for the complex sociotechnical assemblage—minus 
themselves. It allows Michael and Christian to talk about it without specifying 
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the component or the software module. The “personification” (Interview 
Robin 06/20/14) of MiG thereby serves to reduce its complexity. The members 
personify the car, but they still explain its behavior in terms of logic; they 
could, for instance, make sense of the car’s behavior in more human-like terms 
by saying that is an expression of its ‘will’ or something done because ‘he 
feels like it.’ Although the car’s response is indeed unaccounted—there is no 
traffic participant on the street—the crew assumes that the car’s responses are 
dictated by rule-following. 
Anthropomorphism is often a two-lane street, with technomorphism 
going in the opposite direction (Vertesi 2012, p. 401). Michael and Christian 
locate themselves within the software of the laptop (“[…] that we grant the 
way”). Troubleshooting MiG’s behavior involves facing the results of their 
own actions. They or their colleagues programmed the software and produced 
the maps. In the crew’s joint sense-making, the distinction between MiG and 
themselves becomes blurry.
Reconciling tensions
MiG is vulnerable, but—like any motorized vehicle—it can potentially do 
considerable harm. Safety is therefore a crucial concern of the crew during 
street trials. Handing over control to the car does not rule out the possibility 
of accidents. In the following interview transcript, Thomas explains how he 
ensures the safety of the drive and how he makes sense of his experience as 
a safety driver:
When I’m driving myself, I know what I’m going to do. Almost exactly. So then I just 
need to see what the others are doing. In an autonomous vehicle, you have to watch 
what the others are doing and what your own vehicle could do. What would the vehicle 
do, what would be the worst case? And could the worst case be critical? That means 
acting sort of like a driving instructor. For a driver, it might be a bit better because a 
person might be a bit more predictable, so you wouldn’t assume that a person would 
pull the wheel down hard in one direction or something. The vehicle doesn’t either 
(emphasis), but theoretically it might be possible that that happens. A bit like a driving 
instructor (.) if we drive past a bus now, for example, that could be that kind of situation, 
OK, so I have to be a bit more careful. (Interview Thomas 03/16/15)  
In manual drive Thomas experiences the car as an extension of himself. He 
imagines manual driving as a state of certainty. He feels in full control of 
the car and his attention can then focus on what other traffic participants are 
doing. In autonomous drive Thomas perceives the car as external to him. He 
presents autonomous driving as a state of uncertainty. 
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Callon et al. distinguish between uncertainty and risk (Callon et al. 2009, 
p. 19). By risk they refer to a potentially dangerous event that could happen 
and that can be described by statistical methods (for example, the probability 
of core meltdown in a nuclear power station). Uncertainty, on the other hand, 
relates to events that we do not know about. “We know that we do not know, 
but that is almost all that we know: there is no better definition of uncertainty” 
(p. 21). In the case of the safety drivers, the result is suspicion and presump-
tion. Safety drivers do know that the car can potentially harm somebody, but 
they will only know the precise cause after it has happened. There is known 
danger, yet the casual chain is unknown. A responsible safety driver works 
on being suspicious.
Thomas compares his experience of monitoring autonomous driving to 
that of a driving instructor supervising a learner. He sees a crucial difference, 
however, between monitoring human drivers and monitoring an autonomous 
car: the autonomous car could respond in ways that he would not expect from 
human drivers. The car could respond in unforeseeable and potentially danger-
ous ways. In his imagination, a human driver would not act in such an erratic 
manner. Thomas concludes that human drivers can be more easily supervised 
because their actions can, at least in principle, be anticipated. 
Thomas explains how he uses perspective taking as a means of minimizing 
the uncertainties involved and thereby of ensuring safety. The relationship is 
more akin to relations of care than to relations of control. Thomas also draws 
on a classic technique for fear management: continuously imagining the worst 
cases while simultaneously monitoring the surrounding traffic situation. In 
other words, he takes into account all possible responses of the car, such as brak-
ing, accelerating, turning, and relates them to what other road users are doing.
Safety drivers view resuming control of the car as the ultimate measure 
to ensure safety during autonomous drives. Michael reports how his reaction 
time and the car’s distance to other road users are crucial variables. 
But if he [MiG, GB] slams on the brakes, (…) then I won’t be able to react quickly 
enough if someone comes up super close in the same moment. And then (as a safety 
driver, G.B.) you have to avoid that kind of situation. You have to watch out—is some-
one behind me who could crash into the back or something? So that you can judge what 
is the worst thing that could happen right now. And then when this kind of situation 
comes up, when it could happen, you’d have to take over and drive yourself and not risk 
it (.) where in other situations you know that if no one is behind me on the motorway, 
then nothing can happen anyway. (Interview Michael 2/22/13)
Michel explains how paying attention to both the front and the rear of the car is 
crucial to monitoring the car in autonomous drive. The possibility of rear-end 
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collisions was cited by all safety drivers as a worst-case example. Michael 
mentions a second strategy to ensure safety. By prospectively resuming 
control he seeks to avoid traffic situations that could develop in potentially 
dangerous ways. 
Distance is a joint object of concern for MiG and the safety driver. Thomas 
describes his heightened sense of alertness when other cars come too close to 
the car.
And what would happen if that guy cuts in and the one behind is too close? Sometimes 
I say stop, that’s too dangerous, and then either I’m being too cautious or sometimes I 
might say, OK, we’re gonna stop this now. That’s just too extreme, in the sense that the 
safety margin is really too small now. (Interview Thomas 03/16/15)
Thomas reports how he manages the fear of losing control. For instance, his 
fear of not being able to respond fast enough to prevent an accident can be 
addressed by prospectively resuming control or by accepting the tension. In 
Thomas’ imagined situation, if another car cuts in front of MiG, then MiG 
will engage in a braking maneuver. The car is programmed to keep distance 
from other road users along its path relative to its velocity. Contrary to human 
drivers, the car does not tolerate cutting.35 If the following driver is too close, 
the safety driver will not have time to intervene. Hence, a braking maneuver 
could lead to a rear-end collision. The safety driver therefore has to make 
sure that there is sufficient space in front and in back of the car. He makes 
autonomous driving happen by making space for it. 
Thomas also points to a dilemma inherent in the function of the safety 
driver. A conflict can emerge between ensuring safety and letting MiG pro-
ceed. If the safety driver is too cautious, s/he will prematurely resume control 
of MiG. However, only if one lets the car drive by itself can one observe 
whether MiG is able to safely handle traffic situations. Safety drivers need to 
balance safety concerns with letting the car proceed. 
Fear can be a problem, but so can lack of fear. Michael reports how sticking 
to the routine can lead to a dangerous lack of focus. 
(…) and you definitely have to watch out that it doesn’t become like a routine. You 
still have to concentrate and just keep in the back of your mind that it is a trial and 
that things can always go wrong. And that something can go wrong that you haven’t 
35 As Brown and Laurier (2017) have noted, this problem occurs in other prototypes and 
cars with ADAS. The project members also had the experience that their approach 
works only if other drivers keep distance. It prescribes considerate drivers who do not 
take advantage of gaps.
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foreseen, but relatively quickly—at least for me—you develop great trust, that I defi-
nitely—that I know (emphasis) that it doesn’t always do everything right, but I know 
(emphasis) how it reacts in what situations. (Interview Michael 2/22/13)
Michael makes sense of his experience by figuring his relationship as an 
intimate bond of trust. Trust is an interesting choice of words, given that he 
talks about a machine. Trust means that the car behaves in a foreseeable way. 
Trust is the antidote to fear of the unforeseen. If you trust the car, then you are 
not afraid of losing control. But if you rely too much on your intimacy with the 
car, then you may be oblivious to the uncertainties involved. As this is a trial, 
Michael calls for a critical self-assessment of the apparent sense of control. 
MiG is too complex to be reduced to simple rule-following. Having a lot of 
experience with the car does not mean that the car cannot still surprise you. A 
careful safety driver is always prepared for the unexpected.
Balancing trust with fear is a strategy he developed to remind himself of 
the uncertainties involved. For Michael, it is not a problem that the car does not 
work reliably all the time. Its shortcomings are accepted. On his account, an 
over-confident safety driver can become an issue; safety drivers need to stay 
alert and remain suspicious.
In addition to managing the car in relation to other traffic participants, 
safety drivers have to manage themselves; they have to manage their own 
emotions. As we have seen, the safety drivers take into account that the car can 
respond in potentially unforeseeable, erratic ways. They navigate the tension 
between being overly suspicious and overly confident. If they are too cautious, 
they will preemptively disconnect the systems, ruling out the capacity of MiG 
to prove that it could safely deal with a traffic situation. On the other hand, 
safety drivers must constantly stay alert, because if anything that requires 
intervention happens, then they need to act immediately—traffic often leaves 
little time for careful considerations. 
I argue that the crew’s technical care work serves to temporarily reconcile 
several different tensions that arise from contradictory goals (Law et al. 2014, 
pp. 189–190). The goal of driving autonomously can come into contradiction 
with the goal of ensuring safety. The safety driver must reconcile the tension 
between letting MiG proceed and re-taking full control of MiG. Given the 
openness and brevity of traffic situations, safety drivers need to manage their 
emotions: they must reconcile suspicion with confidence. 
The bold promises of the envisioned potentials of autonomous driving over 
manual driving do not materialize in street trials. In the ‘care-ful’ stories of 
the safety drivers the hierarchy of manual and autonomous driving is reversed; 
manual driving serves as a safe haven for the responsible and careful safety 
driver. 
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Chapter 4 | Pioneers 
A global race over the future of mobility is in full swing: autonomous vehicles are con-
quering the streets in the U.S. and Germany. And Berlin is right in there (Innovations-
labor AutoNOMOS 10/13/10, p. 1).36
When I started my fieldwork, I expected members of the AutoNOMOS project 
to be enthusiastic about cars and driving. I was surprised when I learned that 
my expectations diverged from members’ self-images. The relationship of the 
members to the dominant culture of automobility (Miller 2001; Sachs 1992; 
Urry 2004) is complicated. In this chapter, I will use my disconcertments 
(Raasch and Sørensen 2014, p. 264) as entry points to an investigation of how 
members assemble gender (e.g. Lagesen 2012) by associating and dissociating 
between artefacts, meanings, identities, and practices. 
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on ethnographic interviews 
with project members and complemented by fieldnotes. Apart from one 
instance, I decided against eliciting perceptions of gender directly (Meuser 
2010, pp. 193–194). Rather, I analyzed the spontaneous narration that occurs 
during ethnographic interviews and informal chats to trace the associations 
and dissociations through which autonomous driving are masculinized accord-
ing to the members’ own codes. For example, I analyze the values, ideals, and 
narrative forms through which practitioners describe their attraction to the 
field of research in autonomous driving. I selected episodes for fine-analysis 
in which links between autonomous driving and masculinity are taken for 
granted and in which they become problematic. 
The chapter starts with describing the ambivalent relationship between mem-
bers and cars and continues with an exploration of what it means to be a member 
of a car-centered robotics project and how an idealized member should be. 
Distancing from automobility
I will begin by presenting three brief examples of moments in which my 
expectations were called into question. Robin, a former project member at 
that time, had worked in the automotive industry before joining the project. 
During the ethnographic interview he made his stance on automobility quite 
36 “Ein globales Wettrennen um die Zukunft der Mobilität ist in vollem Gange: autonome 
Fahrzeuge erobern die Straßen in den USA und Deutschland. Und Berlin macht mit.”
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clear by saying, “I am proud that I have never owned a car” (Interview Robin 
06/20/14), while pointing at his electric bike parked inside his office. When 
I asked him if he was the only car sceptic in the project, he replied, “It was 
actually rarely discussed as a topic, since many members were students before 
and pursued a student’s lifestyle” (Interview Robin 06/20/14). Robin imagines 
car ownership and enthusiasm for cars as being incompatible with student life 
in a major city like Berlin. Hardly any project member owned a car, and not 
all of them had a driver’s license.
In the second example, journalists’ expectations diverge from members’ 
self-image. Journalists are an important audience for the project; they contact 
the project frequently to do stories on autonomous driving. The following 
vignette took place at the end of an autonomous test-drive with a journalist. 
MiG has just been parked inside the garage again.
The journalist would like to take another photo of them with the car. We push the car 
out again. First, he gets Christian and Michael to pose in front of the car. Then they 
have to get inside MiG. Finally, Michael has to point to the big emergency stop button 
in the foot well. Later, when asked about it, Michael laughs and says he has never done 
anything like this before. But Stefan had told him that one time the journalists had 
made them pose in front of the hood with a screwdriver in their hands. He thinks this 
is ridiculous. (Fieldnote 03/10/14)
The vignette describes how members are asked by journalists to pose for 
photos with MiG. The emergency buttons are moved into focus. They seem 
to have a symbolic value for the journalist. These switches can disconnect the 
additional ICT systems (including the laptop) from the rest of the car. During 
my fieldwork I have only once observed them in use. When asked about this 
unusual staging, Michael responds by telling an anecdote about an even more 
ridiculous and amusing request to pose with a screwdriver. His response clar-
ifies that he sees this as an unnatural connection. The screwdriver is viewed 
as a misunderstanding of the nature of their research practices. 
The screwdriver symbolizes mechanical tinkering with MiG. It positions 
the project close to car modification and car repair (see Wajcman 1991, 
pp. 143–146; Balkmar 2012). However, this is not how members like to see 
themselves. Rather, members tend to reject any comparisons with car mechan-
ics or car modifiers. I interpret this as a distinction along class divisions. Car 
modification and car repair are usually associated with working-class mas-
culinity rather than middle-class masculinity (Wajcman 1991, pp. 144–145). 
Distinguishing oneself from car mechanics documents Michael’s alignment 
with computers and robots as part of his professional middle-class identity as 
a computer scientist.
77
The third and final example deals with how members imagine themselves 
in relation to male car enthusiasts. The following vignette describes a scene 
where Martin, Thomas and I return from a public engagement event. We 
presented MiG at the exhibit. I was interested in hearing how they felt about 
the lack of diversity among the audience: 
On the drive to the garage I play the idiot and express my surprise that it’s mostly men 
who are interested in the car. Martin and Thomas are not surprised: “it’s about a car.” 
They add that women are only interested in whether it works. Thomas tells an anecdote 
from his former computer science professor (female). The question was whether a 
cleaning robot should be able to carry on a conversation. A woman said a robot should 
just clean. Thomas says his girlfriend found his colleagues in New England off-putting, 
although she is a computer scientist herself. These colleagues only talked about cars. 
And even Martin does not share his automobile industry colleagues’ fascination with 
playing around with the electronics in their cars during their free time. Martin makes 
fun of their hobby. (Fieldnote 06/13/15)
In this vignette, I pose a naïve question in order to elicit a post hoc account of 
how members perceive the gendered interest in their car during the event. For 
Martin and Thomas, it is self-evident that MiG appeals predominately to men 
because it is seen as a car. Thomas argues that men and women have different 
expectations towards technology. Thomas draws on a binary discourse which 
constructs men as passionate about technology and women as pragmatic 
about technology (Landström 2006; Holth 2014). He uses his former female 
computer science professor as evidence. According to Thomas, she simply 
expects technology to do its job; she does not wish to be drawn into imagining 
what else could be technologically feasible. 
In the second half of the vignette, Thomas and Martin problematize the link 
between masculinity and cars. Martin, an industrial PhD student, distances 
himself from his male colleagues in the automotive industry, who tinker with 
their cars passionately in their spare time. Thomas argues that certain men 
exclude women through their collective obsession with cars. Thomas refers to 
his girlfriend, who is also a computer scientist, in order to support his claim. 
In opposition to masculine hands-on tinkering with automobiles and obsession 
with cars, the field of computer science is constructed as open to all genders. 
This can be seen as indicative of how computer scientists tend of think of their 
field as being gender neutral: it is considered to “brainwork” (Faulkner 2009b, 
p. 185) as opposed to work with physical technological artifacts. 
The three examples make manifest members’ ambivalent relationship to 
automobility. During my fieldwork I was disconcerted. If most of the project 
members are not really interested in cars or driving, I wondered, then why and 
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how are they drawn into research in autonomous driving? Before addressing 
this question, however, it is important to revisit the ambivalent relationship 
with automobility, for it is more ambivalent than these three examples suggest.
Identifying with racing
Project Members’ ambivalent relationship with automobility was not the only 
thing that called into question my expectations about the field of research in 
autonomous driving. As we have learned in chapter 2, the project’s imaginary 
is driven by a desire for full automation. Human drivers are positioned as the 
source of many problems related to automobility in urban landscapes; manual 
driving is imagined as undesirable. The imaginary draws on discourses of 
sustainable mobility. Yet during my fieldwork I came across references to a 
second imaginary, one which celebrates manual driving through racing. I will 
present three examples of this imaginary. 
During an ethnographic interview with Thomas, I wanted to know how 
the requirements for MiG’s controller were devised. The controller is a part 
of MiG’s software that runs on its laptop and that, among other things, sends 
instructions to the accelerator, brake and steering. Thomas’ reply made me 
laugh because of the surprisingly graphic and stereotypical imagery. 
Thomas: That was Rojas’ requirement; he said my grandmother has to be able to drink 
coffee in the back.
(GB laughs)
Th: I use that as a quote in lectures, too, that those were the requirements. The point is 
not (emphasis) to show as sporty as possible (“Es geht nicht darum möglichst sportlich 
zu zeigen”) how safe the car goes round the curve at 50, but that the whole thing always 
(emphasis) works. That it works safely and comfortably. No big jerks, and when it 
brakes, it brakes gently. (Interview Thomas 03/16/15)
Thomas likes this illustrative requirement, as he uses it during his own talks. 
In Thomas’ story, Rojas mobilizes his grandmother as a potential passenger. 
In this case, by relating his grandmother to a stereotypical activity (drinking 
coffee) he serves to signify the demand for a smooth ride. This positions riding 
in cars as something closer to trains or airplanes, where it is indeed possible 
to drink your coffee without spilling. The prospective user of autonomous 
driving is imagined as the exact opposite of Thomas: female, aged and inter-
ested in being driven comfortably rather than driving “sporty” (sportlich). In 
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this example autonomous driving is constructed in opposition to racing. The 
imagined user of autonomous driving is feminized. 
Another instance when I was puzzled by references to racing was at a 
neighboring institute in Berlin-Dahlem, where Rojas presented the project to 
colleagues. During his talk, Rojas used videos to illustrate the project. There 
was one video I had not seen before as it was not publicly available on the 
internet. However, I had already heard stories about the events documented in 
the video. The video was taken during a trade fair for electric cars.
Rojas shows a video in which MiG drives through an obstacle course with squeal-
ing tires. Rojas explains that for this a “racing controller” had been developed by a 
post-graduate “just for fun.” The human racing driver was only 2 seconds faster, but 
that day they used up a whole set of tires (Fieldnote 04/18/13).
The story of this particular moment in the project’s history circulates among 
project members and it has also been shared by the funding initiative.37 As 
part of the entertainment for the trade fair’s audience, a professional race 
car driver was driving an electric vehicle on an obstacle course. The project 
members asked the race car driver whether he could race with MiG. He 
agreed and the project members recorded his tracks while he was driving 
MiG. They manipulated MiG’s controller to allow for greater acceleration 
and sharper turns. Finally, the members replayed the recorded tracks in a 
race against the clock.
Each time I heard the story about the race it was noted that they used up a 
full set of tires during this event. The tires serve as material evidence for their 
seriousness to race while simultaneously acknowledging the material costs 
that come with it. By emphasizing that the PhD student did this for enjoyment, 
Rojas implicitly distinguishes this technology demonstration from the proper 
conduct of technological research. Despite this rhetorical demarcation, it begs 
the question of how celebrating racing relates the project’s imaginary. Before 
I take up this question, I would like to present my final example. 
During my first field day with MiG, I accompanied Stefan, Michael, and 
Tim to an enclosed driving ground that was designated for safety training 
(Verkehrsübungsplatz). On this field day, the members rehearsed a technol-
ogy demonstration for the Federal Minister of Education and Research, who 
funded their project at that time. We spent hours driving in circles until all the 
details of the test-track were manually “fine-tuned” to be smooth and thus able 
37 https://web.archive.org/web/20110628035851/http://www.unternehmen-region.de:80/
de/5841.php [Checked on 03/04/20]
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to fulfill the requirement of comfort mentioned in the interview with Thomas 
above. When we were finished, Stefan asked Michael, Tim, and me,
“Who wants to puke?” Stefan, Tim and I enter the car while Michael goes to the toilet. 
I expect Stefan to let MiG replay its mission with a higher speed. Instead he manually 
drives with squealing wheels across the driving ground (Fieldnote 07/25/12).
I was surprised. I did not expect Stefan to ‘blow off steam’ after monitoring 
the car driving in circles for hours. I realized that just because the project 
aims at turning drivers into passengers it does not mean that members do not 
enjoy interacting with cars in different ways. The fact that full automation is 
imagined to be desirable does not mean that members cannot also be attracted 
by an imaginary of racing.38 The project’s imaginary, however, is actively 
resisted in the last two examples. The celebration of driving in a sporty man-
ner contradicts the ideal of comfortable, efficient and safe transport that is 
central to the project’s imaginary.
Members exhibit an ambivalent relationship to automobility. On the one 
hand they distinguish themselves from working-class masculinity by making 
their work with MiG seem abstract and distanced, while on the other hand 
they identify with racing—a traditional masculine activity formed around 
competition and risk-taking among men (Balkmar and Joelsson 2012, p. 47).
Masculinizing autonomous driving
In order to understand members’ sense of masculinity, I will now consider 
acts of positioning in relation to robotics, computer science, and autonomous 
driving. I will also consider the narrative forms in which members tend to 
articulate their work with respect to the pleasures it affords them. 
When describing their motivation for working on the project, most of 
the projects members I interviewed highlighted the pleasures derived from 
interacting with technology. For instance, when I asked Thomas what he—as a 
post-doctoral researcher in computer science—finds interesting about autono-
mous driving, he began by talking about how autonomous driving differs from 
his former experiences with robots. Thomas concluded his reply by connecting 
his interest in robotics to his childhood pleasure of playing with mechanical 
and electric toys and construction sets. 
38 Allusions to driving as racing can be also found in some of the names of the desktop 
computers in the office that go by sport sports car brands, such as Maserati.
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No, exactly, the whole technical side, the mechanics behind it. That’s what I found 
fascinating—it’s all linked to robotics: not just the algorithms, but this embodiment, 
the physicality. So there is this machine (emphasis). Whether it’s a walking robot or a 
vehicle with wheels and cogs and everything. When I was a kid it was like that, con-
struction kits, something similar to Meccano we had in the GDR (German Democratic 
Republic), and there were cogs and motors and then you had lamps that lit up—I was 
always excited about that (Interview Thomas 03/16/15).
Thomas accounts for his interest in autonomous driving by adopting the sub-
ject position of a roboticist. He abstracts from the concrete robot—whether 
it comes with legs or wheels—and from its context of use—whether it is on 
a soccer field or on the road. The fusion of the physical with the virtual is 
what fascinates him. As Tine Kleif and Wendy Faulkner have observed, those 
describing their feelings about working with technology often frame their 
interaction with it in terms of thrill and excitement (Kleif and Faulkner 2003, 
p. 301). What is central in such description is the excitement derived from 
being able to control technical artifacts in a way that they show a desired effect 
(“Lights light up”). 
Thomas’ story connects early childhood interests and pleasures with his 
professional work as a roboticist. His biographical narrative thereby highlights 
continuity. As Mellström argues in his cross-cultural studies of technical 
specialists in Sweden and Malaysia,
technology has often been an essential part of many men’s upbringings as boys and 
connects closely to definitions of what is masculine and what is not. Crucial for such 
identification is the early socialization with and the embodiment of different machines 
and technological knowledge and the pleasures derived from this. Such tinkering 
pleasures are generally codified as masculine (Mellström 2004, p. 370).
Many team members worked on robots before entering the autonomous car 
projects, e.g. in RoboCupSoccer teams. These members tend to use comparison 
with their past experiences to make sense of their current work experiences. 
The stories I elicited during ethnographic interviews often emphasized the 
heterogeneous character of work practices in robotics. For example, Michael 
framed his job experience as a hybrid of writing software and of hands-on 
tinkering with the car:
But there are nearly always some small things to fiddle with, especially when you’re 
developing something new, and that really is fun. Actually, that would be even more 
so with the soccer robots, because there you’re building a complete robot, but now we 
cannot (.) we don’t want to intervene in the whole car mechanics thing (…). But at any 
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rate, that is another aspect why (…) I like working here, that it isn’t just (emphasis) 
about programming but also fiddling around with cars and all the other stuff (Interview 
Michael 2/22/13).
In answering my question concerning what he enjoys about robotics, Michael 
stratifies the field of computer science. He also takes up the subject position 
of a roboticist. According to Michael’s cartography, robotics is more than “just 
[…]ar programming.” In this way, he demarcates robotics from other areas of 
computer science or from many occupations in the IT sector. He highlights 
the pleasures derived from tinkering with a physical artifact as a means of 
complementing the manipulation of virtual objects in software development. 
Robotics is, as it were, the best of both worlds. 
Yet for Michael autonomous driving is not ideal robotics. MiG does not 
allow the same level of intimacy as, for instance, the soccer robots. MiG 
could not be built from scratch. That would require skills found not among 
roboticists but among automotive engineers—not to mention the requisite 
funding and a workshop. For legal reasons, project members also have to 
refrain from tinkering with the research vehicle (Chapter 2). This invokes a 
distance between members and MiG.
Stefan makes sense of his commitment to the project by drawing on a dif-
ferent narrative. He identifies more closely with the outcomes of technological 
projects than with the technological interaction:
GB: And now you’re really committed to this, so what motivates you like that? Or what 
makes it fun?
Stefan: That’s very clear, my first motivation was really clear: a moving car. Back 
then I always thought Knight Rider was cool, so [I was drawn to, GB] robotics and 
AI and cars. I’m not one of those car-tuners and don’t really know that much about 
cars and so on, but I’m really fascinated by robotics because it’s something you can 
get your hands on. When others say, “so here I’ve solved an NP complete problem … 
optimized something here, found a double approximation” (alters his voice, speaks 
through his nose in a geeky way) or calculated some theoretical aspect or other, 
that’s, well, I think with a soccer robot, at least you can look at it. You can see 
that something’s going on. A car that drives, that’s something real (“etwas Echtes”) 
(Interview Stefan 08/23/13).
Stefan accounts for his interest by fully identifying with autonomous 
driving while simultaneously distancing himself from car modifiers or 
car mechanics. Stefan’s account documents the pride he takes in being 
involved in the creation of a publicly visible and tangible artifact. For him, 
83
autonomous driving is at the intersection of computer science, robotics and 
automotive engineering. First, Stefan distances himself from car modifiers 
and car enthusiasts. It is implied that expertise in cars and driving is not a 
requirement for becoming a project member. Then, he demarcates research 
in autonomous driving from other areas of computer science. A purely math-
ematical interest in computer science and a playful interest in soccer robots 
function as academic others to the AutoNOMOS project. Stefan ridicules 
computer scientists interested in numerical mathematics and theoretical 
computer science as stereotypical nerds (see Kendall 2011; Sjögren 2015). 
He depicts their pursuit as an autistic means-in-itself that pursues purely 
intra-disciplinary objectives. Stefan belittles RoboCupSoccer as fun to look 
at with no immediate applicable outcomes and argues that the AutoNOMOS 
project is more “real” than other domains of computer science. He ascribes 
reality effects to the project by referring to the successful demonstration 
of their car. Visible performance is understood as a self-evident marker of 
meaning and purpose. This makes sense within the “demo culture” (Bean 
and Rosner 2013) of robotics.
Stefan’s account hierarchizes different forms of technical expertise and 
interest within computer science according to the realness or reality of their 
outcomes. As opposed to the mechanical skills of a car modifier or the ana-
lytical skills of a mathematician, the skills embodied in robotics are univer-
sal—and, for this reason, seen as superior. Robotics outdoes computer science; 
autonomous driving outdoes laboratory robotics. Research in autonomous 
driving produces “real” artifacts—not something which ‘only’ exists inside 
a computer or a laboratory environment. Autonomous driving is positioned at 
the top of the hierarchy. 
Domination is a generative principle of masculinity (Meuser 2010, 
pp. 123–124). The hierarchization of different areas of computer science is 
simultaneously a hierarchization of different forms of masculinity in techno-
logical worlds. Robotics demands the linking of two forms of technical skills 
that are symbolically associated with masculinity: the abstract knowledge 
work of analytical problem-solving, as exemplified by programming and 
mathematics; and the mechanical skills of problem-solving, such as hands-on 
tinkering with technical artifacts (see Wajcman 1991, pp. 143–146).
Despite his insistence on the realness of the project’s outcomes, Stefan 
establishes a connection between the 1980s science fiction show Knight Rider 
(Larson 1982–86), starring David Hasselhoff, and his interest in autonomous 
driving. For Stefan, Knight Rider depicts a fusion of robotics, artificial intel-
ligence and cars. Knight Rider is a science fiction detective show. Its hero, a 
former policeman, and his side-kick, a one-of-kind driverless car (KITT), fight 
evil—usually by assisting women in their struggle with powerful, criminal 
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men. It is an iteration of the myth of the lonesome cowboy, who fights for 
justice with the assistance of his more-than-a-horse partner.39 
Knight Rider was repeatedly put forward as an existing frame of meaning 
(Czarniawska 2005, p. 271) by journalists who reported on the project (Kohnen 
2009; Oelmaier 5/19/2011; Falkner 2012). Not all team members can relate 
to that. For some the association between Knight Rider and their research 
is problematic. For example, Michael and Thomas distance themselves from 
Knight Rider. Thomas argues that early Terminator movies, for example, serve 
as a better illustration of how machines sense their environment (Interview 
Thomas 03/16/15). Michael regards Knight Rider as a curiosity rather than as 
something with which to identify. Nevertheless, he wonders whether Knight 
Rider has contributed to making driverless cars conceivable and acceptable 
(“salonfähig”) for broader audiences (Interview Michael 2/22/13). 
In the course of this chapter we have learned that project members identify 
with the subject position of a roboticist. Project members oppose their engage-
ment with cars to the engagement found in car modifiers and car mechanics 
by signifying their concern for designing the future (see Wajcman 1991, 
pp. 144–145). This kind of distinction is also at issue when Thomas, in the 
following interview excerpt, constructs the project’s meaning in relation to 
research in the automotive industry.
[…] they [industrial research, GB] undoubtedly researched their own stuff at some 
time, but they have to get things that universities have pre-researched ready for the 
market. Market-maturity (“Marktreife”) also means maybe you have to start small, 
but with things that really function reliably. 100 %. Which doesn’t mean (emphasis) we 
don’t want that, but we can say we’ll build a prototype that can do something (emphasis) 
really awesome, but is maybe ripe for decision (“spruchreif”) in about 10–15 years 
and not until someone or another makes assumptions on infrastructure, for example. 
Car2X […] to put it briefly, I just think that we can look a bit further into the future 
and aren’t interested so much in finished systems […] where there are quite different 
specifications concerning safety, with redundancy. We consciously leave some things 
out; for example, safety concerns: how do we build a middleware—if two laptops fail, 
a third one takes over?
(GB expresses attentiveness)
39 During the series’ intro Knight Rider’s protagonists and their motivation are outlined 
as, “One car, one computer, one man. Knight Rider: One man and his car fight injus-
tice.” (German version translated by GB)
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It’s also a question of capacity. You have to focus on certain things. Or, now we’re 
looking into using computer vision methods to observe the surroundings even better. 
Where lots of people—including the technical inspection agency (“TüV”)—say: How 
is that going to be verified? If it’s such a gigantic neural net, then where is the proof 
that it will always work? So we’re not even asking that kind of question, first we just 
want to see how it can function at all.
(GB expresses attentiveness)
Like I said, our ‘raison d’etre’—we look a bit further ahead. And we look for topics 
that others aren’t focusing on yet. To clearly distinguish us from others. (Interview 
Thomas 03/16/15)
Thomas draws on a linear innovation model in order to position the project 
as prestigious “basic research” (Calvert 2006). In this model, technology is 
viewed as an application of science. He characterizes industrial research as 
constrained by the short-term demand to develop market-mature products. 
Thomas constructs the project as free not only from time constraints, but also 
from other constraints, such as those of reliability and safety. In doing so, he 
constructs the AutoNOMOS project as being able to focus on what matters to it: 
functionality. By making assumptions about an infrastructure that may or may 
not be in place, Thomas frees the project from the constraints of designing a 
prototype that must reliably perform under everyday conditions. Computer sci-
entist call a technology demonstration of the feasibility of an approach a “proof 
of concept”. This is not to confused with a mature product. Proof of concept 
in this context means that the laboratory conditions are extended to real-world 
scenarios. Thomas leaves it to the industry to figure out how self-driving cars 
can be made reliable. If we compare this positioning with Stefan’s assessment 
of a car being “real” in opposition to other forms of computer science research, 
then we can see how the car’s identity is fluid. Depending on the situation, the 
very same research vehicle can be mobilized as proof of a relevant contribution 
to tangible real-life consumer products (Stefan’s story) or as proof of presti-
gious basic research that looks “a bit further into the future” (Thomas’s story).
Thomas uses branding to defend the project’s position in an area dominated 
by the automotive industry. He distances himself from industrial research by 
positioning the project vision in the long-term future. The project members 
look for topics that are not taken seriously by the automotive industry because 
these topics cannot be turned into a profit fast enough. Thomas locates their 
project at the frontier—that is, where future is assumed to become present. 
Freedom—which is situated at the edge of the ‘civilized’ world—and the 
pushing of its limits are central to the frontier imaginary of the project. The 
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following brief vignette, which positions the team’s research in relation to time 
and their competitors, documents the use of frontier imagery in order to make 
sense of their practices. 
Talking to a journalist about designing and testing new algorithms for self-driving cars, 
Michael says, “we do things that maybe nobody has done before”. (Fieldnote 03/10/14)
This quote is loosely based on the classic opening lines of Star Trek,40 which 
has a colonial imagination of space travel. Frontier narratives are also perva-
sive in popular accounts of the internet and hacker culture (Adam 2003). This 
frame of meaning positions the team as being at the forefront of technological 
research. They see themselves as pushing the limits of what is possible. This 
use of the notion “frontier” is grounded in the view of technological research 
as a form of competition between rival project teams, i.e. of being the first 
to do something and thus being ahead of those who will follow. The notion 
of frontier is used as a resource for positioning themselves as “high-tech 
cowboys” (Both 2015, p. 26) at the cutting edge of robotics and automotive 
engineering. 
Heroic masculinity also manifests itself in framing the work with MiG as 
a challenge. For example, Michael referred to autonomous driving in urban 
traffic as “supreme discipline” (“Königsdisziplin”) (Fieldnote 01/07/13). In 
this manner, he imagines their street trials as part of a competition similar 
to that found in athletics. Rojas talks about autonomous driving in Mexico 
City as the “ultimate test” (Fieldnote 04/18/13), thereby locating the project 
at the frontier of autonomous driving. In the following vignette, Stefan tells 
me about the preparation to qualify for the Grand Challenge 2007 robotics 
competition funded by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency). In this story, the car is figured as an extension of the heroic and 
dedicated “we”: 
And now a little story on the side. We practiced all through the night until 5 am. It was 
the same intersection scenario over and over again, because we only had this one laser 
scanner in the front,
40 “Space, the final frontier, these are the voyages of the starship Enterprise. […] to 
explore strange new worlds, to seek out new life and new civilizations, to boldly go 
where no man [sic!] has gone before.” The analogy of science and the frontier itself is 
reminiscent of Vannevar Bush’s report to the U.S. President—“Science the Endless 
Frontier,” from 1945—which called for an expansion of basic research funding by the 
federal government. (Roddenberry 1966-69).
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(GB expresses attentiveness)
with four beams, they go out at 2.3 degrees, that means they give a really small slice.
GB: Oooh (surprised)
and our intersection was so uneven that if you looked from the north you were looking 
over other cars, if you looked from the south you were looking into the roads because 
it was a bit sloped. And that was a huge problem for us (emphasis). And then we were 
testing all through the night. And after about 25 hours of testing the alternator went 
up in smoke.
GB: oh no (sympathetic)
So in the morning at 6 and at 8 we had to say, sorry, we can’t drive.
(GB expresses empathy)
Yeah, the car has broken down, can we get a second chance? And they said yes, OK, 
tomorrow morning at 8.
(GB laughs)
So we had one day to change the alternator and one night for more tests.
(GB expresses attentiveness)
So no sleep again that night and pouring rain at 8. Our car drives in a circle, everything 
perfect. Then the people from DARPA come and explain something, and while they’re 
doing that the weather changes, bright sunshine, wet ground. As a human, you couldn’t 
see a thing!
GB: oooh (appreciatively)
Texas rain, Texas sun. That means our car that relied on computer vision, that searched 
out yellow lines in America, […] completely messed up, because everything was yel-
low. The car drove 5 meters, went right and stopped. […] No way could we drive. So we 
started, the sun dried up the water, we swept it away. Then we were able to show really 
well that we could drive in a circle. E-stop and things like that. We thought we were 
done for anyway, but somehow three weeks later we got news: you made it (Interview 
Stefan 08/23/13).
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In this “story on the side,” Stefan tells me the heroic story of how they managed 
to make the research vehicle work against all odds and setbacks. The team 
is figured as underdogs by means of an emphasis on their scarce resources 
(just one laser scanner) relative to their competitors, who had at their disposal 
redundant sensors and backup cars. By addressing me as a fellow computer 
scientist, Stefan invites me to appreciate the challenge of getting the car to 
work with just one laser scanner. Even though the laser scanner had a very 
small angle, the team and its car eventually passed the test. 
Stefan’s storytelling emphasizes the hardships. He presents a story about 
struggling with a machine, about last-minute improvisations, and about pride. 
This is the high-tech cowboy way: getting the car to work, not in an elegant 
or sustainable way, but in an effective way that solves an immediate problem 
on site and on time. The story documents an ethics of total dedication to the 
project. Importance is placed on working collectively until an immediate 
problem has been fixed. This heroic story celebrates effectiveness, stamina, 
a tolerance for frustration and an ability to deliver on time. Validation comes 
from being able to pass the test posed by the judges from DARPA. Stefan’s 
story seems to confirm the observation that Cynthia Cockburn makes in her 
seminal workplace place study: “A good engineer loves a challenge […] In the 
excitement of teamwork a mutual admiration arises. One sees oneself reflected 
in the admired eyes of other men” (Cockburn 1985, p. 172).
Stories about being initiated into a homosocial association provide a sense 
of what it means to be a man in the context of the project (Mellström 2002, 
p. 476). In the following interview excerpt, Stefan tells the story of how he 
joined the project as a Master’s student. He had already started his Master’s 
thesis in a different group. During that time, he received a mail that Rojas 
had sent to all members of the Institute of Computer Science, which invited 
students to join the project.
I had finished my first chapter and read this mail (…) and I said, so I have to do this, 
and the next day I went over to the robotics lab in Takustraße and there are Markus, 
Tim (…) and maybe next door the soccer robots with Ahmed, and they were just sitting 
there. So I said: “Is this the right place for autonomous driving?”
(GB laughs)
Stefan: And Tim says drily—our brain—but total genius (Stefan citing Tim) “Do you 
know what a PID controller is?” 
(Stefan citing himself) “no” 
89
(Stefan citing Tim) “OK, then find out what it is and come back tomorrow!”
(GB laughs)
Stefan: I read up overnight what PID controllers are and then he said (Stefan citing 
Tim): “OK, you can make the controller for SoB [Spirit of Berlin, the first research 
vehicle, GB]” (Interview Stefan 08/23/13).
Stefan’s story describes how he abandoned his Master’s thesis after he had 
read Rojas’ announcement for the autonomous driving project. He self-iden-
tifies as one of the “fanboys,” a group of dedicated male followers of Rojas 
that is excited by the prospect of being part of a visionary project. His story 
documents passion, or even compulsion (“I have to do it”). This compulsion 
to pursue the topic outweighs any considerations that might follow from a 
concern for efficiently finishing his ongoing Master’s thesis. 
Stefan vividly remembers his first encounter with the project members. He 
describes the basement environment of the robotics lab and his astonishment 
to see three PhD students sitting around a table. It seems he had expected 
something fancier (“is this the right place”?). Without any further introduction 
or getting to know each other, Stefan narrates the occasion as being put to the 
test immediately. The fact that a call for participation in the project had been 
made did not necessarily mean that he could join right away. He describes the 
cool understatement of the PhD student Tim. By labeling Tim “our brain,” 
Stefan depicts him as an exceptionally skilled computer scientist—though one 
lacking in social sensibility. In Stefan’s story, Tim’s cognitive capacities make 
his rudeness permissible. 
Stefan tells the story in the compressed form of a challenge. In order to 
join the project, he must demonstrate that he is willing to understand a new 
topic on his own, without help or guidance. Once he has passed the trial, he is 
accepted into the project by having a task assigned to him. 
These heroic stories construct the idealized team member as autonomous, 
self-learning, self-interested and capable of working overnight. It celebrates 
performance. The story is also about making sacrifices to pursue one’s dream. 
By reproducing traditionally masculine values, this representation iterates the 
symbolic link between masculinity and technology. 
The capacity and willingness to demonstrate one’s ability is narrated by 
Stefan as a necessary condition for joining an elitist group. He remembers 
joining the group in terms of a test of his will and skill. By subjecting himself 
to the scrutiny of his abilities by PhD students and their shared sense of what 
constitutes a project member, he becomes a project member. Being selected 
means becoming part of an elite group of young men.
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Autonomy is highly valued by members. In Stefan’s story, autonomy is 
constructed as self-learning. Independence and self-reliance are narrated as 
features of ideal members. Thomas constructs autonomy as freedom from the 
external demands:
I think the reason that so many decide to go to university […] is that we have a huge 
playing field here.
(GB expresses attentiveness)
Thomas: We have our vehicle here. So first of all we can test out what we want. We’re 
not thinking all the time—and I think that’s also really important—now how can we 
sell that? (Interview Thomas 03/16/15)
In Thomas’ narrative MiG symbolizes freedom. He figures university 
research as a “playing field.” This emphasis on playfulness blurs the bound-
ary between work and play. Yet playing here should not be taken to mean 
that one can simply “goof off” (Kleif and Faulkner 2003, p. 302). Thomas 
instead highlights the playful and pleasurable characteristics of interacting 
with machines.
When members talk about the AutoNOMOS project, the gendered com-
position of the project team is usually not mentioned; it seems to be taken 
for granted. In an interview with Thomas, I asked about how he joined the 
project. He shared with me, in retrospect, the impression of the project that 
he had as an outsider. Most team members during my field work studied at 
Free University Berlin and joined the project as Master’s or PhD students. 
Thomas joined the project after he completed his PhD at a different univer-
sity. His story values performance and collective achievements:
GB: What made you decide to get into this project? How did that happen?
Thomas: So that was when I was at the Winkelmann University in the RoboCup 
project. And the group around Prof. Rojas was often there [at the RoboCup competi-
tions, GB], too. So I already had an idea at least that the group existed—when I was 
a student already. And they were very successful, I knew that already, too. Those 
boys (“Jungs”), they are capable. (…) Because of the RoboCup I got the feeling they 
were doing really extreme stuff (“die machen ja richtig krasse Sachen”) (Interview 
Thomas 03/16/15).
Thomas begins his story of joining the group by telling me how he learned 
about Rojas’ project, i.e. through soccer robotics. Computer scientists tend 
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to identify with their working group. Robotics is a collective endeavor. 
Thomas highlights the project’s genealogy. The AutoNOMOS project was 
spearheaded by graduate and PhD students originally from the RoboCup-
Soccer team. It is implied that robotics competence is generic—that it is 
independent of specific tasks and contexts. 
By referring to the team as “boys”, he mobilizes a gendered and aged 
membership category to refer to the team. Computer science and gender 
identity become packaged in this label, i.e. technological competence is 
simultaneously a performance of professional identity and masculine iden-
tity. His statement manifests how the composition of the team, with respect 
to gender and age, is taken for granted. In this team, the use of a generic ‘he,’ 
even when women are part of the group, is widespread. Such use of gendered 
language renders women invisible, and could even be said to make the “very 
category of woman engineer a non-sequitur” (Faulkner 2009a, p. 7).
Thomas’ assessment highlights the group’s capacity to demonstrate 
“really extreme stuff,” i.e. their capacity to make their robot do tasks deemed 
difficult by the standards of roboticists. By valuing the team’s capabilities, 
he ascribes agency to “the boys” and thereby positions them as the heroes 
of his story. The robots are the means of simultaneously expressing one’s 
abilities and one’s masculinity. It is not the robots who make them heroes. 
Project members become heroes through mastering their robots.
This chapter has reconstructed the idealized team member as autono-
mous, self-learning, self-interested and full of stamina. By linking research 
in autonomous driving with traditionally masculine values, autonomous 
driving is masculinized. Research in autonomous driving is a “serious 
game” (Meuser 2007). By joining a project and being able to participate in 
the serious game, male members can assure themselves that they measure 
up to what it means to be a man in this field. 
In this homosocial group of researchers, many links between masculinity 
and technology are taken-for-granted. Being associated with an automobile, 
however, poses a challenge to the roboticists. A car does not sit easily among 
computer scientists who work on controlling cars through software and 
sensors. The masculine pleasures of ‘joy of driving’ and of ‘tinkering with 
cars’ are typically underplayed in ethnographic interviews and informal 
chat. Yet the dissociation from men’s love affair with cars is complemented 
by a celebration of racing both literally and figuratively.
The car as a research platform comes with associations that challenge 
roboticists, but it also has benefits over humanoid robotics confined to lab-
oratory environments. MiG enables them to explore new terrains and proof 
their worthiness as roboticists. Research in autonomous driving affords a 
playing field for trials of masculinity by providing competition with other 
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projects over who can first demonstrate certain capabilities, and who can 
stand his ground in the “real world” of urban traffic (see quote at the begin-
ning of the chapter). The heroism of the field manifests itself in references 
to frontier imagery and in the popularity of the narrative form of the hero’s 
journey. 
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Chapter 5 | Video demonstrations
Video demonstrations (hereafter: video demos) are ubiquitous in research in 
AI and robotics. In what follows, I will give attention to some examples of their 
varying usage and audiences. The Springer Handbook of Robotics addresses 
expert audiences and is accompanied by a website with video demos for each 
chapter (Siciliano and Khatib 2016). Video demos are also used in robotics 
conferences and at public engagement events to communicate completed 
research. They can serve as a requirement for entering robotics competitions, 
such as the DARPA Urban Challenge 2007, or as attention-getters on projects’ 
websites41 as a means of attracting lay audiences and potential project partners. 
Video demos are an important resource for network-building as they can 
continuously attract new allies with little investment (Both 2015).
Video demos constitute a key element of robotics’ epistemic culture 
and serve as a medium for communicating research to both lay and expert 
audiences (Bischof 2017, pp. 249–265). When video demos are consumed by 
different audiences, tension can arise between “visually proving research” 
and “visually communicating research” (Elish 2011, p. 26). Roboticists as 
audiences can be wary of video demos. Consider the following exchange 
between Stefan and Benjamin over a popular video demo42 from the Google 
Driverless Car project. 
Stefan (annoyed): Google drives allegedly without (emphasis) safety drivers
GB (surprised): what?
Stefan: in their video with the blind guy




41 https://web.archive.org/web/20110719204731/http://autonomos-labs.com/ [Checked on 
03/04/20]
42 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cdgQpa1pUUE [Checked on 03/04/20]
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Stefan accuses Google of misrepresenting the conditions of street trials. Benja-
min dismisses the video demo by treating it as a means of public relation rather 
than as a serious and accountable work of roboticists. Project members dissect 
video demos from other projects for clues that indicate whether the video is 
“fake” or “real” (echt)—does the video document the actual capabilities of a 
system or does it only provide a series of edited images to sell a project?
This chapter focuses on two video demonstrations which stage MiG 
through different emplotments: the heroic “Mission Brandenburger Tor: 
Autonomous Car in Berlin”43 and the tutorial “Beam me up autonomous car.”44 
I complicate the transparency of video demos by uncovering several levels of 
meaning. My interest in video demos is manifold. I take video demos to be an 
expression of an imaginary in which fantasies can be lived out. Fantasies take 
on available narrative forms and draw on existing images and metaphors. The 
constraints of their work and artifacts can be ignored. For example, editing 
makes it possible to stage or insinuate actions that cannot be performed with-
out breaking the law or that are too dangerous. I also take video demos to be 
idealizations that document how members want to be perceived by outsiders 
and ways of disseminating the imaginary of autonomous driving. Finally, even 
if video demos can be “fake,” they also can have very real consequences for 
the researchers themselves. I will begin my discussion of the performativity of 
video demos in this chapter and continue it in the following chapter.
a) The hero’s journey
The video demonstration “Mission Brandenburger Tor: Autonomous Car in 
Berlin” tells the fantastic story of MiG succeeding in its “mission.”45 The plot 
of this video demo draws on the archetypical hero’s journey. In a hero’s jour-
ney, the hero goes through the three stages of departure, initiation, and return 
(Campbell 2004 [1949]). Typically, a human protagonist portrays the hero. If 
we take this video demo literally, MiG is the hero. Its mission is driving itself 
through Berlin’s city traffic to Brandenburg Gate.
During the stage of departure, the hero—that is, the “autonomous car”—is 
introduced by being portrayed in its habitat. It is depicted while “training” on 
the forecourt of former Tempelhof Airport. It is preparing for its journey. The 
car is portrayed driving on the huge forecourt of former Tempelhof Airport 
43 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZqL6j2D5H4 [Checked on 03/04/20]
44 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kyk1VLTSH_U [Checked on 03/27/19]
45 All quotations in this section are taken from captions in the video demo.
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with no visible safety driver.46 Heroic agency (Schlechtriemen 2016, p. 28) 
is formed by the caption, “It needs no driver” (Image 10). MiG is figured 
as a self-sufficient and bounded technological artifact with a high degree of 
agency. 
The video demo highlights the MiG’s IT components, such as “GPS unit, 
laser scanners, radars, and computers.” The sequence on former Tempelhof 
Airport introduces the hero in terms of its IT components, which enable it “to 
brave Berlin’s streets.” It is implied that because of these components the MiG 
does not require a driver to operate and navigate it.
Image 10: MiG on the fenced-off area at former Tempelhof Airport
In its initiation, the autonomous car is staged, during daylight hours, amidst 
light traffic on the city autobahn and large boulevards in West Berlin. It is 
not alone any more. Not only is it sharing the road with other vehicles, it 
also co-exists with human companions. The safety driver is introduced as 
a passive observer: “a safety driver follows the action.” He and the system 
observer are shown in a high state of concentration and dressed up in white 
laboratory coats. The physical separation from the car is staged by making 
it visible—from both the outside and the inside of the car—that the safety 
driver’s hands are off of the steering wheel. The heroic storytelling relies on 
46 Thomas tells me how he created the illusion. He hid below the glow department with 
his finger on an emergency stop button: “I ducked and the car was empty.” (Fieldnote 
07/23/15)
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concealing the necessary care work of the safety drivers (Chapter 3). Rather 
than a separation of driver and vehicle, an intimate bond between safety 
drivers and MiG ensures the safety of street trials. 
On the road the hero undergoes a series of trials: traffic lights are to be 
“recognized”; roundabouts have to be “mastered”; “Berlin’s notorious drivers” 
are to be taken care of; “obstacles” have to be “detected” and lanes tracked; a 
car is followed. These challenges are narrated as being met by the MiG’s IT 
components. 
At the climax, the hero arrives at Brandenburg Gate. This is where MiG 
and its crew (safety driver, co-pilot, camera men) are united with other human 
project members. The team is getting ready to pose for a picture, in a manner 
that soccer teams often do, with MiG visible on the side. 
During the stage of return the hero does not return to Tempelhof, as the 
archetypical hero’s journey would suggest. Rather, it is depicted driving 
through the woods, a place that is neither specified nor visited at any earlier 
point of the video demo. My reading of this shot is that the car’s habitat is no 
longer the enclosed space of Tempelhof but has become the open road. This 
shot suggests MiG is released into the wild.
The fantastic storytelling is supported by the heroic soundtrack. It is a 
heavy metal interpretation of Johann Pachelbel’s (1653–1706) Kanon, a victory 
hymn. The soundtrack is taken from a popular YouTube video47 of that time. 
In this video a male, self-identified “ordinary computer science student” vir-
tuously interprets the Kanon on his electric guitar. The soundtrack combines 
the traditional (baroque music) with the modern (heavy metal). This move is 
mirrored by the video demonstration, which combines the traditional (a car) 
with the modern (a self-driving car).
The heroic plot is also supported by the choice of the setting. The massive 
terminal building of former Tempelhof Airport is a monument to the mad-
ness of national socialist Germany. Its roof was constructed to host 100,000 
people watching their heroes during flight shows. The other sites visited 
by the car during video demo also showcase military heroism. The victory 
column (Siegessäule) was designed to commemorate the Prussian victory 
in the Danish-Prussian War. The Brandenburg Gate is a Prussian triumphal 
arch.48 Following West Germany’s annexation of East Germany in 1990, the 
Brandenburg Gate was re-cast as a symbol of what is officially referred to 
as the reunification of Germany. The heroic emplotment turns the mundane 
47 https://youtu.be/TF6cnLnEARo [Checked on 03/04/20]
48 Ironically, it was first used for a triumphal procession by Napoleon and his troops in 
1806.
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events of driving on the city autobahn and streets into something exciting: an 
adventurous quest of an autonomous vehicle.
The video demo combines tech lingo with anthropo-/zoomorphic meta-
phors in order to reduce the complexity of assembling autonomous driving. In 
this imagery, each technical component of the assemblage is related to a dis-
tinct purpose and compared to an organ. For example, in the following still 
you can see the combined images from the two cameras that have been 
installed to detect traffic lights.
Image 11: MiG's traffic light detection
By figuring the video cameras as the car’s eyes (Image 11), it is implied that 
these technical components are more than sensors. I asked Benjamin how he 
had implemented MiG’s traffic light detection. 
Benjamin: you just think that it is easy to detect traffic lights because they are quite 
bright. But then you realize at some point that camera images do not really reflect what 
one sees as a human with the eye.
GB: in what way?
Benjamin: Well, I would say that the ‘human hardware’ is so far better because they 
afford a better contrast sensitivity than a camera. […] The biggest problem has always 
been finding these points. They were not always the brightest. (laughs) […] What I just 
want to say is that the problem was not that easy because you just want a high level of 
reliability. This should work in—let’s say—99 % of cases. […] to facilitate the problem, 
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I used maps on which the positions of the traffic lights had been marked. (Interview 
Benjamin 09/06/13)
Benjamin struggled with the problem of making MiG detect and classify 
traffic lights in a reliable way. Just because a camera is capable of capturing 
video streams in high resolution does not imply that it is similar to the ways 
that humans see. Benjamin had to find a solution—that is, a way of making a 
machine work reliably in a road infrastructure built for human road users. It 
is these actual accomplishments of the project that have become the building 
blocks of MiG’s fantastic adventure.
The video celebrates both MiG and the human project members as heroes. 
This is articulated through the opening scene of the video demo. The video 
begins with a shot of the team in front of Brandenburg Gate with the car on 
the side. Almost all male members are dressed uniformly in the AutoNOMOS 
t-shirts, while the two female members are dressed in black shirts. The project 
members smile into the camera and seem proud of their collective accomplish-
ment (Image 12). 
Image 12: The opening scene of the video demo
The plot can be read as an allegory for the AutoNOMOS project as a whole. In 
this respect, the video demonstration tells a fictionalized story of the project. 
The viewers of the video demo are invited to identify with the project members 
and their ways of seeing traffic through ICTs. As an allegory, the trials MiG 
had to withstand are really the doable problems that the team managed solve 
with the car’s ICTs. ICTs, such as the video cameras, are the tools with which 
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the project members work. The anthropo-/zoomorphic metaphors, such as eyes 
or brain, are also technomorphic metaphors (see chapter 3). The video cameras 
are not MiG’s eyes and the laptop is not MiG’s brain; rather, the cameras and 
the laptop are figuratively the eyes and brains of the practitioners.
b) The fake tutorial
To demonstrate that an autonomous car could act as a service comparable to 
today’s taxi, the video demonstration “Beam me up autonomous car”49 narrates 
the story of an imagined consumer, portrayed by “Arturo,” who was a project 
member during the time of the video. The title “Beam me up autonomous 
taxi” associates the video with a well-known quote attributed to the Star Trek 
(Roddenberry 1966–69) franchise. Yet the actions and events portrayed in the 
video are narrated in the present.
The video demo opens up with the voice-over “How to call an autonomous 
taxi in Berlin.” This invites for a misreading. The video demo is not a tutorial. 
Rather, it is a repurposing of the immensely popular tutorial genre on You-
Tube.50 Contrary to ordinary tutorials, the video demo does not explain how 
viewers could imitate the actions depicted in the video. 
Arturo—clad in a white laboratory coat—and his tablet are the protag-
onists of the story. MiG plays a supporting character, for it is the obedient 
servant to Arturo and his tablet. The story begins with Arturo leaving a hotel. 
Arturo calls the autonomous taxi with his tablet. The next shot depicts the car 
in the company of other cars on a parking ground. We can witness how the car 
slowly drives out of its parking lot (Image 13). The voice-over says “There is 
no driver inside”. 
The car is now represented as an icon on a map on the tablet (image 14). It 
is implied that the car really drives without supervision. It cannot actually be 
shown driving without supervision, since this can be done only on enclosed 
private grounds—not on public roads. Finally, the car is shown arriving at the 
hotel. Arturo climbs into the backseat and the car drives away. 
49 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kyk1VLTSH_U [Checked on 03/27/19]
50 A search query on youtube.com for „how to“ leads to 270,000,000 results [Checked on 
06/17/17].
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Image 13: MiG leaves its parking lot with no visible safety driver
Image 14: The movement of the car is simulated and visualized on the tablet
The video ends with a few stills of the car, highlighting its sensors on the 
chassis and its electronics in the back, followed by a picture of the project 
members. The voice-over narrates that “MadeInGermany is a result of the 
research at the autonomous team at the Free University.”
In this video, MiG takes up the role of a supporting character. The video 
is predominately a demonstration of an app, and the car is figured as an 
extension of the app. It is a story about exerting power over distance. Hence, 
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the vision is translated in an app that can perform one aspect of the vision, i.e. 
sending the GPS location to a driverless car. 
The video reduces uncertainty about driverless cars. It also insinuates 
actions that are illegal,51 since all motorized vehicles require a driver when 
driving on public roads. Consequently, during street trials MiG is always in 
the good company of skilled safety drivers and system observers. This video 
demo is about staging the project’s imaginary rather than documenting what 
it is legally possible. The uncertainty of whether it will be legally acceptable 
to have a car driving itself unsupervised at some point in the future is avoided 
is bracketed. The events shown in the video depict not the current state of 
affairs, but rather what autonomous cars could be used for if unsupervised 
driving were legal and if autonomous cars were as robust and as autonomous 
as they seem in this video. The video implies that, with the proper investment, 
autonomous cars could serve as taxis for customers with mobile devices. By 
comparing the car with an existing service, the potential capacities of the car 
are translated into something familiar and intelligible. The car is therefore not 
figured as something completely new (and potentially scary) but as compara-
ble to a familiar mobility service.
The video demo is not a heroic story about the MiG’s agency. Quite the 
contrary! This story tells about how docile the car could potentially be. It is 
about Arturo-with-the-tablet’s agency. The story is told from the perspective 
of an individualized user, i.e. Arturo-with-his-tablet. The systemic level of the 
narrative and the promise of more “environmentally sustainable” (Chapter 2) 
transport are called into question. There is no indication that the car could be 
shared nor that it could be connected to existing modes of transport. Ironically, 
the narrative is transformed in a way that subverts the vision of autonomous 
taxis. The vision of autonomous taxis promised no more parked cars, yet this 
video demo shows how the car is parked in a parking lot among other cars. It 
also leads to an empty car driving through the city and thus contributing to 
even more traffic.
The video seeks to convince its audience that it is feasible to remotely 
control a driverless car with a tablet and that there is a demand for autonomous 
taxi services. Hence, this particular video demo settles two uncertainties at 
once. By showing a supposedly empty driverless car, it provides proof for the 
feasibility of autonomous driving. One could argue that the label “autonomous 
taxi” already performs the rhetorical work of sustaining the vision. The label 
indexes something that does not exist outside of controlled environments. Yet 
it insinuates the possibility of becoming realized someday. By telling the story 
51 In Chapter 2 I describe why MiG cannot be operated driverless on public roads. 
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of an imagined customer, the video demo tries to settle the controversy over 
whether autonomous driving could be acceptable (see chapter 6).
Fragile demonstrator
Video demos produce repeatable accounts of technology, giving rise to the 
impression that those capacities for action displayed in video demos have 
ongoing existence (Suchman 2011b). Video demos stabilize the project by 
staging MiG’s capacities as enduring. Video demos erase all traces of the 
human labor that goes into producing the account. However, the ongoing 
existence of the demonstrated capabilities has to be sustained. Consider the 
following vignette, where Stefan and Michael debate whether it is still possible 
to demonstrate the capabilities portrayed in a video.
Stefan and Michael talk about an upcoming technology demonstration for a team from 
German public television. The TV producers requested filming how the car is remote 
controlled through the tablet. The software has not been used for a long time and the 
operating system on the tablet has been updated since. Even with the old operating 
system the software was already “buggy.” For example, the transmission of the video 
stream from cameras only worked once on the smart phone and never on tablet. Michael 
and Stefan agree to contact the software developer, a former project member, for “old 
time’s sake” and ask him whether he could assist them with the software (Fieldnote 
02/13/13).
The demonstrator in this vignette is performed as fragile (“buggy”) and in 
need of competent technological care. The decision to reach out to the old 
software developer highlights how humans and nonhumans are interdependent 
elements of the assemblage of an autonomous vehicle and a mobile device. 
Components are entangled with former or present project members. With 
people moving on to jobs outside the project, the assemblage is threatened by 
dissociation. 
The TV producers have most likely watched the video demo. The video 
demo succeeded in interesting the media, but it also created accountability. 
The members are expected to be able to re-enact it. The members fall victim to 
their own ways of promoting their research. The video demo has performative 
effects for the members themselves.
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Chapter 6 | Defending autonomous driving
Automation discourses promise to relieve humans of dangerous or unwanted 
labor (Downey 1998). For advocates of present-day automobility (Urry 2004; 
Böhm et al. 2006), driving is not unanimously considered to be unwanted 
labor, though. For proponents of autonomous driving, its core vision—the 
driverless car—is self-evident. Human drivers make automobility inefficient, 
dangerous, and a waste of time. The solution seems simple; all the functions 
of human drivers should be delegated to machines. Not everyone shares the 
project members’ enthusiasm about the prospect of autonomous driving. For 
example, unavoidable IT security risks of driverless cars and potential job 
losses for professional drivers are expected as potential downsides of autono-
mous driving. The self-evidence of the vision can become problematic when 
faced with hegemonic definitions of what automobility is about. 
This chapter analyzes three different strategies of innovation communica-
tion (Plesner and Horst 2013, p. 1118; Horst et al. 2017, pp. 892–893) in dealing 
with the acceptability of autonomous driving. This chapter begins with a 
description of actors speaking in defense of contemporary German regime 
of automobility and its economy which is said to depend of its competitive 
automotive industry. I then describe how project members deploy different 
tactics and strategies to promote their research area: a) being chauffeured 
over driving; b) appeasing the audience; c) celebrating control and technical 
mastery. These tactics and strategies take the form of visionary stories which 
are told about autonomous driving to different audiences. Taken together, 
these strategies produce different versions of the project, its purposes, and its 
visions. These tactics and strategies are supposed to stabilize and maintain the 
project. However, not all stories told about the project are equally beneficial. I 
analyze how one particular strategy produces overflow so that the roboticists 
become victims of their efforts to sell the project. The chapter concludes with 
a description of how project members try to minimize the damage of the 
overflow. 
Rejection
Autonomous driving is contested. According to a recent survey, two thirds 
of all German drivers oppose to the idea of handing over full control to a 
driverless car (Kropp and Renn 2018, p. 7). In this section, I focus on the 
issue of human control over cars and the manner in which it is linked to the 
acceptability of autonomous driving. I start my argument by introducing two 
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dissenters52 to autonomous driving and bringing their accounts into conversa-
tion with cultural and social studies of automobility. 
Winfried Hermann (The Green Party) is the minister for transportation of 
the federal German state of Baden-Würtemberg. Baden-Würtemberg is one 
Germany’s centers for the automotive industry. During a podium discussion 
with representatives of the automotive industry in 2015, he criticized autono-
mous driving for leading to “the emasculation of the German driver.” During 
a subsequent radio debate on autonomous driving (Eva-Maria Götz, Michael 
Roehl 5/27/2015) he elaborated his proposition. Hermann situates his claim 
regarding the emasculation of the German driver by distancing himself from 
those who are excited by the prospect of autonomous driving:
And there I made the point that the philosophy of the automotive industry has really 
been for 100 years, you are your own master (“Herr”), your own helmsman (“Steuer-
mann”), your own pilot and now this is so-to-say going to be turned upside down. If one 
thinks about the testosterone-driven automobile drivers (“Autofahrer”), the race-car 
drivers (“Rennfahrer”) on the Autobahn, who enjoy stepping on the accelerator, taking 
risks, they will be emasculated by such a system. I said this with a wink (Eva-Maria 
Götz, Michael Roehl 5/27/2015).
As the minister of transport of Baden-Württemberg, Hermann is concerned 
about the future of the German automotive industry: 
Because everyone knows Germany is an automotive center, and particularly 
Baden-Württemberg. And we are doing everything possible to maintain this standard 
and make cars fit for the future. So we must not miss any new technological develop-
ments (Eva-Maria Götz, Michael Roehl 5/27/2015).
Hermann imagines autonomous driving by comparing it to the affects and 
desires afforded by today’s cars. He envisions driverless cars as a technological 
assemblage that abolishes manual driving. Hermann reminds the automotive 
industry how it branded the automobile by associating it with freedom and 
autonomy,53 and he goes on to argue that the selling points of cars are pow-
erful emotions and masculine desires rather than their capacity to transport. 
52 I have selected these specific dissenters because they both prompted Rojas to respond 
in a defense of autonomous driving. 
53 For a history how freedom and autonomy were associated with cars and driving as an 
ideological strategy in the conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, see Seiler 
(2007). 
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He illustrates his point by referring to men54 who enjoy risk-taking on the 
Autobahn, i.e. the German limited access highways that are renowned for 
having no speed limit on many segments. He puts his claim into perspective 
by saying it was also meant to be a humorous statement. Hermann does not 
clarify whether the humor is owing to his statement’s reliance on exaggeration 
and simplification. It might also be that he is distancing himself from the nor-
malization of risk-taking on the Autobahn as an acceptable driving practice. 
Wolfgang Sachs’ psychoanalytic and cultural historical analysis of auto-
mobility (Sachs 1992) maintains that the car incomparably makes available 
to private citizens a means of amplifying their power. In his view, cars can 
function as prosthetic devices for those seeking enjoyment through power 
and independence. According to Sachs, the motor drives the automobile-self, 
creating an ideal human-machine symbiosis. This is why the car materializes 
emotions of omnipotence. As Sachs also reminds us, omnipotence can easily 
lead to emasculation. The figure of the race-car driver imagines traffic as 
a form of competition. When drivers are stuck in traffic congestion or are 
overtaken by other drivers, feelings of omnipotence can easily be substituted 
by feelings of emasculation.
Leaning on Horst (2008), I view acceptability as a pattern of positive 
associations with the vision. Challenging the acceptability of the driverless 
vision, then, means associating it with an element deemed negative: emas-
culation.55 By contrasting autonomous driving with today’s driving practices 
and their affective economy, Hermann associates autonomous cars with a 
negative element. By drawing on the interpretative frame of automation as 
emasculating, and by qualifying his imagined driver as German and localiz-
ing him on the Autobahn, Hermann contextualizes his claim. The Autobahn 
provides the stage for the performance of a specific configuration of nation, 
masculinity, and technology. The freedom to risk one’s life and the lives of 
others by speeding is lawfully supported by the German state and serves as 
a showroom for German automobile brands. It is known that severe—and 
thus fatal—traffic accidents could be reduced by introducing and enforcing a 
speed limit, but there is no indication of any German policy change in the near 
54 All of his analogies are expressed in the male gender. 
55 The trope of emasculation is mobilized in other countries, too. As Jutta Weber and I 
have shown with the example of a 2012 Superbowl ad, the US American sports car 
brand Dodge relies on the trope of emasculation to sell their cars as vehicles of free-
dom and autonomy (Both and Weber 2014). Self-driving cars are framed as a stepping 
stone to humanity’s enslavement through robots. Speeding in a sports car is represented 
as a heroic act of resistance.
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future.56 Hermann presents himself as a spokesperson for the German driver 
who does not want to give up the thrill of speed on the Autobahn and who 
values driving over being driven. Hermann uses masculinity as an organizing 
principle to demarcate manual driving from autonomous driving. 
Herman speaks out against the enthusiasm for autonomous driving that 
may be found among leaders of the automotive industry. Yet not everyone in 
the automotive industry is excited about autonomous driving. When asked by 
a German automotive journalist about his position on autonomous driving, 
then-CEO of Porsche Matthias Müller, replied
that his customer base enjoys accelerating, steering, braking, and switching gears. He 
does not see the point in self-driving cars because you can already take a cab or a train 
(Alex and Katemann 2013).
Müller does not associate the driverless car vision with emasculation; he 
disqualifies it by claiming that his customers would not recognize it as a car. 
Autonomous vehicles are not cars! Driving, he observes, involves mastering 
the machine and enjoying its powerful force. Müller furthermore denies 
that autonomous driving is an innovation, since cabs and trains can already 
transport passengers.
Hermann and Müller speak on the behalf of an imagined driver. They 
both reject the driverless car vision by questioning the acceptability of the 
envisioned technology. The driverless car vision is about reconfiguring iden-
tities—those of the driver, the car, and their relations. 
Automobility has successfully conquered most parts of the world because 
of its capacity to transcend national boundaries. Nevertheless, it continues to 
be shaped by national histories and driving cultures (Edensor 2004). The Ger-
man state was built around cars (Sachs 1992). Sachs argues that the success of 
cars in Germany is not because of some inherent nature that would make them 
superior to other available modes of transportation. In fact, cars tended to be 
fiercely rejected and viewed as a meaningless hobby for adventurous elites. 
According to Sachs, cars came to dominate Germany because of a political 
will to craft a competitive automotive industry for both civilian and military 
56 In January 2019, Germany’s federal minister of transport and infrastructure, Andreas 
Scheuer, has rejected the suggestions of the government committee “Nationale Platt-
form Zukunft der Mobilität” (national platform future of mobility) to raise taxes on 
diesel and to introduce a speed limit on the Autobahn as “against all common sense” 
(“gegen jeden Menschenverstand”) (N.N. 2019). This is an example of the nihilation 
strategy (Berger and Luckmann 1991 [1966], pp. 132–133).
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purposes.57 Building a national network of Autobahns, car manufacturers, car-
friendly regulations, and car-friendly cities contributed to the stabilization of 
the private automobile as the dominant mode of transport. 
Emergent technologies tend to be conceived within two familiar registers: 
a rhetoric of hope and a rhetoric of fear. Anna-Lena Berscheid’s (Berscheid 
2014) discourse analysis of the reporting done by leading German newspapers 
and technology-focused media on autonomous driving found that self-driving 
cars are envisioned by drawing on two different but symmetric plots: utopian 
stories of salvation, which claim that driverless cars will save us or make a 
better world; and dystopian stories of threat, which claim that the technologies 
we create will take away joy in driving by eliminating control and autonomy. 
We have now heard what dissenters have to say about autonomous driv-
ing: it is not a car, it is not an innovation, and—on top of that—it should be 
expected to emasculate its driver. Project members tend to refer to accept-
ability as one of autonomous driving’s challenges. In the following interview 
transcript, Thomas reflects on the communication of autonomous driving to 
various publics, as well as on how he believes it is necessary for the project to 
become meaningful to others. He argues that innovation communication can 
be the solution. 
[…] it is in our interest to raise awareness about the topic because our technology can 
only be deployed, if, for example, proper legal conditions are established, […] 2006 
through 2007 nobody had heard of it [autonomous driving, GB]. There was rather 
disapproval. If you talked to somebody, then “For what? What’s the point?”
GB (puzzled): What do mean by ‘for what’?
Thomas: When we said, we are developing an autonomous vehicle, people said, “For 
what purpose?” They looked at us, “What’s the point?” (Interview Thomas 03/16/15)
Thomas makes the argument that innovation communication can be instru-
mental in influencing regulators to change the law in favor of the technology 
being advanced. In doing so, he takes up the subject position of an innovator 
who cares for the fate of their collective creation. He hints at the current traffic 
code in Germany (or anywhere else) that requires a driver to be present and 
conscious at the steering wheel at all times. Thomas ties the effectiveness 
57 Volkswagen, which is still partly state-owned, can serve as the prime example. The 
town of Wolfsburg was practically built from the ground up to supply Volkswagen with 
the necessary infrastructure (including workforce). Volkswagen did not deliver any 
civilian cars until its relaunch after World War II. 
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of their research to the manner in which driving is legally regulated. He 
maintains that the technology can only become meaningful if regulators allow 
autonomous driving. You have to sell the innovation in order to be allowed 
to make it. If regulations are not changed to accommodate fully autonomous 
driving, then the innovation journey will hit a dead end. 
Thomas ties acceptability to the presence or absence of a sense of use-
fulness. In Thomas’ account, laypersons tended to question autonomous 
driving research because they could not see how it could be useful. The public 
understanding of technological research that he attributes to laypersons is one 
in which such research is obliged to provide answers to societal problems. 
According to Thomas, laypersons do not appreciate autonomous driving 
research because it is unclear what kind of problem it seeks to solve. 
I have chosen this interview excerpt because it shows how researchers like 
Thomas struggle to make their research meaningful, or translatable in a coher-
ent manner, to lay audiences. The car needs to be embedded in a plausible and 
positive narrative. This is what characterizes the project. The meaning and 
purpose of autonomous driving is neither fixed nor self-evident. The project 
must find an answer to the question of meaning (Sinnfrage). Innovation com-
munication is not only about allocating resources from elsewhere but also 
about developing and disseminating meanings for the project.
Accommodating rejection
This section analyzes the different tactics and strategies for communicating 
autonomous driving as useful, acceptable, and desirable. I will demonstrate 
that different frames and stories emerge in relation to other frames and stories. 
The visionary stories are born out of conflict. They respond to challenges or 
they anticipate challenges. Finally, I will analyze the consequences of these 
versions with respect to the interactions between the stories. 
How does the project accommodate resistance to the driverless vision? By 
producing positive stories. First, I will scrutinize two tactics for accommo-
dating the resistance: valuing being chauffeured over driving; and appeasing 
the audience. Afterwards I will take a closer look at video demos and show 
how some follow the strategy of celebrating control and technical mastery. My 
focus is on the different frames and stories they produce and the implicated 
forms of masculinity.
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a) Valuing being chauffeured over driving
As the driverless vision is contested, project members find themselves in 
situations where they are expected to defend their project and/or to generate 
support for it. For example, during the already quoted radio debate on autono-
mous driving with Hermann, Rojas is asked for a rebuttal. He remarks:
I do not think that freedom means controlling the accelerator or brakes. Ask the three 
million drivers in Mexico City on the road everyday if they enjoy driving. They will 
all say I’d rather sit in a taxi than suffer from this traffic situation (Eva-Maria Götz, 
Michael Roehl 5/27/2015).58
Rojas represents himself as a spokesperson on behalf of those who do not 
experience driving as ‘freedom of the road’ or speeding on the Autobahn. He 
challenges the configuration of freedom with the operation of a machine by 
drawing on the experiences of drivers locked in traffic congestion in a global 
megacity. Rojas problematizes driving by associating driving with an element 
that is deemed negative: congestion. To make his local network stronger and 
its vision more persuasive, he mobilizes as support three million drivers stuck 
in traffic. By associating driving with the mundane experience of immobility, 
driving is positioned as annoying rather than desirable. Rojas draws on a 
classic frame of automation: relieving humans of undesirable work. 
Low acceptance of autonomous driving is considered to be an issue among 
project members, who therefore engage in what could be called ‘lay accep-
tance research.’ For example, in the following vignette, Rojas elaborates on 
his strategy in selling their research:
I am sitting with roughly 20 men and 2 women in a historic seminar room at an institute 
of the Max Planck Society. During his presentation Rojas talks about his experiences in 
selling the vision of autonomous taxis to the automotive industry and journalists. After 
mentioning the skepticism among car manufacturers towards self-driving cars, Rojas 
refers to Porsche CEO Müller, who publicly spoke out against autonomous driving 
in an interview. Rojas says that usually he would reply ‘What do the rich people do? 
First they hire a cook and then a chauffeur so that they can do other things during the 
drive.’ And Rojas adds, the CEO of Porsche must surely have a chauffeur at his service 
(Fieldnote 04/18/13).
58 “Ich denke nicht, dass Freiheit darin besteht, dass ich Gaspedal oder Bremse betätige. 
[…] Fragen Sie mal die 3 Millionen Autofahrer die in Mexiko-City jeden Tag unter-
wegs sind, ob sie Freude am Fahren haben. Die werden alle sagen, ich sitze lieber in 
einem Taxi, als diese Verkehrssituation zu erleiden.”
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Rojas discredits the CEO of Porsche as a hypocrite. By imagining a dialogue 
between himself and Müller, Rojas illustrates how he would argue for the 
benefits of being chauffeured over driving. He uses comparison to support 
his value judgment and draws on relations of power and privilege in a classed 
society to sell the vision. Autonomous driving is embedded in a narrative of 
emancipation of the masses.
Valuing being chauffeured over driving is a nihilation strategy (Berger 
and Luckmann 1991 [1966], pp. 132–133) that aims to make the driverless 
car vision resilient against claims of non-acceptance. By speaking on behalf 
of frustrated drivers locked in traffic and by associating being driven with 
class privilege, Rojas imagines drivers as rational individuals who maximize 
individual comfort. In this imagination, drivers prefer the comfort of being 
chauffeured over driving. Private car ownership and driver autonomy is 
positioned as the result of individual, rational decision-making. Consequently, 
automobility in its current form could lose its hegemony and attractiveness 
through the introduction of autonomous driving. It should be noted that this 
story figures driving and car ownership in terms of an instrumental relation-
ship that could easily be replaced by future modes of transportation. It reduces 
manual driving and car ownership to transportation.
b) Appeasing the audience
The following vignette is based on my fieldnotes from a final presentation 
and demonstration of a large public-private research project in the area of 
autonomous driving. At the two-day event I joined Michael in order to browse 
through the different subprojects and chat with their representatives. In the fol-
lowing vignette, Michael and a corporate automotive engineer reflect on their 
professional practice in communicating autonomous driving to lay audiences. 
Michael and an engineer from a major German car manufacturer talk about the accept-
ability of autonomous driving. They agree that it is necessary to familiarize laypersons 
with automation in a step-by-step manner. Michael adds that they usually point out 
to laypersons that autonomous driving will be an optional feature and not obligatory. 
There are people who are afraid of being patronized and of losing the joy of driving. 
(09–19–13 Tech Demo KOFAS: 27) 
Michael and the automotive engineer share a common imaginary. As experts 
and proponents of autonomous driving, they view automation as desirable 
and beneficial. However, they are also aware that not everybody shares their 
enthusiasm. Their hero-to-be can also be viewed by others as a villain-to-be. 
Michael tells the engineer about how he positions their project by anticipating 
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objections. This is a therapeutic strategy (Berger and Luckmann 1991 [1966], 
pp. 130–131). Michael argues that laypersons need time to adapt to autonomous 
driving, which is presented as a certainty. Laypersons will eventually come 
to understand that they really do not want to drive manually. To avoid asso-
ciating autonomous driving with emasculation, Michael presents a different 
vision of self-driving cars: advanced driving assistance systems (ADAS). This 
defensive tactic is to appease dissenters by affirming human control. Rather 
than rejecting objections altogether, fears are acknowledged and anticipated 
by adjusting expectations accordingly. As a result, prospective accounts of 
autonomous driving can be designed for specific recipients. 
Rather than making autonomous driving a technical default, Michael envi-
sions automatic functions as an optional feature of future cars. Comparable to 
present ADAS, such as adaptive cruise control, the driver will choose whether 
s/he engages in autonomous driving. As a result, autonomous driving is imag-
ined as an improved version of today’s cars, leaving manual driving with its 
externalities unquestioned. Instead of reconfiguring automobility through the 
bold vision of autonomous taxi, a modest version of ADAS is put forward.
c) Celebrating control and technical mastery
The third strategy celebrates human control and technical mastery rather than 
full automation or assistance. It tries to associate autonomous driving with 
more positive elements—such as playfulness, iPhone hype, mind control, and 
eye control—to communicate the project and to attract potential supporters. 
While the other strategy relies on imagination and projection to make the 
project and the research area meaningful, this strategy relies on demonstration 
to inspire imagination. The project produced a series of video demonstrations 
in which the research vehicle is controlled through extraordinary human-car 
interfaces.
The first interface they tried out was the iPhone59. The release of the iPhone 
had created a huge media hype at that time. This particular video demo shows 
how project members remotely control the car through an iPhone interface 
(brakes, steering, acceleration). At the climax of the video, a project member 
rides on top of the vehicle while controlling it with his iPhone (Image 15).
59 https://youtu.be/oHDwKT564Kk [Checked on 07/20/18]
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Image 15: Still from the video demo “iDriver – iPhone remote controlled car”
The idea was inspired by the James Bond movie Tomorrow never dies 
(Spottis woode 1997). In this movie the hero controls his car remotely via an 
early smartphone. 
Trying to ride the wave, the project continued along these lines using 
eye-tracker60 and a brain-computer interface61 (an EEG-headset). These 
video demos connect the car to off-the-shelf interfaces which have been 
developed elsewhere and which are meant to be used for gaming or for dis-
abled people. In particular, the brain-interface seems to attract journalists. 
Although very unpractical (only one out 20 members was able navigate 
the car in a reliably way), it seems to inspire imaginations of the future. A 
regular car, like the Dodge Caravan in the video, hardly symbolizes ‘the 
future.’ But mind controlling a car has ‘the future’ written all over it. Rather 
than making the driver expendable, these demonstrations are about reconfig-
uring the human-car interface by enrolling sophisticated human-computer 
interfaces. I argue that these videos, and particularly the one involving the 
iDriver, can be understood as compensating for the lack of human control in 
the driverless car vision.
This chapter has described the contestation of autonomous driving 
with respect to the issues of control and ‘joy of driving’. The chapter has 
uncovered the latent meaning that defending the status quo of automobility is 
60 https://youtu.be/0zbrySJVQ5A [Checked on 07/20/18]
61 https://youtu.be/iDV_62QoHjY [Checked on 07/20/18]
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simultaneously a defense of certain links between masculinity, driving, and 
cars. The iDriver and similar demos celebrate human control albeit through 
uncommon means. These demos link masculinity and technological skills—
with a slight but crucial difference. The power of ICTs is celebrated and thus 
computer scientists are the heroes. 
“Is your project a real project?”
Playful and entertaining demonstrations that celebrate technological mastery 
proved to be a successful strategy for creating awareness about the project. It 
succeeded in attracting journalists and potential project partners, and it sig-
nificantly boosted the project’s search rank. However, as Michael comments 
in the following interview excerpt, there is no connection between the video 
demo and the state of research (at that time) in autonomous driving. 
So it was just the video that provoked most of the attention, it was really simply driving 
a car with an iPhone. Because at that time the iPhone was relatively new, and so it was 
when there was this iPhone hype, then all of a sudden it’s like “OK, they programmed 
an iPhone control,” and everyone who more or less has a clue about it knows: OK, so 
if I practically have the option to control the car by computer, then to control it with 
an iPhone or access the steering, accelerator, brakes, just like that, […] but from the 
scientific perspective it was practically a joke. (Interview Michael 2/22/13)
Michael explains the success of the video by relating it to the hype of par-
ticular smartphones rather than to autonomous driving. Yet he is wary of 
misinterpretations. By watching the video, experts could construe an unde-
sirable image of the project. Michael does not see much scientific value in the 
demonstration because it does not contribute to their core competencies in the 
field of robotics. This is not artificial intelligence, this is plain engineering. 
A prerequisite for autonomous vehicles is that you can control the car with a 
computer. Once you have a computer controlling the car you can use any kind 
of human-computer interface to control the car.
In this final section I will describe how the heroic and playful video demos 
of controlling the car through different interfaces have produced overflow. 
Some members respond by mobilizing basic research as ‘new’ frame in com-
municating their project.
Celebrating human control and technical mastery in video demonstrations 
was beneficial for the project in terms of awareness but, as Michael already 
hinted, it also has its downside. In the following vignette of a Monday morning 
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team meeting, the project’s website62 is problematized and a call for action is 
issued. The project has become a victim of its own ways of communicating 
and selling robotics. 
The Monday morning meeting begins with Martin’s presentation of his ongoing 
PhD thesis, which evolves into a lively discussion of different suggestions and the 
potentiality of different approaches with several project members. After the discussion, 
Thomas—who to my surprise did not engage in the previous discussion—goes to the 
front, followed by Tim. Thomas introduces Tim by referring to Tim’s past involvement 
in updating the project’s website. Thomas says, this is about “representing the project in 
an adequate way.” He adds that new people have joined and that you cannot find them 
on the website. I think to myself, he does not mention the fact that half of the members 
listed on the website have already left, including one of the few female members. 
Thomas mentions that two years ago Stefan received an email from an international 
peer asking “is your project a real project?” This is because there are no publications 
on the website and the website has not been updated for four years. Tim puts emphasis 
on the fact that they are also really doing research here. Thomas and Tim ask all project 
members to send them short abstracts and a bibliography of their publications. Tim 
stresses the importance of everybody pulling together in the same direction. I am 
amazed by Tim’s choice of words. It sounds as if he anticipates resistance or inertia. 
Rojas joins in and demands that the videos of their trip to and through Mexico be made 
available. Michael interjects that first somebody has to edit the 100 hours of video 
footage. Rojas complains about the music. Michael says that he really liked the music 
and that Rojas had asked for it. Everybody breaks out in laughter and the meeting is 
adjourned. (Fieldnote 08/04/14)
The project is caught between audiences with conflicting expectations. Using 
heroic and playful video demos to excite lay audiences has, in the past, under-
mined their credibility as academic roboticists. The videos and their website 
have led peer researchers to doubt the seriousness of their project. Their 
innovation communication created expectations that came back to haunt them. 
Thomas and Tim argue for highlighting scientific achievements that would 
account for the professional skepticism among roboticists towards its demo 
culture (Chapter 4). Thomas and Tim want to take up a frame of basic research 
by presenting academic publications and ongoing work, such as current PhD 
projects on the project’s website.
62 This is how the website looked like before the meeting: https://web.archive.org/
web/20140529004631/http://autonomos-labs.com:80/ [Checked on 03/04/20]
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Rojas pushes for making their street trial in Mexico visible as a story on 
the website. The group was invited to present their car at several institutions 
in Mexico, including universities. This created opportunities to observe MiG’s 
performance under Mexican conditions—both in rural and in urban environ-
ments. Rojas’ suggestion narrates a heroic and bold version of the project. It 
positions the project as capable of constructing technology that can withstand 
“real world” trials. It emphasizes MiG’s capacity to drive autonomously rather 
than the project’s academic achievements.
After the update of the website,63 the video demonstrations were moved to 
“past projects.”64 The website’s menu was also re-designed. A new menu item, 
“Research,” features ongoing work, open theses, and publications. 
Complimentary visions
Autonomous driving is controversial: Will legislators and potential consumers 
accept it? What is the use of it? The members try to settle the controversy by 
visionary storytelling. Rather than promoting a single interpretation, the project 
embraces the multiplicity of autonomous driving both as a field of research in 
robotics & AI and as an emerging technology. In this chapter, we have heard 
the four stories and frames through which members make sense of autonomous 
driving: driverless car vision, ADAS, controlling cars through different means, 
and basic research. The driverless car vision is an element of the grander 
autonomous taxi vision which has been thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 2. 
In the second version, the project is portrayed as contributing to ADAS 
rather than to unsupervised autonomous driving. ADAS is not a substitution 
for drivers, rather it is aimed at making manual driving safer and—in the case 
of congestion, for example—it is promised to be more comfortable. The desire 
for and the appeal of human control is recognized, even if only as a means for 
making autonomous driving less threatening and more acceptable. 
The third strategy, i.e. celebrating human control through different means, 
neither promises assistance nor emphasizes the promised benefits of auton-
omous driving. This version, as I have demonstrated, draws on masculine 
images as a means of making the project seem exciting. The fourth version—
basic research—is a fallback strategy. It figures the project as contributing 
to the advancement of robotics and AI as a field of technoscientific research. 
63 https://web.archive.org/web/20141209011607/http://autonomos-labs.com:80/ [Checked 
on 03/04/20]
64 https://web.archive.org/web/20150207105404/http://autonomos-labs.com/projects/
past-projects/ [Checked on 03/04/20]
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If you put these different versions side-by-side, as I have in my report, it 
becomes clear that autonomous driving is framed and narrated as more than 
one thing. Its purposes and its figuration of cars and drivers/passengers are 
manifold. These different versions are not simply variations that relate to one 
another. They are complimentary, but also inconsistent, particularly in relation 
to the question of human control. We might take as an example the relation 
between the driverless car vision and the ADAS vision: if human control is 
seen as an obstacle for more efficient use of resources and safety, then the 
prospect of ‘optional’ autonomy undermines all these promises. 
Inconsistencies between visions can be attributed to the relentless search 
for meaning and purpose. In this chapter, I have presented four versions, 
but this is not an exhaustive list. In an effort to attract funding and potential 
partners, the project created additional frames of autonomous driving by 
imagining how a driverless car could be useful for potential collaborators—for 
example, driverless sidewalk sweeping for Berlin’s city cleaning service and a 
driverless surveillance vehicle to guard former Tempelhof airport (Interview 
Stefan 08/23/13). Multiple visions like these are not unusual, nor are they 
inherently malevolent. Ambivalence, as Singleton and Michael (1993) have 
argued, can contribute to the stabilization of networks. Brunsson (2006, xi) 
claims with regard to formal organizations that inconsistencies are unavoid-
able and they often do not pose a problem but the solution.
In the promotional materials of the project, such as the FAQ, you can find 
both versions—the bold vision and the modest vision—side-by-side. In this 
example, we can see how these two strategies and their respected visions com-
plement each other: a bold vision of the future to inspire a technophile audience 
and a modest vision to appease a skeptical audience of automobilists. They can 
be seen as answering to contradictory demands. The bold version answers to 
the need for radical change in urban transport and sustainable automobility. 
Those who are favorable towards automatizing driving can be excited about 
the imagined potentials of driverless cars. The more modest version of ADAS 
answers to a different demand—maintaining the status quo of automobility by 
promising to increase safety and comfort. The playful video demonstrations 
seem to respond to a demand for awe-inspiring technology. The different 
versions allow for different resources to be allocated. PhD projects are funded 
by the automotive industry and its suppliers for ADAS, peer researchers can 
take the project seriously as an endeavor in basic research while journalists 
and laypersons can be interested by the bold vision of autonomous taxis and 
entertaining demonstrations of technological mastery. Depending on their 
audience, project members may switch colors to promote their project. 
The classic promise of automatization is the liberation of humans from 
undesirable or dangerous work (Downey 1998). As we have seen in this 
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chapter, in the case of autonomous driving this promise is rejected by some 
audiences. A dystopian story has emerged which associates autonomous driv-
ing with emasculation. This story links acceptability of autonomous driving 
with human control over cars. Manual driving of cars is highly valued by 
those defending the hegemonic configuration of Germany, masculinity, and 
technology. Only a car that can afford masculine desires is an acceptable car. 
The project members, with their commitment to autonomous driving, find 
themselves on contested ground for automatization. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the project’s visionary stories and video 
demonstrations are not isolated but rather produced in relation to other stories 
and expectations. Visionary stories and video demonstrations are analyzed 
as an effect of different tactics and strategies of innovation communication. 
This is why there are multiple stories and demos of the project. The different 
versions are not free-floating. They have different degrees of substance as they 
depend on what project members can make the car do or what members can 
imply by hiding certain aspects.65
In defense of their project and research area, hopeful narratives are crafted. 
People living in cities are promised emancipation from the regime of auto-
mobility: Everybody will become privileged! Or, the dystopian narrative of 
emasculation is called into question by positioning autonomous driving as an 
optional feature. In addition, the group produces alternative configurations of 
drivers, cars and ICTs in the shape of heroic video demonstrations. These can 
be read as a form of compensation for the lack of human control in the driver-
less car vision. In these video demos, the figure of the driver is reinstated—not 
in its original form, with him/her on the steering wheel, but mediated through 
information technology. These video demos celebrate human control through 
unusual interfaces, although not without side-effects. Prioritizing excitement 
and visual effect over academic performance can have negative repercussions 
for the project’s scientific credibility among peer researchers. In order to 
counter these challenges a narrative of basic research is also mobilized. 
65 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of how the safety driver hides in the car or how a visu-





This study engages with the phenomenon of autonomous driving. It seeks 
to contribute to the recent interest in applying care as an analytical lens to 
the social studies of technology (Both and Cohn 2017; Cohn 2013; Denis 
and Pontille 2015; Mol et al. 2010; Singleton 2010). It takes the vulnerability 
and fragility of the visions and demonstrators as a point of departure. The 
study describes and analyzes the various ways of sustaining autonomous 
driving symbolically and materially within a university research project. It 
demonstrates that by maintaining the project—a sociotechnical assemblage 
of roboticists, visionary stories, and technological artifacts—its members 
perform specific connections between technology and masculinity. 
The study has investigated autonomous driving by engaging in ethno-
graphic fieldwork among the research project AutoNOMOS at the Institute 
of Computer Science at FU Berlin between June 2012 and November 2015. 
The window study (Czarniawska 1997, p. 65) scrutinizes autonomous driving 
by following a robotics project, which started in 2006. Market-oriented fund-
ing by Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research allowed the 
AutoNOMOS project to advance from ‘driving around in circles’ on enclosed 
training grounds to street trials in Berlin’s city traffic. The time window was 
opened by the ethnographer after the funding from the ministry had ceased. In 
this time period, the practitioners struggled to sustain symbolically and mate-
rially the demonstrator MiG, which serves not only as the project’s research 
instrument, but also its vision of driverless cars, which is embedded in its 
vision of autonomous driving. The demonstrators need maintenance, but the 
human members have needs, too. Grant applications had been turned down. 
With few funded positions left, many members abandoned the project to take 
up lucrative jobs in the industry. At the same time the project seemed active 
and thriving from the outside. The project had more interview and technology 
demonstrations requests from journalists then the members could fulfill. 
Public interest in autonomous driving really took off during that time. This 
created a paradoxical situation: While the project was struggling to continue, 
it seemed active and thriving from the outside.
Members of the AutoNOMOS project have subscribed themselves to 
tackling a complex and “new challenge” (chapter 2). To automate driving in 
the “real world”—as roboticists say—is different from doing robotics within 
enclosed and highly controllable environments. Nevertheless, the projects’ 
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approach relies on the “basic robotic paradigm” (Wang 2012, p. 21) which 
presumes that a robot can model its environment based on sensor data. The 
bold promises of AI and robotics claim that all human capabilities may be 
substituted by ICTs. Yet, MiG’s sensors do not ‘sense’ in human-like ways. 
Cameras do not ‘see’ in a human-like fashion. All these common anthropo-
morphic metaphors misconstrue the actual capacities of sensors. Rather, the 
sensors and cameras are the ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ of the computer scientists, who 
strive to make the most of MiG’s actual capacities. The resources researchers 
have at their disposal are quite limited; for example, laser scanners can only 
determine the relative position of objects in the vicinity of the vehicle and at a 
certain point in time. The limited affordances of the ICTs influence the ways 
in which members approach driving in traffic. Their approach places trust on 
the belief that driving can be formalized and compartmentalized into distinct 
scenarios and rules. The imaginary realized in the configuration of MiG is 
mechanistic. It seeks to control urban traffic by rendering it meaningful as a 
collection of isolated, rule-abiding, moving “obstacles” (Chapter 3) localized 
on a map of the road infrastructure. 
During street trials, uncertainty and ambiguity is produced by traffic, 
weather conditions, and unreliable technical components. The safety drivers 
perform a specific type of care. They take care of an assemblage, which is 
individualized into an agent. In diagnosis, project members try to construct a 
coherent narrative that explains MiG’s behavior. MiG becomes a character—
with a masculine pronoun “he”. 
For the Safety drivers, who operate and monitor MiG carefully, control 
is always precarious. The demonstrator’s capacities to master autonomous 
driving can be exceeded within “interesting situations” (chapter 3). Safety 
drivers skillfully remedy MiG’s deficiencies and irregularities. Safety driver 
interventions are not only a normal part of street trials, but they are really the 
‘tip of the iceberg’. The stressful part of being a safety driver is revealed in 
their stories; safety drivers continuously anticipate potential traffic situations 
that could evolve into an accident. They perform the invisible but necessary 
work of temporarily stabilizing the assemblage in an environment, which they 
cannot control. Care is necessary in order to make MiG’s imaginary of control 
work.
Street trials are sustained through the safety driver’s care of and intimacy 
with the research vehicle. Safety drivers are enmeshed with the assemblage 
in an affective bond. They are responsive by exercising perspective-taking. 
Safety drivers must reconcile the tensions between MiG’s idiosyncratic way 
of ‘understanding’ and responding to the ever-evolving surrounding traffic. 
Developing a ‘feel’ for MiG’s behavior patterns is calming for safety drivers, 
but it may also lead to carelessness. Safety drivers say that they ought to 
121
maintain a certain level of alertness and suspicion in order to stay responsive. 
To be able to care they must control themselves. This tension is complicated 
by the conditions of street trials. In street trials, safety drivers have no control 
over how other traffic participants will react to MiG’s behavior. MiG may also 
respond to literally anything and anyone in its sensor range in an idiosyncratic 
way. In order to care for MiG and anyone in its environment, safety driver 
may always resume manual control of the research vehicle. This creates an 
irreconcilable tension that safety drivers have to live with. If they care too 
much, MiG cannot control itself and they cannot evaluate and improve its 
performance. If safety drivers care too little, they might lose control of the 
assemblage. Control and care are linked in street trials. 
It might be tempting to conclude that the roboticists’ ideal of autonomy is 
not realized in street trials. Roboticist Wang acknowledges that autonomous 
vehicles are not autonomous because they rely on “external inputs” (2012, 
p. 18). Yet, this line of argument would presume that autonomy can be a dis-
creet property of system (Bradshaw et al. 2013, pp. 2–8). No being—human 
or otherwise—is simply autonomous. Autonomous agency is not contained in 
individuals or machines (Suchman 2007, p. 213). Rather, MiG exhibits agency 
not despite its lack of autonomy but because it is supported by a network of 
humans and nonhumans. 
I find it generative to ask whether this is actually driving and not something 
else. Computational enhanced automobiles certainly appear to drive within 
traffic, but their movements are “merely agented–responsive to conditions to 
satisfy goals” (Brown and Laurier 2017, p. 422). Being transported by MiG 
feels less like riding in a car and more like riding a tram with invisible tracks. 
There are elements of driving, such as embodied communication between road 
users, that escape the androcentric imaginary realized in the configuration 
of MiG. Driving in traffic is an ongoing sociomaterial accomplishment; for 
example, road users coordinate each other’s actions reciprocally (Juhlin 2010, 
p. 53–54). Responsible human drivers are “responsive to a background knowl-
edge of what maneuvers are thoughtless, polite, safe in traffic” (Brown and 
Laurier 2017, p. 422). Coordination is a local, situated activity (Juhlin 2010, 
p. 53–54). This is in opposition to how the assemblage performs ‘driving’ and 
how traffic registers from its ‘point of view’. For example, MiG’s maps pre-
scribe a stable backdrop for its behavior when encountering other road users. 
MiG’s access to the contingencies of unfolding traffic situations is limited. 
Critical computer scientist Agre (1997, pp. 27–48) argues that AI concepts 
and tools are figurative rather than descriptive. Early AI scientist McDermott 
(1976) argues in a similar vein that robotics and AI suffer from the malpractice 
of “wishful mnemonics”. For example, to attribute ‘understanding’ to a piece 
of software tells more about the aspiration of its programmer than the actual 
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capabilities of the program. This view suggests that autonomous driving is a 
metaphor, and specifically one, which serves to conceal that ICTs do not fully 
substitute for drivers. 
Masculinity
Feminist scholars have criticized classic studies of actor networks for their lack 
of attention to gender and for celebrating heroic innovators (Star 1991; Har-
away 1997; Wajcman 2004; Clarke 2005). Other feminist researchers promote 
ANT as a useful tool to avoid the reification of gender (Omrod 1995; Lagesen 
2012). ANT suggests to follow the actors and describe how they assemble 
their networks. But what if the actors we follow claim that their network is 
gender neutral (see Paulitz et al. 2016)? During my fieldwork gender relations 
were hardly a topic of conversation. The core team was all men, but its lack of 
diversity was never problematized in my presence. This posed a methodolog-
ical challenge: How can I describe relations of gender and technology without 
forcing my own categories upon the research material? My strategy was to 
closely examine acts of positioning in project member’s self-narratives and 
their efforts to defend autonomous driving against automobilists.
The project’s vision of autonomous taxis calls for an abandonment of what 
many drivers in Germany hold dear: Owning your car and driving it yourself. 
This creates a controversy where the potential acceptance of autonomous driv-
ing is at stake. Driverless cars appear to automobilists as completely senseless 
at best and as a dystopian, emasculating nightmare at worst. Project members 
respond to these challenges by e.g. drawing on class distinction rather than 
masculinity. Being chauffeured is associated with freedom and privilege, 
whereas manual driving is figured as a nerve-wrecking waste of time. 
In assembling gender, the computationally enhanced car plays an ambiv-
alent role. By bonding with a computationally enhanced automobile, project 
members articulate the world from the position of a driver. Being associated 
with an automobile creates tensions and uncertainties for the roboticists. Cars 
and their meanings are an ambivalent cultural resource for project members. 
MiG is unlike the humanoid robots they used to work with. Due to regulations 
and safety requirements, the computationally enhanced automobile cannot 
afford the same level of intimacy. To stabilize their identities as roboticists, 
project members tend to distance themselves from car modifiers, and car 
mechanics. By rejecting these available subject positions, project members 
separate themselves from the profane. As visionaries (Law 1994, pp. 79–80), 
roboticists aim for the ultimate goal—making drivers expendable by master-
ing driving through ICTs.
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By analyzing the talk-in-interaction during my fieldwork, I found that the 
symbolic link between masculinity and technological competence is iterated 
not despite but through denying expertise over cars. The subject position of 
the roboticist is constructed as a master of robots in general—not automobiles. 
The roboticist allows for a dismissal of the assumed masculine working-class 
affinity to cars as his/her interest in cars is mainly that s/he can control it 
through software. 
The subject position of the roboticist is often emplotted in a heroic 
narrative. Performing in—what roboticists call—the “real world” is what 
counts and serves as a means of distinction from other computer scientists. 
The “real” serves as a code for masculinity in the project. Frontier narra-
tives turn the mundane practice of street trials into a heroic proving ground, 
which is described as the “supreme discipline” (Chapter 4) of autonomous 
driving. Projects compete over who can first demonstrate certain capabilities 
and functionalities that have been deemed relevant for the realization of 
autonomous driving. To make a computational enhanced automobile with-
stand trials outside the lab or computer simulations is to prove oneself in the 
male-centered community. According to members’ own codes of masculinity, 
research vehicles are not only demonstrators by which approaches from AI 
and robotics are tested, evaluated, and improved; in this homosocial associ-
ation of male computer scientists, the research vehicle is also an instrument 
to test and measure masculinity. Research in autonomous driving creates a 
“playing field” (Chapter 4) in which conjunction and distinction among men 
is accomplished. Women are almost entirely physically absent; femininity as 
such is symbolically absent. 
Narrative
Safety driver’s practices and narratives of care co-exist with practices of 
visionary communication and narratives of mastery. Care is always relational, 
but so are narratives, stories, promises, and visions. They are the product of a 
relationship between roboticists and their audiences. Roboticists are spokes-
persons of yet-unrealized artifacts and systems (see Woolgar 1985, p. 566). 
Roboticists depend on storytelling to make their envisioned creations useful, 
meaningful, acceptable, desirable, and potentially feasible. Emerging technol-
ogies are characterized by a discrepancy between technology demonstrations, 
e.g. “proof of concept” or a physical demonstrator, and the envisioned working 
systems, such as a driverless car or a public transportation system of autono-
mous taxis. This gap is typically filled with promises and speculation (Stilgoe 
2018, p. 33). 
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Video demos are a medium in which visions can be narrated as if they 
were already realized. In these video demos, the enchantment of autonomous 
driving is achieved through “cutting the network” (Suchman 2007, p. 283). 
Video demos stage research vehicles as autonomous by masking the networks 
of humans and nonhumans of which they are necessarily a part. Video demos 
are performative, for “the videos create a record that can be reliably repeated 
and reviewed in what becomes a form of eternal ethnographic present” (Such-
man 2008, p. 148). These videos imply that what might have only worked once 
will work anytime, anywhere, and without the implicated networks of human 
and nonhuman actants. Video demos play a significant role in sustaining the 
promises of AI and robotics (Suchman 2011). These videos seem to provide 
visual proof of the ongoing existence of autonomous robots and of the feasi-
bility of the imagined futures. 
Visionary storytelling is not performed in a vacuum. In their quest for 
autonomous driving, members rely on available standardized technical 
components and established approaches to robotics, but they also recycle and 
reconfigure available plots and frames of meaning which are reconfigured 
in relation to specific audiences and in relation to competing frames and 
plots. Members tell complimentary visionary stories in order to immunize 
the promises against dissenters and to excite audiences about these visions. 
For example, members can appease automobilists by narrating autonomous 
driving as an incremental improvement of today’s automobility. Rather than 
taking the driver out of the control loop of the automobile, members promise 
that it will be up to the driver to decide whether the car is driven manually or 
autonomously. 
The roboticists in my study are skilled and versatile story-tellers. Project 
members have adjusted to the demand for expectation making and visionary 
storytelling. They might disagree over how the project should present itself 
(Chapter 6); to “play the drums” (Interview Rojas 07/13/15), however, is 
viewed as an undisputed necessity. The project relies on third-party funding 
to continue. Project members place hope on innovation communication to 
increase their chances for further funding and to influence regulators in favor 
of autonomous driving. The production of narratives is a crucial element of 
technological research practices. Innovation communication is not what comes 
‘after’ technological research but is rather integral to the very processes of 
innovation (Horst et al. 2017, pp. 892–893). 
There are ongoing conversations, within the humanities and social sciences, 
about material relations and material agency (Barad 2007; Ernst et al. 2017; 
Palm et al. 2018). These conversations are often labeled as New Materialism. 
It might be surprising that this study, which is based on fieldwork among men, 
cars, and computers, argues for the centrality of promises and storytelling in 
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autonomous driving. The fact that this study draws on more ‘traditional’ con-
versations, such as actor-network-theory (Mol 2010; Law 2009) and narrative 
analysis (Czarniawska 1997, 2004, 2008, 2014), should not be understood as a 
dismissal of New Materialism. In fact, the study shares with New Materialism 
an emphasis on and advocacy of posthumanist approaches. Nevertheless, I 
argue that nonhuman agency is not always the missing ingredient in the stories 
we tell about our objects of study. In some cases, one’s research topic may 
not be illuminated by putting emphasis on material agency. In regimes of 
research and innovation ’the technical’ is centered, “whereas ‘the social’ is 
separated out and relegated to the margins.” (Suchman 2007, pp. 269–270) To 
accomplish adequacy (Strübing et al. 2018, p. 86) with regard to autonomous 
driving, it is vital to strategically decenter nonhuman agency. To do otherwise 
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